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Abstract 
The thesis puts the key question – who sets the agenda of two policy issues, 
economic diversification and violent crime, in Canada and Australia? This question 
remains critical in current scholarly debates. Among the major actors, media 
seems to exert predominant influence, though the public has grown in influence 
with emergence of internet. Finally, academia and think tanks are also found to 
exert agenda-setting influence for some issues, often socially controversial issues 
and those with scientific uncertainty. This research analyzes the contexts of Canada 
and Australia for two policy issues – economic diversification and violent crime – 
over the period from 2008 to 2015.  
This research should contribute to agenda-setting theory in the internet era 
by defining the most vital actor(s) across the two countries based on longitudinal 
dynamics in attention. The methodology includes: using think tanks’ web-sites to 
collect trends in the number of publications as a proxy for attention dynamics and 
conducting the content analysis of these pieces; use of Scopus and Web of Science 
to trace scholarly articles as a proxy of academic attention, and analyze content; 
use of Nexis Lexis and Google Search to trace media articles, with content analysis 
of articles; and use of Google search (filtered for blogs) 1  and 
www.blogsearchengine.org to trace comments of the wider public on e-blogs and 
relevant media articles related to the two issues, and content analysis of these 
comments to develop context-specific patterns. Finally, LEGIS info database in 
                                               
1 Google has recently disabled its Blog search engine, so now it offers instead Google news search 
that can be filtered by specifically selecting blogs. http://searchengineland.com/google-blog-
search-now-within-google-news-search-202202 
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Canada and Parliament of Australia Search Hansard system in Australian context 
are employed in order to track policy-making activities, as measured through 
numbers of relevant bills and laws. 
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Chapter 1.Introduction 
 
The present thesis revolves around the agenda-setting stage of the policy 
process. Defined as the first and most critical stage of the policy process (Howlett 
et al. 2009) that determines its subsequent stages (Peters 2015), agenda-setting 
contributes to a more nuanced understanding of media’s role in society (Carragee 
et al. 1987, as cited in Rogers et al. 1993). Although this stage of the policy process 
generally involves a number of major actors, such as the public, interest groups and 
scholarly communities among others, it is largely media that appears to continue to 
play a predominantly vital role in setting policy agendas, as suggested by current 
debates in the field and literature review, although the public’s role has become 
stronger since the emergence of online resources, e.g. internet, and their increasing 
use among scholars. 
The current research attempts to clearly answer the key question of who sets 
the agenda of two policy issues, economic diversification and violent crime, as 
applied to Canadian and Australian contexts over the eight-year period from 
January 1, 2008 to December 31,2015 (Figure 1). The major actors analyzed 
include think tanks, and scholars, collectively constituting the expert community, 
media, as well as the public (as non-experts). The key reason for grouping the actors 
into these two categories is based on the large prevalence of non-experts, i.e. either 
media or the public, in setting policy agenda according to the literature review, 
while the role of expertise (as represented by scholars and think tank communities) 
remains unjustifiably ignored (see, for instance, Fuerstein 2008 with regard to the 
need to better empower epistemic actors in agenda-setting given the complexity of 
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governance). This research should contribute to existing theories: by using internet 
research tools and content analysis applied to the two policy issues in both nations, 
it seeks to identify: a) specifically the key actor(s) driving the agenda in this specific 
country context over the given time period, and b) generally identify relative 
prevalence of (non-)experts in agenda-setting.  
Figure 1 An overview of key actors in agenda-setting2 
 
       
 
 
Non-experts    Experts 
 
The research questions this thesis attempts to answer include the following.  
RQ 1: Who sets the agenda? To answer this mega-question, analyses will 
contrast experts versus non-experts: the former including scholars and think tanks 
for each of the two issues in Canadian and Australian context, and the latter 
including two distinct groups - media, and the public at large. 
RQ 2: Is the agenda-setting influence uni-, bi-, or multi-directional for each 
of the two issues over the time from2008 to 2015? For instance, media might be 
found to set the agenda directly influencing the public (non-experts), i.e. uni-
directional influence, or it may influence the public sentiments first, followed by 
                                               
2 Block arrows (      ) indicate assumedly strong influence, while line arrows ( ) denote 
weaker influence links 
 
 
Media 
Public 
Academia 
Think 
tanks 
Policymakers 
(Government 
agencies) 
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the public’s bi-directional influence back to media through feedback loops (hence 
the public’s medialized influence in agenda-setting, e.g. as in Neuman et al. 2014); 
it may also be multi-directional, provided that the public’s medialized influence 
extends to think tank domains as reflected by relevant policy publications.  
Furthermore, the research capitalizes on the inductive nature of the content 
analysis method (section 3.4 below) and analyzes some of the specific codes that 
should emerge in the research process, e.g. common and divergent patterns, as 
observed for each of the two issues. 
The following research hypotheses are suggested: 
1. Given the scientific uncertainty and technical complexity around the 
economic diversification issue, the public is expected to play a weaker role in 
setting the agenda for this issue, instead either academia or think tanks should play 
a stronger role. The role of media is expected to be intermediary, functioning as a 
framing channel through which influence signals are transmitted between the 
public, scholars and think tank communities, and policymakers. 
2. Given a high level of public attention and sensitivity with regard to justice 
and crime issues generally, as suggested by opinion polls in Canada3, either the 
public or media is expected to play a stronger role in driving the agenda for the 
issue of violent crime over the period. Scholars and think tanks, on the other hand, 
should play a moderate role, either largely responding to signals from the public or 
media, or exhibiting bi- or multi-directional (however still rather modest) influence 
back to the major actor(s). 
                                               
3 For instance, according to CBC surveys in 2015, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/vote-compass-
canada-election-2015-issues-canadians-1.3222945 
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1.1 Contextual background on both issues across Canada and Australia 
To begin with, the context related to economic diversification across both 
Canada and Australia largely combines low attention intensity shown by the non-
experts, i.e. media and the public, as well as government agencies, and higher and 
more systematic attention, i.e. with more regular patterns, as exhibited by the expert 
community (both think tanks and academia in the Canadian setting and academia 
in Australian context), suggested first by Quantitative analysis and then further 
reinforced by the Descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes (sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 on 
Canada and 4.2.1, 4.2.2 on Australia; see also the summary in section 4.3). Among 
a range of industry sectors as related to economic diversification discourse, all 
actors unanimously tend to emphasize the primary resource sector, followed by 
advanced industries, then services (Table 8, section 4.3). The predominant focus on 
primary resources entails two policy implications. First, it reflects the context of 
energy-rich economy’s dependence on primary resources; and secondly, the 
primary resource sector is perceived as the foundation for further economic 
diversification.  
Next, with regard to the major types of economic diversification, the 
attention trends exhibited by key actors across both country contexts follow a clear 
pattern, i.e. non-experts (the public, media) and government tend to emphasize 
market diversification policy, while the experts (think tanks, academia) mainly 
focus on higher-quality and research-intense product and industrial dimensions of 
economic diversification policy (Table 9, section 4.3). Not only do the non-experts 
and government focus on the (less technical) market diversification, but it is worth 
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noting both media’s and government’s strong motivation to reflect preferences of 
the public, i.e. media’s interest grounded in its ability to ‘sell’ digestible and 
somewhat sensational material to the mass reader while the government tends to 
develop policies based on the public preferences. 
Second, with regards to the violent crime context across the both nations, 
attention intensity somewhat varies across the country cases. In Canadian context 
the government is found to show low intense but regularly recurring attention 
cycles (Fig. 42) thus demonstrating resilience against external pressure even more 
so than in the diversification case, while media, on the contrary, exhibits 
unsystematic attention trends initially downward with a sensation-driven spike in 
2012 and then returning to the pre-shock level followed with steadily increasing 
trends. The public generally exhibits unsystematic attention intensity over the 
period, which resembles non-expert patterns. Furthermore, among the experts, 
academia also exhibits patterns similar to non-experts, with a spike around 2014 
(section 5.3). Finally, it is think tanks that exhibit systematically growing trends, 
with two distinct spikes around 2010 and 2014 (Fig. 45).  
The Australian context demonstrates a more coherent picture. All actors, 
except think tanks, largely exhibit increased attention toward the end of the period 
thus resembling non-expert patterns. This observation is then analyzed in detail at 
the content analysis stage (see section 5.2.3). Another interesting observation is 
possible correlation in patterns among Australian think tanks, media and 
government around 2014-2015 with a common theme being domestic and family 
violence cases. While media and government correlation may not appear surprising, 
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the correlation between government and think tanks is less obvious. This is because 
among think tanks a substantial part constitutes government-affiliated think tanks 
and research centers, while it is not the case in Canadian context (see section 5.2.2 
for details). Furthermore, while quantitative analysis suggests the tentatively 
stronger role of think tanks in driving policy agenda on violent crime across both 
countries, this is then disproved at descriptive analysis stage (see section 5.3. for a 
summary). Media though generally appearing less robust vis-à-vis think tanks or 
the public, exhibits relatively greater prominence in the Australian setting than in 
Canadian context both with regard to violent crime and diversification contexts. 
Thus the nature of policy issues does not seem to have an impact on variation in 
media’s intensity, though it is vital to note the (limited) tentativeness of this 
observation given small N of policy issues and country cases analyzed. Yet, the 
nature of issues influences interactions between government agencies and the 
public: the government is mostly referred to by other key actors in economic 
diversification context, while violent crime context emphasizes the public. The last 
prominent actor (though not an agenda setter) is the government: it exhibits 
systematic (i.e. as perceived by a range of actors, not just by a single actor) 
resilience specifically in Canadian context as applied to both policy issues. The 
Australian government, on the other hand, is found to express stronger preference 
for a partnership approach to strategically accommodating the agenda-setting 
interactions driven by the public in violent crime context and the private sector in 
economic diversification context (see Ch. 4 and 5 for detailed data analyses on 
diversification and violent crime, accordingly). 
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Finally, the contextual background description would be incomplete without an 
overview of the types of violent crime (please refer to Table 17 for a summary). 
First, Canadian context points to a correlation between media and public attention 
focused mainly on gun violence, while think tanks and academia correlate around 
murder and homicide policy sub-areas; government attention is left uncorrelated 
grounded in physical violence (which further reinforces the notion of government 
resilience against external pressure in actor-centric agenda-setting context). The 
Australian context suggests a correlation among government, media and the public 
mainly focused on domestic and family violence sub-areas (with physical violence 
being another important sub-issue within violent crime discourse), while think 
tanks pay greater attention to physical violence, and academia remains totally 
uncorrelated by attending more to alcohol violence and thus is often characterized 
as the ‘Ivory tower’. To sum, this section seeks to provide a brief account of 
contextual overview without detailed analyses in terms of who, among the key 
actors, actually sets the policy agenda on economic diversification and violent 
crime across both country settings over the time period (i.e. 2008-2015), which is 
the predominant focus of Ch. 4 and 5, especially in sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.3 (detailed 
content analyses of diversification policy across Canada and Australia 
accordingly), sections 5.1.3 and 5.2.3 (content analyses of violent crime discourse 
across both countries), and sections 4.3 and 5.3 with regard to summaries of three-
level analyses with regard to both policy issues.  
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Chapter 2. The Agenda-Setting Stage of the Policy 
Process 
 
 Public policy is a complex phenomenon. One of the popular approaches to 
analyzing public policy is to view it as a process or as a set of stages where policy 
issues tend to flow in some form of sequence from “inputs”, i.e. problems, to 
“outputs”, i.e. policy solutions (Howlett et al., 2009). This sequence of stages is 
often called the “policy cycle” (Werner and Wegrich, 2007). As outputs emerge, 
the policy cycle also embraces monitoring and evaluation activities. Its attention 
largely focuses on generic aspects of the policy process, not so much on concrete 
actors or institutions, or specific policy issues. Yet, most studies do not apply the 
entire policy cycle framework for their analyses, but instead focus on a specific 
stage of the process. As suggested by Howlett et al. (2009), the policy cycle model 
includes five stages: 1) agenda-setting, 2) policy formulation, 3) decision-making, 
4) policy implementation, and 5) policy evaluation. The present research 
predominantly focuses on the agenda-setting stage.  
Based on this model, agenda-setting is defined as the process in which 
policy issues (problems) arrive to the attention of government leaders. It is the first 
and most critical policy cycle stage that deals with the way policy issues emerge 
competing for government’s attention. This stage largely pre-determines the whole 
subsequent stages of the policy cycle and their outcomes (Howlett et al., 2009; 
Peters 2015). An agenda can be defined as the set of issues that government bodies 
will take action on (Cobb and Elder, 1972). Agenda-setting can be viewed as the 
“list of subjects” that government officials pay attention to, while their attention is 
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greater to some issues than to the others (Kingdon, 1984: 3-4). Thus the lack of 
guaranteed inclusion of a certain issue into political agenda is a function of the 
speed at which the issue moves onto/off the agenda (Peters, 2015). Placing a policy 
issue on agenda might seem rather simple, but in reality this is likely to entail 
significant mobilization of political resources. Such an “issue attention cycle” is the 
reflection of the unpredictability of public opinion, but also pressure exerted upon 
the government, which itself possesses limited time and other resources (Downs, 
1972). Since there are other events taking place concurrently in the economy and 
society that can attract the attention of media and/or government bodies, a given 
issue is unlikely to remain on political agenda for long. Policymaking at the agenda-
setting stage indicates the need for recognition of a policy issue. Such recognition 
means that a social problem needs to be clearly identified, and the need for 
government intervention is stated (Werner and Wegrich, 2007). 
2.1 Literature review: key actors in agenda-setting 
A major theme in agenda-setting is the role of key players in driving policy 
agenda, with the question posed: who sets the agenda? (see Table 1 below). 
Identifying the key actors in agenda-setting is one of the most central questions in 
modern public policy analysis (Rochefort and Donnelly 2013). As Daugbjerg and 
Pedersen (2004) note regarding agenda-setting, the nature of actors that initiate 
discussions of policy issues is a major force driving an issue from informal to the 
formal, i.e. institutional, agenda (as cited in Howlett et al., 2009). Neuman et al. 
(2014) specifically address the question of who sets the agenda in the digital age, 
and find that ties between media and the public often can be bi-directional. 
10 
 
Numerous sources still generally emphasize the stronger role of media over the 
public (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar and Simon 1993; Wood and Peake 1998 
etc. as shown in Table 1). Specifically, Soroka et al. 2013 emphasize the critical 
role of media in policymaking, which can be expressed through framing, or as a 
critical conduit between the public and elected politicians, assisting the public in 
conveying its messages to the government. 
Others emphasize the predominance of the public. For example, Margetts 
et al. 2016 note citizens empowered by social media tools to drive their collective 
agenda; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2013’s observation that when an issue gets 
into macro-political agenda, two factors – public opinion and party competition – 
become vital in driving policy change. Wlezien and Soroka 2016 refer to active 
voters as the type of public that matters most; Stocking 2015 links the emergence 
of internet to the growing role of the public vs. media in agenda-setting; Bonafont 
and Palau 2011 refer to the role of citizens in driving policy change etc. 
Furthermore, scholars increasingly recognize the role of netizens, i.e. the online 
public, or as “active cyber citizens” (as in Denham 2010, p.315) in driving their 
own agenda. Netizens and bloggers are viewed as independent agenda setters able 
to influence media, and by extension the public agenda and policy initiatives 
(Cooper 2006, as in Denham 2010). Netizens can react by offering comments to 
media articles and possibly affecting the following reporting of an issue (Denham 
2010), thus showing a bi-directional influence. 
A number of scholars suggest a strong role of academia and think tanks in 
agenda-setting, e.g. see Zimmerman 2016 on the role of think tanks in security 
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policies and Shaw et al. 2014 for healthcare; Ekayani et al. 2016 on the scholars’ 
role in driving forestry issues in Indonesia, Nisbet and Huge 2006 note scholars 
drive biotechnology issues in the US; Mintrom and Williams (2013) group US-
based think tanks as “watch dogs” and “idea brokers” (p. 6), depending on their 
political stances; Timmermans and Scholten 2006 on the scholars’ role in shaping 
immigration and reproductive technology issues in Netherlands; and Fuerstein 
(2008) raising the need to strengthen the role of epistemic knowledge to bolster 
governance decisions. Yet, some scholars further suggest the importance of other 
actors in setting agenda – international organizations in Kazakhstan (Mukhtarova 
et al. 2013); social media in Italy (Ceron et al. 2015); advocacy groups in the US 
and Eastern Europe (Copeland, Hasell and Bimber 2016; Bartlett and Pagliarello 
2016); EU Commission (Littoz-Monnet 2012); and political and public officials, 
both across the developing world e.g. Mukhtarova et al. (2013) on the role of 
president in setting anti-corruption agenda in Kazakhstan, and Benney (2015) on 
Chinese government’s promoting social stability; and various nations, both 
developed and developing nations (Wu et al. 2010; Wanta and Kalyango 2007; 
Wanta and Foote 1994). 
Table 1 A summary of key players in agenda-setting 
Key Players Corresponding author(s) Jurisdiction 
Media  
(non-experts) 
McCombs and Shaw 1972, Iyengar and 
Simon 1993; Wood and Peake 1998; 
Roberts et al. 2002; Kiousis 2005; Son and 
Weaver 2006; Tan and Weaver 2009, 
2010; Dunaway et al. 2010; Dursun-
Ozkanca 2011, 2014; Muddiman et al. 
2014; Weaver and Choi 2014; Vergeer 
and Franses 2015; Sevenans and 
Vliegenthart 2016; Brosius and 
US (10), UK 
(2), 
Netherlands 
(2), Belgium 
(1), Germany 
(1); EU (1); 
Malaysia (1) 
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Kepplinger 1990; Desmet et al. 2015; 
Mustapha and Wok 2015; Soroka et al. 
2013 
The wider public 
(non-experts) 
Margetts et al. 2016; Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen 2013;Lax and Phillips 2011; 
Wlezien and Soroka 2016; Delshad 2012; 
Majone 2010; Mukhtarova et al. 2013; 
Schucher and Bondes 2015; Luo 2014; 
Knecht and Weatherford 2006; Bonafont 
and Palau 2011; Stocking 2015; Brosius 
and Kepplinger 1990 
US (5), EU (1), 
Spain (1), 
Germany (1), 
Canada (1) 
China (2) 
Scholars and 
think tanks 
(experts) 
Zimmerman 2016; Shaw et al. 
2014;Ekayani et al. 2016; Stewart 
2014;Nisbetand Huge 2006; Norris 2011; 
Timmermans and Scholten 2006; 
Mintrom and Williams 2013; Fuerstein 
2008 
US, Indonesia, 
Canada, Italy, 
Spain, 
Netherlands 
Advocacy 
(interest) groups 
Copeland, Hasell and Bimber 2016; 
Delshad 2012; Bartlett and Pagliarello 
2016 
US (2), West 
Balkan states 
Social media Ceron et al. 2015 Italy 
EU Commission Littoz-Monnet 2012 EU 
International 
organizations;  
Mukhtarova et al. 2013 Kazakhstan 
Political 
parties/public 
officials 
Mukhtarova et al. 2013; Benney 2015; Wu 
et al. 2010; Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen 2013;Wanta and Kalyango 
2007; Wanta and Foote 1994 
Kazakhstan, 
China, France, 
African nations 
Source: The author’s own analytics 
 
As Table 1 suggests, two key players – media and the public – tend to 
dominate agenda-setting across various jurisdictions generally, followed by a 
moderate role of academia and think tanks, and weaker roles of interest groups, 
international organizations, social media, and policymakers. As Weaver and Choi 
(2014) summarize recent findings in agenda-building, there are five influencing 
factors for media agenda: news sources, other media, journalistic norms, 
unexpected events, and media audiences. Thus, three of the five factors are still 
13 
 
media-related, the fifth factor relating to the public, and the other one relating to 
events. 
Apart from analyzing key actors that set the policy agenda in specific 
contexts, it is also important to look at (often multiple) directions of agenda-setting 
influence they exert. For instance, Copeland, Hasell and Bimber (2016) with regard 
to same-sex marriage (SSM) issues in the US context, find that while generally 
media organizations tend to influence the public, the latter shows longer attention 
persistence to the issue than media. As news media attention on the SSM issue 
largely waned in Twitter within four weeks, the public continued to discuss the 
issue over seven weeks. While at the beginning, “a mutually reinforcing, 
multidirectional agenda-setting dynamic occurred among the public itself, news 
organizations, and advocacy groups…” (p. 3800), media organizations eventually 
shifted their attention, along with some members of the public. The rest of the 
public continued to discuss the issue well after it disappeared from media attention 
radars. Internet enabled platforms seem to offer opportunities to the public to 
continue their discussions even after media attention wanes. In another piece, 
Neuman et al. (2014) pose the central question of who sets the agenda in the digital 
era by analyzing attention trends of traditional and social media for 29 issues in 
2012, and found agenda-setting showing complex and dynamic interactions. 
Particularly, social media in contrast to traditional media devotes more time on 
socially sensitive issues, e.g. birth control, abortion and SSM, and public order 
issues, e.g. drugs and gun use, while it appears to spend less time discussing more 
technically complex issues such as economics and government policies. 
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Interestingly, blogs and discussion boards’ attention trends appear to precede 
traditional media attention spikes. Thus, in answering the key question, the authors 
suggest the possibility of “mutual and reciprocal causality” (p. 210). 
To summarize, the ongoing debates in agenda-setting literature prima facie 
suggest the importance of identifying key actors that set policy agenda in specific 
contexts. Although media continues to exert predominant agenda-setting influence, 
the public has grown in its power to set agendas especially in the internet era 
(Margetts et al. 2016, Stocking 2015). Furthermore, another group of actors – 
academia and think tanks – can also demonstrate agenda-setting influence 
especially regarding technically complex issues depending on context, e.g. forestry 
issues in Indonesia (Ekayani et al. 2016), immigration in Netherlands 
(Timmermans and Scholten 2006) etc.; as well as issues that involve scientific 
uncertainty, e.g. climate change (Stewart 2014), or biotechnology issues (Nisbet 
and Huge 2006). Furthermore, as analyses of Copeland, Hasell and Bimber (2016) 
and Neuman et al. (2014) suggest, it is important to look into agenda-setting 
influence through the prism of two-way and/or multiple directions. Thus who sets 
the agenda in a given jurisdiction on specific policy issues remains an interesting 
research question to explore. 
2.1.1 Review of agenda-setting publications in Australia and Canada 
To conduct the review, first, the author compared and contrasted Web of 
Science and Scopus databases. The search for Australia-related publications on 
agenda-setting over the period 2009 – 2017 returns 24 results by using Web of 
Science, and 35 by Scopus. The search for Canada context agenda-setting 
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publications over the same period returns 31 results by Web of Science and 28 by 
Scopus. These search-generated articles are further filtered for relevance, which 
leads to the final selection of 30 publications in Australia and 27 in Canadian 
context for analyses, while three publications focus both on Canada and Australia 
(thus, the total number of distinct published articles is 54, see Appendix 1 for 
details). The total numbers of publications for both nations per year over the period 
are outlined in Table 2 below. 
Table 2 Australia and Canada agenda-setting publications, 2009-2016/17 
Year Canada Australia Total 
2016/17* 6 4* 10 
2015 3 4 7 
2014 4 5 9 
2013 2 6 8 
2012 1 4 5 
2011 2 3 5 
2010 3 1 4 
2009 6 3 9 
Total 27 30  
*This includes 2 Australia-related articles published in 2017 as of February 20, 
2017. 
Source: The author’s own analytics 
 
As Table 2 suggests, agenda-setting research across Canada and Australia has 
recently gained increasing scholarly attention, i.e. since 2013 (with 8 published 
articles in both nations’ contexts) all through 2016/17 (with 10 relevant 
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publications, including 2 published over the first two months of 2017). A brief 
search, i.e. without filtering for relevance, of agenda-setting publications over an 
earlier period from 2001 to 2008 returns the following results: Web of Science 
produces the total of 20 pieces related to Canada (including 4 in 20084) and 4 related 
to Australia (including 1 in 2008) over the 8-year span; and Scopus offers the total 
of 22 published articles on Canadian context over the period (including 55 in 2008) 
and 11 on Australian context (including 2 in 2008).  
The publications collected over the 2009-2016 period for both nations can 
be divided into the following major policy areas analyzed 6 : Australia-related 
published articles tend to analyze health policy issues (11 pieces, including 3 on 
mental health, and 1 on obesity), climate change and environment (6 publications, 
including 2 on carbon pricing), mining (2), infrastructure development (2), and 
education, water, traffic safety and migration policies (1 publication each); while 
Canadian context publications encompass health policy (total 8, including 2 on 
mental health, and 1 on obesity), climate change and environment (5), elections (2), 
monetary policy (2), and forestry, water, food, infrastructure development, 
education, terrorism (9/11), internet gambling, and municipal policy (with 1 
publication for each policy issue). 
                                               
4 Further analysis suggests that one of the four 2008 articles identified by Web of Science is not 
much relevant to agenda-setting but to the decision-making stage of policy processes in Canadian 
context. 
5 Again, when filtered for relevance, the number of relevant articles in 2008 is 4 related to 
Canadian context. 
6 The total numbers of policy areas may not match the number of publications for each country 
since some papers do not explicitly focus on any policy area but instead analyze the role of 
institutions, a range of actors etc.  
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Regarding the methods employed, Canada-based publications use the 
following major categories7: content analysis – 12 publications (including 8 with 
qualitative and 4 quantitative analysis), discourse analysis (6), case study (4), 
interviews (4), statistical analysis (3), surveys (3), and experiment design (1). The 
Australia-related articles incorporate the following key research methods: content 
analysis – 14 pieces (with 8 qualitative and 6 quantitative content analyses), 
discourse analysis (6), case study analysis (5), interviews (5), historical analysis 
(4), surveys (3), statistical analysis (3), and network analysis (1). 
Apart from the major research methods used, many of the analyzed articles 
emphasize the roles of a specific actor (sets of actors) in driving policy agenda 
(Table 3). Both nations demonstrate the relatively prevalent role media plays in 
agenda-setting, more so in Australian context (e.g. Maeder et al. 2016, Lee 2015 
etc. in Canadian context; Baker et al. 2017, Wei et al. 2015, Mazur 2009 etc.). The 
wider public (including NGOs and citizens) appears to exert certain power, more 
so in Canadian context. Yet, another potentially strong actor, especially in the case 
of Australia, is the club of academia and think tank communities (e.g. Dykeman 
and Williams 2014, Walker and Rubenson 2014 in Canadian context; and Baker et 
al. 2017, Shannon and Smith 2015, Laws et al. 2013 etc. in the Australian case). 
These observations are generally in line with an overall overview of agenda-setting 
publications in Section 2.1 (Table 1). 
 
                                               
7 The total number of methods may be greater than the number of publications, since some papers 
use a combination of research methods, e.g. a case study and interview and/or survey etc.  
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Table 3 An overview of agenda-setting publications related to the contexts of 
Canada and Australia over the period 2009 – 2016/17 
Key Players Corresponding Authors Jurisdiction 
Media (8 publications) Maeder et al. 2016, Lee 2015, Walker and Rubenson 
2014, Hoffbauer and Ramos 2014, Ahchong and 
Dodds 2012, Sutcliffe et al. 2009, Mazur 2009, Ries 
et al. 2011 
 
 
 
 
Canada 
The public [including 
NGOs and civil society] 
(7) 
Raso and Neubauer 2016, Watson 2015, Hoffbauer 
and Ramos 2014, Kirchhoff et al. 2010, 
Contandriopoulos and Bilodeau 2009, Young and 
McCarthy 2009, Rex and Jackson 2009 
Academia and think tanks 
(4) 
Lee 2015, Dykeman and Williams 2014, Walker and 
Rubenson 2014, Ahchong and Dodds 2012 
Advocacy groups (4) Hopkins 2016, Dykeman and Williams 2014, 
Embrett and Randall 2014, Walker and Rubenson 
Government and political 
parties (4) 
Margulis 2015, Hoffbauer and Ramos 2014, Howlett 
et al. 2010, Ries et al. 2011 
Policymakers Keskitalo et al. 2016 
The private sector Keskitalo et al. 2016 
International law and 
international orgs 
Bernesteinand Naples 2015, Momani 2010 
Media (12 publications) Baker et al. 2017, Wei et al. 2015, Shannon and 
Smith 2015, Lankester et al. 2015, Prokofieva  and 
Clark 2014, Eagleman et al. 2014, Sgro 2014, Dixon 
et al. 2014, Wilkinson and Thelwall 2012, Lancaster 
et al. 2011, Hinchcliff et al. 2011, Mazur 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Australia 
Academia and 
think tanks (8) 
Baker et al. 2017, Whiteford et al. 2016, Shannon 
and Smith 2015, Laws et al. 2013, Crowley 2013, 
McEvoy et al. 2013, Lewis 2012, Hinchcliff et al. 
2011 
The public [including 
NGOs and civil society] 
(7) 
Walsh et al. 2017, Anker 2016, Watson 2015, 
McKnight and Hobbs 2013, Marsh 2013, Lewis 
2012, Battam and Johnson 2009 
Government and political 
parties (4)  
Baker et al. 2017, Shannon and Smith 2015, Marsh 
2013, Crowley 2013 
Advocacy groups (5) Whiteford et al. 2016, McKnight and Hobbs 2013, 
Crowley 2013, Hinchcliff et al. 2011, Battams and 
Baum 2010 
The private sector McKnight and Hobbs 2013 
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International law Bernestein and Naples 2015 
Source: The author’s own analytics 
 
To summarize, agenda-setting studies not only remain important in the 
academic contexts of both Canada and Australia, but these have relatively 
intensified in terms of the number of relevant publications since 2009, and 
especially around 2013-2014 (Table 2). In terms of the research methods employed, 
both nations demonstrate relatively high use of content analysis vis-à-vis other 
methods. In particular, content analysis is present in 12 Canadian-context 
publications (44% of the total number), and 14 publications related to Australia 
(47% of all publications). 
2.2 An overview of agenda-setting theories 
As the definitions of agenda-setting in Section 2 above suggest, the agenda-
setting process is the most crucial stage of the policy process (Howlett et al. 2009; 
Peters 2015) that involves issues competing for selected policymaking attention; on 
which the government will take action (Cobb and Elder 1972); and government’s 
attention is higher to some issues than others (Kingdon 1984), due to its limited 
time and resources that can be spent on attending to policy issues (Downs 1972). 
Finally, agenda-setting recognizes a vital power within the policy process, i.e. the 
ability to place certain items onto policy agenda, while keeping the rest of issues 
off the table (Mayo 2011). Such a detailed definition and interpretation raises a 
number of important points. First, it is the notion of conflicts, or the scope of 
conflict among various stakeholders, in shaping and defining an issue (or issues) 
that should be included into policy agenda (Schattschneider 1960). Second, it 
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suggests the need to specifically relate to issue characteristics such as significance 
for society and temporal relevance (Cobb and Elder 1983). A closely related notion 
is Kingdon’s (1984) three streams theory, suggesting that an issue is more likely to 
gain prominence on agenda if it is coupled by at least two of the three streams: 
problems, politics and policy streams. In their earlier work (1972) Cobb and Elder 
describe two types of agenda – systemic [issues defined as vital by political 
communities], and institutional, or formal, agenda that includes items explicitly 
selected for consideration by government. This theory based on Schattschneider 
(1960), views conflict within groups as a dynamic process. The third vital notion is 
the importance of tracking attention cycles to a certain issue, an ability to 
understand actors driving it into agenda, such as the public or media (Downs 1972). 
It is worth noting that three related notions - Schattschneider’s (1960) policy 
contestation, Kingdon’s (1984) three streams and Cobb and Elder’s (1972) group 
contestation as a dynamic process - are largely grounded on the assumption of 
actors interacting in a conflict and hostile environment that aggressively pursue 
their own agenda in a zero-sum context. An alternative framework, though not 
exclusively related to the agenda-setting stage of the process, is offered by Sabatier 
(1988) who developed the advocacy coalition framework which assumes that some 
actors may cooperate by forming coalitions to jointly pursue their policy goals and 
better protect themselves against external pressures from other actors or coalitions. 
Though undeniably Sabatier’s (1988) ACF is a step forward as it provides room for 
individual actors to cooperate, it remains to be built around the notion of group (as 
contrasted to individual) conflict-driven policy contestation. This comparative 
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account points to a vital gap within agenda-setting theories. Thus it is interesting to 
explore whether agenda-setting interactions among key actors necessarily always 
proceed in a zero-sum contested environment. 
The question of under what conditions (i.e. when and by what actors) and 
how certain issues emerge on political agenda has been of high interest in academia. 
However, most of the above described theories of agenda-setting still fail to answer 
this central question with sufficient precision. Schattschneider’s (1960) notion of 
conflict can only operationalize visible forms of political contestation between 
stakeholders and groups, while hidden conflict is largely ignored and which might 
indeed turn out to be more profound than the visible side of it. Similarly, Cobb and 
Elder’s (1983) notion of social significance suffers from a lack of clarity: not only 
is it challenging to specify the definition of and operationalize the notion of 
“significance”, but “society” is also a complex phenomenon, consisting of various 
groups (by income, ethnic composition, gender, age etc.). Furthermore, what seems 
“significant” today to an individual may not be viewed so tomorrow. Cobb and 
Elder’s earlier theory (1972) on systemic agenda also fails to include specific 
measurement methods, thus suffering from lack of operationalization (Loveridge 
1973).Furthermore, Cobb and Elder’s exclusive focus on interest group conflict 
assumes that other factors are ignored, such as the role of media (ibid.). Lastly, 
Kingdon’s (1984) three streams theory can be also hard to operationalize. Even if 
all three streams are coupled, it still remains uncertain whether/when an issue 
reaches agenda prominence. Finally, what exactly a “stream” includes remains 
incomplete (Howlett et al. 2013). 
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Next, as literature review (Section 2.1) suggests, a major current debate is 
regarding the identification of the role of major actors (e.g. who sets the agenda in 
the digital era?) in setting policy agenda for specific issues, with a focus on bi- and 
multi-directional ways of agenda-setting influence. Initially, in an attempt to 
answer the question of who sets the agenda, McCombs and Shaw (1972) developed 
their agenda-setting theory that posits the strong role of media (including editors, 
news staff and broadcasters) in setting political agenda. The essence of media’s 
ability to shape agenda can be expressed by borrowing Bernard Cohen’s (1963) 
quote: “the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to 
think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (as 
cited in Dearing and Rogers 1996, p. 2). However, since early theories primarily 
looked into one-way direction of influence in agenda-setting, the current 
scholarship recognizes the importance of context specificity, and the need to 
analyze multiple directions and reciprocal causality patterns. 
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Chapter 3. Research Methodology 
 
The central question is what actors set the policy agenda for specific issues, 
which needs to be empirically established in terms of contrasting the roles of 
scholars and think tanks (collectively referred to as “experts”), media, as well as 
the wider online public (non-experts) across two issues – economic diversification 
and violent crime – in the contexts of Canada and Australia over the period of 2008 
– 2015. The rationale for selecting this time span is driven both by relatively high 
internet penetration rates in Canada and Australia, i.e. around 75% and higher since 
2008 in the Canadian case (Table 4a), with more than 70% Internet penetration in 
Australia (Table 4b), and by relatively high scholarly attention to agenda-setting 
across these two nations since around 2009 (as Table 2 above suggests).  
Table 4a Internet penetration levels in Canada, 2005-2016 
 
 
Source: Internetlivestats.com (2016a) 
 
Table 4b Internet penetration levels in Australia, 2005-2016 
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Source: Internetlivestats.com (2016a) 
 
To trace attention dynamics of the public, both the content of e-blogs and 
readers’ comments to relevant media and think tank publications will be analyzed 
with the time span from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2015. The two sources 
of e-blogs are www.blogsearchengine.org and Google search (filtered for blogs). 
To collect and analyze mentions related to “economic diversification”, the 
following Google commands will be employed:  
- “econ* diversif* AND Canada” in English, and “diversif* économique AND 
Canada” in French will be employed, thus capturing online mentions among both 
English and French-speaking parts of population related to economic, or economy, 
diversification, or diversified economy, in the context of Canada over the eight-
year time period. 
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- “econ* diversif* AND Australia” in English will be employed, thus capturing 
online mentions related to economic, or economy, diversification, or diversified 
economy, in the context of Australia over the time span. 
On mentions for “violent crime”, the following commands are used: 
- the command “violent crime* AND Canada” in English, and “crime violent AND 
Canada” in French will be employed, which should capture blog-generated 
mentions of the issue within the umbrella of justice in Canada among both language 
groups over the time. Translation duplicates will be noted and reconciled, 
accordingly. 
- similarly, the command “violent crime* AND Australia” in English will be used 
to generate relevant mentions in Australian context over the time span. 
Next, Lexis Nexis will be employed to trace media publications for the two 
issues across two nations. It is a comprehensive database that offers adequate 
possibilities for searching a wide range of information coming from 45,000 sources 
(Lexis Nexis 2016), including media publications by source type, e.g. newspapers 
(see Figure 2 below). For instance, the search for news publications on “violent 
crime” in Australia for the period from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2015 by 
using the following command [“violent crime” AND Australia], returns 138 results 
with the “headline and lead” function, while the search for “economic 
diversification” in Canada returns 100 media pieces. 
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Figure 2 Lexis Nexis Interface 
 
Source: http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/ap/academic/ 
With regard to collecting data on think tanks, their respective web-sites are 
selected for analysis. First, the list of Canadian think tanks is composed. Among 
the major sources that list Canadian think tanks8, the information presented by 
McGill appears the most comprehensive, listing 60 think tanks (McGill Career 
Planning Service 2016). Among the 60 think tanks, some that are found to possess 
relevant publications and/or expert opinion pieces include Atlantic Institute for 
Market Studies9 (for instance, with 3 publications on economic diversification and 
5 on violent crime), C.D. Howe Institute10 (65 pieces on economic diversification 
unfiltered for the time period and relevance yet), Canada’s Ecofiscal Commission11 
(3 on economic diversification) etc. This preliminary analysis suggests that there 
                                               
8http://www.hillwatch.com/pprc/think_tanks.aspx 
http://guides.library.ualberta.ca/think-tanks/canadian-a-c 
https://www.mcgill.ca/caps/files/caps/guide_canadianthinktanks.pdf 
9http://www.aims.ca/ 
10https://www.cdhowe.org/ 
11https://ecofiscal.ca/ 
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should be a greater number of relevant think tank publications to be identified as a 
result of further search. 
Scopus and Web of Science databases are employed to generate numbers of 
academic publications on each of the two policy issues over eight years (see Section 
3.3 below on the rationale for selection). Any repetitive or duplicated pieces across 
both databases will be filtered, accordingly. These datasets serve as a proxy for 
scholarly attention 12  to the two issues. For instance, to generate mentions on 
“violent crime” in 2008-2015, the following command is used: “violent AND crime 
AND Canada” (Figure 3), which returns 75 results, while a similar search for 
Australia results in 64 documented publications over the period, unfiltered for 
relevance yet. Regarding economic diversification in Australia, the following 
command is employed: “economic OR economy AND diversification AND 
Australia”, with Scopus search returning 75 results, unfiltered for relevance. 
Similar commands are used for Web of Science. 
Figure 3 Scopus interface
 
                                               
12 It should be noted that given the nature of academic research, most sources tend to cite other 
academic articles and books rather than refer to other actors e.g. media. Still, due to triangulation 
of actors with a range of actors involved, this should not pose a critical issue for this research. 
28 
 
Source: Scopus (2017) 
Last (but not least), to trace policymakers’ attention trends in the context of 
two nations, LEGIS info parliamentary legal database is employed for Canada 
(Parliament of Canada, 2016), and Search Hansard Parliamentary document 
database for Australian context (Parliament of Australia, 2017) as the major sources 
of legislative activity with the time span from January 1, 2008 through December 
31, 2015. The purpose is to generate data on the number of each of the two policy-
related bills adopted over the period. The data collected serve as a proxy for 
government’s attention to the issues, which will be aggregated to observe its 
relation to the trends of public and media attention, as well as think tanks and 
academia attention trends. 
Once data are collected, these will be used, first of all, to assess the agenda-
setting influence of experts versus non-experts as measured in terms of temporal 
sequence of attention dynamics. Second, attention dynamics of each actor will be 
analyzed to see which of the key actors precede the attention of the rest in terms of 
temporal sequence. This analytical part is based on quantitative analysis with the 
goal to measure the number of mentions by each actor over the time span. At the 
third stage, qualitative content analysis will be employed to generate a set of nodes 
as suggested by the inductive nature of NVivo. As suggested by Dyussenov (2017), 
some of the nodes may include common themes such as definitions of policy issues, 
the industries in which actors pursue policy (or suggest the need thereof), causal 
links and effects, key actors (i.e. what actors are found to influence a specific actor, 
such as media employing a definition first developed by academia, or using a 
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reference to an academic study to present their story to wider audience), and policy 
recommendations. Given the inductive nature of NVivo content analysis, specific 
nodes and codes may differ depending on how analysis evolves.  
To cite another relevant example of using (Internet-based) content analysis 
to assess an impact of one actor on another, Cottiero et al. (2015) in light of the 
conflict in Ukraine analyze the content of a government-controlled TV show in 
Russia and assess its impact on the online public. They first identify key frames as 
employed by Kremlin through a state-run TV program as related to the conflict 
(ibid). Second, the power of Kremlin’s public agenda-setting impact based on use 
of frames is assessed (ibid). This is done by collecting data based on search results 
of Yandex and Google, two most popular search engines in Russia as a proxy for 
public salience toward the issue, i.e. Ukraine crisis (Cottiero et al. 2015). Their 
findings show government’s mediatized influence on the public, as measured by 
online searches of netizens; the Internet then provides new terms and concepts the 
Kremlin could not develop, hence demonstrating agenda-setting influence in a 
continuous loop (ibid).Indeed, Russian political leaders cannot always clearly 
define concepts that would influence the public, thus the government can 
effectively take advantage of (online) crowd-sourcing by using the net as a source 
of new ideas (ibid). 
3.1 Country and Policy Issue Selection 
The literature review raises a number of important points. First, most 
agenda-setting studies tend to analyze the US context (e.g. McCombs and Shaw 
1972, Roberts et al. 2002) and some the EU generally, or specific member states 
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(e.g. Margetts et al. 2016, Sevenans and Vliegenthart 2016 etc.), while much of 
developing nations, as well as some of developed states, remain largely ignored. 
Second, since the thesis relies on using online research tools, i.e. the Google search 
engine for tracing blog content and Nexis Lexis for media publications, an important 
criterion is a relatively high internet penetration rate in a given nation 
(Internetlivestats.com 2016a), as an effort to ensure an adequate level of objective 
representation of population online and to address the issue of digital divide 
(Section 3.3). Thus, both Canada and Australia appear to be good examples to 
explore. First, these nations remain significantly less investigated analytically vis-
à-vis other developed nations, such as the US and UK13. Second, their internet 
penetration rates have been more than 70% since 2008 (Tables 4a, 4b), with around 
85-90% as of 2015, compared to the comparable level in the US (88%), 92% in the 
UK, 86% in France, and 85% in Korea (Internetlivestats.com 2016a). 
While it would be desirable to include some developing nations into 
research, the persistent issue of digital divide still remains (see Section 3.3 below 
for details). Since the research involves internet methods for collecting and 
analyzing data, nations with relatively high internet penetration rates should be 
selected [see, for instance, Ripberger 2011 on digital divide in the US around 2009-
2010 when the internet penetration rate was 71%, according to 
Internetlivestats.com (2016a)]. 
                                               
13 Scopus search for agenda-setting publications over 2009-2015 suggests 103 pieces in US 
context, 43 in UK, 23 (English only pieces) for Germany, while Canadian and Australian cases 
show 21 and 28, accordingly. 
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Furthermore, the most common approach in social science research is 
adopting the most similar system design (Przeworski and Teune, 1970), specifically 
two-party system nations of the Anglo-Saxon world are good cases as these possess 
common economic, political and socio-cultural traits, making it easier to control 
for any differences that might be found in analyses. In his work, Ragin (1987) well 
describes the merits of comparative research methods based on a case-centered 
approach as distinct from quantitative research: the ability to capture complex 
patterns of phenomena driven by multiple causes; reflect comparability of 
countries, their cultural and geographical context. “Comparative social science… 
has a long tradition of qualitative work that is stronger and richer than its 
quantitative counterpart” (Ragin 1987, p. viii). Scholars tend to limit analyses to 
country cases that are “as similar on as many theoretically relevant variables as 
possible” (Ragin 1987, p.47). Similarly, George and Bennett (2005) note that the 
most widely known method in comparative research design is “controlled 
comparison”, grounded on the notion of contrasting “most similar” cases 
comparable in all respects except a single (independent) variable that can plausibly 
explain variation in outcomes of the dependent variable (p.81). Furthermore, the 
use of qualitative software provides better analytical transparency creating an 
“audit trail” to see how specific findings had been acquired (Byrne and Ragin 2009, 
p.6). As King et al. 1994 note, qualitative research is based on depth analysis of 
historical materials, rather than what Ragin (1987) refers to as to simply eliminating 
“perplexing elements” of causal complexity typical of statistical analysis (p.32). 
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On the other hand, the most similar system design possesses certain 
weaknesses. These include: its limited ability to compare large N of cases and thus 
generalizability of findings (Ragin 1987; Anckar 2008), and selection bias (George 
and Bennett 2005). To address the issue of a smaller number of cases (i.e. one or 
few, as in King et al. 1994) and limited generalization, George and Bennett (2005) 
suggest testing contingent generalizations, depending on cultural context, timing, 
and geography. It is possible to test cases beyond the defined scope to see if 
conditions can be extended. As George and Bennett conclude, case study findings 
can be used to “incrementally refine… contingent generalizations”, either by 
broadening or narrowing their scope or introducing new types and subtypes through 
the inclusion of additional variables” (p.124). Generalization can be improved by 
using qualitative software, e.g. NVivo, being modeled on code-based rather than 
case-based approaches to analysis. This contributes to the issue of generalization 
by identifying ties and processes across various contexts (Byrne and Ragin 2009). 
Finally, regarding the presence of selection bias,(George and Bennett 2005), it is 
important to provide a careful procedure for selecting cases. For this research, two 
country cases – Canada and Australia – are selected, first driven by the most similar 
systems design – Westminster systems combined with democratic governments, 
large territory, energy rich (hence the relevance of economic diversification), and 
secondly, driven by adequate access to the internet.  
When selecting the time span for analysis, two polarizing methodology 
issues merit consideration. On one hand, digital divide issues (e.g. Ripberger 2011, 
Dunleavy et al. 2006, Margetts et al. 2016) restrict a time frame to a more recent 
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span, i.e. since around 2012-2013, when the internet penetration rate in Australia 
was 79-83%, as in Table 4b above. On the other hand, as suggested by Sabatier 
(1988) at the time when Internet had not been used in research yet, analyzing policy 
change and subsystems require a decade or so. Thus, the 8-year span from 2009 to 
2015 is selected: it is closer to a decade, yet largely avoids the issue of digital divide. 
The year 2016 is excluded due to potential noise that stems from two political 
events: new government in Canada elected in late 2015 under Prime Minister 
Trudeau and the election of Trump as US President in 2016. 
Two policy issues are selected for analyses – economic diversification, and 
violent crime. Economic diversification is relevant for two primary reasons. First, 
economy generally is the most important issue according to public opinion polls in 
2015 in Canada (CBC News 2015) and Australia (Roy Morgan Research, 2015). 
Second, both nations are resource-rich, with certain reliance on natural resources to 
boost their economies (see Figures 4 and 5 below). Mining and petroleum 
extraction constitutes 8% of Canada’s GDP as of 2016, being the third largest  
industry (InvestorsFriend 2016). Furthermore, as outlined in Figure 5, the mining 
services and production sector within Australian economy constitutes 7.2% of its 
annual industry volumes in 2010-2011, and combined with agriculture, forestry and 
fishing these extracting industries form 9.6% in 2010-2011 (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2012). 
Figure 4 Canada’s economic diversity, 2014 (top 7 sector components) 
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Source: Canadian Northern Economic Development 2016 
 
 
Figure 5 Value of goods and services in Australian industry, 2012 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012 
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Next, it is important to describe the rationale for choosing violent crime (as 
a sub-issue of justice and general crime) to analyze. The level of public perception 
of violent crime has recently grown in both Canadian (Roberts, 2004) and 
Australian (Weatherburn, 2016; Davis and Dossetor, 2010) contexts. Although 
Canadians are generally more positive than negative in terms of confidence in the 
justice system (46% versus 32%), this is not a high positive balance, with a 
significant minority feeling insecure about crime (Roberts, 2004).In 1991-2001 
actual crime rates in Canada declined (Wallace, 2004). However, in 2002 only one 
Canadian in 10 believed the rates had indeed declined, while a third believed the 
rates had grown (Ipsos-Reid, 2002). Another widely held perception is that the 
government lacks interest in justice system reform, instead merely reacting to 
signals from other key actors such as media (Correctional Service Canada, 2015). 
Yet, the Canadian public rejects media’s strong role in shaping their attitudes to 
crime, believing instead that growing violent crime is real, not due to media 
(Department of Justice, 2015). Similarly, Australian context shows mismatch 
between public perception and actual crime rates. As Weatherburn (2016) notes, 
Senate candidate for Queensland in her recent speech stressed the increasing public 
insecurity toward crime and street safety, although with regard to violent crime 
specifically research suggests that in the last 15 years murder rates decreased from 
1.6 per 100,000 in 2000 to 1.0 per 100,000 in 2014; assault rates declined from 
3.1% of Australians aged over 15 in 2008-09 to 2.1% by 2014, according to the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (as cited in Weatherburn, 2016). The actual number 
of crimes reported was lower in 2007 than 1998 in the violent crime categories of 
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homicide and robbery (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008, as cited in Davis and 
Dosseter, 2010). As in the Canadian case, media seems to exert certain influence 
shaping public (mis-) perception of violent crime in Australia. As Justice Action 
(2016) notes, crime, justice and media have long been intertwined, because crime 
serves as a fertile ground for media publications, with 35% of news produced on a 
daily basis, and media ideas and narratives have an impact on public opinion. 
To summarize, both nations present interesting cases to explore. First, with 
abundant natural resources and thus relying on mining industries for economic 
development, Canada and Australia should further economic diversification to 
ensure longer-term sustainability. Second, both demonstrate a striking mismatch 
between public perception of violent crime and actual rates, fueled by media and 
politicians. It is thus relevant to analyze who actually sets the agenda for these two 
policy issues. 
3.2 The Research Questions (RQs), Hypotheses, and Variables 
This thesis will attempt to answer the following research questions.  
RQ 1: Who sets the agenda? To answer this mega-question, analyses will 
contrast experts versus non-experts: the former including scholars and think tanks 
for each of the two issues in Canadian and Australian contexts, and the latter 
including two distinct groups - media, and the public at large. 
RQ 2: Is the agenda-setting influence uni-, bi-, or multi-directional for each 
of the two issues over the period from2008 to 2015? For instance, media might be 
found to set agenda directly influencing the public (non-experts), i.e. uni-
directional influence, or it may influence the public sentiments first, followed by 
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the public’s bi-directional influence back to media through feedback loops (hence 
the public’s medialized influence in agenda-setting, e.g. as in Neuman et al. 2014); 
it may also be multi-directional, provided that the public’s medialized influence 
extends to think tank domains as reflected by relevant policy publications and/or 
opinion pieces.  
Furthermore, the research will capitalize on the inductive nature of the 
content analysis methodology (see Section 3.4 below) and analyze some of the 
specific codes that should emerge in the research process, e.g. common and 
divergent patterns, as observed for each of the two issues analyzed. 
The following research hypotheses are suggested: 
H1. Given the highly technical nature of and scientific complexity around 
economic diversification, both the public and media in both countries are expected 
to play a weaker role in setting the agenda for this issue, instead either academia or 
think tanks should play a stronger role. The role of media is expected to be 
intermediary, serving as a framing channel through which signals are exchanged 
between the public, scholars and think tanks, and policymakers. 
H2. Given to the lower technicality and complexity of violent crime in terms 
of public perceptiveness, it is the public and media that are expected to play a 
predominantly stronger role in driving the agenda for this issue across both 
jurisdictions. Scholars and think tanks should play a moderate role, either 
responding to signals from the public or media, or exhibiting bi- or multi-directional 
(however still rather modest) influence back to the major actor(s).Thus, the key 
variables employed throughout the research are as follow:  
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- Regarding H1, independent variables include the degree of technicality of 
the issue, and the following actors – academia, and think tanks – acting as agenda-
setters. The dependent variables include the following: attention dynamics, as well 
as the following actors – media, the public, and government – whose agendas are 
expected to be shaped by the two independent actors 
- Regarding H2, independent variables are the degree of technicality of the 
issue, and the following actors – media and the public. The dependent variables are 
attention dynamics for each actor, as well as the following actors – academia, think 
tanks, and the government – whose agenda are expected to be shaped by the agenda-
setters. 
Finally, the following units of analysis are utilized for the present research: 
“online article”, or “e-document” identified in the process of using the Google 
search engine to track media attention; “e-blog post, or comment” to track the 
public’s attention online; and “publication” or “abstract, or summary” to track 
academia and think tanks’ attention for each of the policy issues analyzed. It should 
be noted here that the use of these units of analysis is not novel. For instance, 
Murray (1991) analyzed e-documents used for person-to-person (online network) 
interactions, and developed cognitive and context-specific strategies to write 
personal computer documents in a study of an IBM manager and his staff (as cited 
in December 1996). To cite more recent examples, Schafer, Ivanova and Schmidt 
(2014) track news coverage of climate change issues across Australia, Germany, 
and India by using news articles as a unit of analysis. Similarly, Lorcher and 
Neverla (2015) analyze climate change attention dynamics of online German news 
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media by using news samples derived from “Spiegel.de” and “Welt.de”, as well as 
readers’ comments (both on news websites and e-blogs) as units of analysis. 
Furthermore, Anderson, Brossard and Scheufele (2012) track the attention cycle of 
(online and print) media coverage of an academic publication on the lethal case of 
Chinese workers resulted from lung damage and exposure to nano-particles, in 
which they find that while traditional print media produces negligible mentions of 
the event, online media devotes greater attention measured in terms of news 
coverage. The article also suggests that online media may follow its own attention 
cycle vis-à-vis print media with regard to controversial events driven by academia. 
This also raises an important implication for the present research, i.e. regarding the 
possible use of academic publications as a unit of analysis, in this case for tracing 
academic attention over time. 
3.3 Rationale for using Google, Blog Search, Scopus, and Web of Science 
As mentioned earlier, the two sources of e-blogs as the proxy for tracing 
public attention are www.blogsearchengine.org and Google search (filtered for 
blogs). The former is chosen with the purpose of triangulating data retrieved from 
Google (blog) search. According to its website, it is offered as the “ultimate source 
for searching blogs online” (Blog Search Engine 2016). It also appears first in the 
Google list of blog engines as a result of searching for “blog search engine”. The 
other blog search engine employed is the Google search engine itself, as filtered for 
blogs. While Google search possessed 65% share of total worldwide search volume 
as of December 2012, in 2016 its share increased to 78% (Internetlivestats.com 
2016b). 
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Apart from remaining the most popular search engine, there are numerous 
academic sources that use Google search, and related tools such as Google Insights, 
for scholarly research. Ripberger (2011) developed a new indicator on public 
attention based on using Internet search tools. The vast volumes of real-time 
information and data on the Internet may serve as a close proxy about how mass 
communication and the public interact in political systems. In particular, the Google 
search engine is found to be a valid indicator of public attentiveness. Lee, Lee and 
Choi (2016), using Google-search queries, empirically establish that internet 
research data reflect attitudes of users, with a positive relationship between suicide 
rates and past orientation. McCallum and Bury (2013), using Google Insights and 
Google Trends as a proxy for public attention to 19 environment issues over 2001-
2009, find general decline of public interest to these issues, except climate change. 
As Cacciatore et al. (2012) conclude, the (online) search engine now serves as the 
“most useful” and “easily accessible” source (p. 1043), allowing access both to 
traditional media content, and online media. 
To summarize, the rationale for using Google search as a research tool 
appears well validated by existing literature, highlighting its use as a proxy to 
measure public attention, easy access to wide (online) population without borders, 
and relative flexibility in terms of time span. It is also important to raise certain 
limitations. As Ripberger (2011) notes at that time i.e. around 2010 in US context, 
regarding representation of internet users, these are more likely to be young, white, 
well educated, and wealthy individuals. The primary concern, therefore, is about 
minority population, the elderly, poor, and uneducated who are more likely to be 
41 
 
systematically underrepresented when using this tool, leading to potentially biased 
findings and data. The persistent importance of digital divide is also noted by others 
(e.g., Dunleavy et al. 2006, Margetts and Dunleavy 2002, Margetts et al. 2016). 
Margetts and Dunleavy (2002) noting slow penetration of e-communication 
systems into UK civil service, analyzed the obstacles in developing e-government, 
and identified cultural barriers that lie at the heart of resistance to new systems. 
They offered ways to overcome these, e.g. incentives for change to civil servants, 
and providing citizen benefits to encourage an uptake of e-government services. 
Dunleavy et al. (2006) observed that while NPM was popular in 1980s-1990s, by 
mid-2000s it had stalled, and the post-NPM regime is based on digital-era 
governance, entailing the digitalization of administrative processes. Margetts et al. 
2016, note that even in today’s world digital inequality still remains, with wealth, 
education, and parental socialization being vital factors (also Ripberger 2011). 
Since the focus of the book is studying collective action in the internet era, this 
assumes predominant attention falling onto (online) social media users, i.e. 
economically privileged. Such a focus is justified by the goal to define trends in 
modern collective action “in the context of still-rising Internet penetration…” 
(Margetts et al. 2016, p. 216). 
Adopting a similar approach, the major aim of this thesis is to trace trends 
in online attention to relevant issues by experts (think tanks and scholars), non-
experts (public at large and media), and the government, with an implicitly assumed 
focus on online users, i.e. netizens, in Canada and Australia. Internet penetration 
rates in Canada remain high at nearly 88% as of 2015 vis-à-vis 83% in 2012 (as in 
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Table 2 above), while Australia demonstrates similar penetration levels e.g. 85% in 
2015 and nearly 80% in 2012.Thus the issue of digital divide increasingly becomes 
less relevant.  
Regarding the selection of Scopus, it appears the most comprehensive 
online repository of scholarly publications that includes quality data and 
comprehensive content along with analytic tools that allow a researcher to track, 
analyze and visualize research. It is viewed as a repository of “interdisciplinary 
content that covers the research spectrum” (Elsevier 2016). Scopus includes some 
21,500 peer-reviewed journals, and also articles in publication (ibid). While other 
academic databases, e.g. Web of Science and Google Scholar also exist, Scopus 
contains more than 20,000 publications vis-à-vis Web of Science, for instance, with 
13,000 pieces (University of Washington Health Sciences Library 2016). Falagas 
et al. (2008) referring to medical databases, note that Google Scholar suffers from 
inconsistent accuracy, inadequate and less often updated citations. Scopus offers 
20% more coverage vis-à-vis Web of Science, although is limited to recent articles, 
i.e. published since 1995. Overall, Scopus seems the most comprehensive 
depository, with a wide range of social science articles. Thus, to triangulate 
academic publication data, both Scopus and Web of Science databases will be 
employed for collecting the data. 
Finally, briefly regarding the selection of LEGIS info and Search Hansard 
Legislation Register systems to track policymaking activities, these are the largest 
official databases in Canadian and Australian contexts, respectively. Established as 
a result of collaboration of Canadian Senate, House of Commons and the Library 
43 
 
of Parliament, LEGIS info serves as a comprehensive research tool for relevant law 
details in parliament (Parliament of Canada 2016). Information is available for each 
bill and contains details on the passage of each bill through the Senate and House 
of Commons, full text and summaries, votes, major speeches, dates and other 
details on coming into force data, and press-releases (ibid). The Australian 
Legislation Register, run by the Office of Parliamentary Counsel under the 
umbrella of the Legislation Act 2003, is a comprehensive whole-of-government 
web-site for legislation and related files and bills in force, which contains full texts 
and lifecycles of laws (Parliament of Australia, 2017). 
3.4 The Content Analysis Method 
Content analysis applies both to qualitative and quantitative research 
settings (Roller and Lavrakas 2015). This method is chosen for research given the 
(online) textual nature of cases on economic diversification and violent crime, and 
also as suggested by literature review in Section 2.1.1. It is the ability to extrapolate 
meaning and draw inferences that is the cornerstone of content analysis as a valid 
research method (Krippendorf, 2013). As a research method, content analysis 
allows making accurate and replicable inferences based on textual content. 
Specifically, NVivo software will be employed for analyzing textual information14. 
CAQDAS packages offer the availability of semi-automated tools, e.g. word 
frequency, text search, and coding (Hughes and Silver 2011). These tools can be 
combined to derive specific text-based concepts and define the cases where these 
concepts are used. Furthermore, it allows focusing on the words captured at all 
                                               
14 Apart from NVivo’s strengths and weaknesses, this software was used as part of class PP6701 
Research Methods I 
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stages of analysis to ensure that new emerging ideas can be contrasted with the 
language used (ibid). However, there are a number of drawbacks. Semi-automated 
tools do not allow much of human control and flexibility (Sinkovics and Alfoldi 
2012). Neuendorf (2002, p.40) puts bluntly: “the notion of the completely 
automatic content analysis via computer is a chimera… The human contribution to 
content analysis is still paramount” (as cited in Macnamara 2011). Automated 
content analysis tends to make arbitrary links between words and phrases, thus 
presenting limitations in terms of capturing subtleties (Macnamara 2011). 
However, CAQDAS can still serve as a repository for coded data and prove 
powerful for analytical and reporting purposes (ibid). 
Thus, it seems well justified to combine the use of automated content 
analysis for analytical purposes along with the human-controlled, i.e. manual, 
approach for sampling relevant (Google-generated) content. As adopted from 
Macnamara (2011), typical sampling methods for media content analysis include 
the following: 
 Systematic random, i.e. every nth unit out of the total number of 
articles/mentions defined as a result of online search; 
 Purposive, i.e. selecting all mentions out of specific (target) media, 
while excluding articles form less important sources; 
 Quota, selectively including part of articles from each of several areas; 
 Stratified composite samples by random selection of articles/mentions 
from certain days/weeks over the period analyzed. 
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The qualitative content analysis method recognizes the complexity of the 
social world and supports the notion of multiple categories potentially applicable 
to a single context (Roller and Lavrakas, 2015). Generally, content analysis can be 
divided into two areas: quantitative and qualitative content analysis (Figure 5). 
Although the present research involves numbers, i.e. mentions of specific issues 
online, it largely relies on qualitative analyses based on explorative investigation 
of actors, and processes. 
Figure 5 Two major uses of content analysis 
CONTENT ANALYSIS 
 
     
Quantitative Research  Qualitative Research 
  
Source: reproduced from Roller and Lavrakas (2015) 
 
Qualitative content analysis is defined as the “systematic reduction… of 
content, analyzed with special attention on the context in which the data were 
created, to identify themes and extract meaningful interpretations” (Roller and 
Lavrakas 2015, p. 230). The present research will focus on online news articles, 
blog content, reader comments to media and think tank publications, website 
content as defined by Google search (e.g. Wikipedia, NGOs etc.), policy-related 
bills and laws, academic publications and summaries/abstracts. Furthermore, 
qualitative content analysis often involves coding the manifest content, e.g. content 
that is immediately apparent, and latent content, e.g. not immediately clear, beneath 
the surface and context specific. The two phases that form the content analysis 
process are: 1. Data generation, where defined content is coded to generate relevant 
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data; and 2. Data analysis, including the grouping and interpretation of collected 
data (Figure 6). 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Phases and steps in qualitative content analysis 
PHASE 1: Data Generation (Coding) 
 
Step 1 Step 2  Step 3  Step 4  Step 5 
Absorb content Define unit  Develop Conduct 
 Code content 
   of analysis  unique codes preliminary coding 
 
PHASE 2: Data Analysis (Grouping and Interpretation) 
 
Step 6   Step 7    Step 8 
Identify categories Identify themes/patterns Draw interpretations 
   across categories  and implications 
 
Source: reproduced from Roller and Lavrakas (2015) 
 
For conducting qualitative content analysis research, an inductive strategy 
will be employed, e.g. scientific discoveries and further hypotheses are primarily 
based on the researcher’s analysis of data – online texts, digital news, blogs, graphs 
etc. While quantitative researchers tend to develop their coding at early stages of 
the research process, qualitative content analysis researchers revisit their content to 
improve their own understanding of research progress, thus modifying their codes 
at the data collection stage, not only at the beginning stage of research (Roller and 
Lavrakas 2015). 
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Chapter 4. Data Analysis on Economic Diversification 
 
 This chapter seeks to incorporate three levels of analyses – the ‘litmus test’ 
quantitative analysis, the descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes, and the content 
(semantic) analysis of specific codes related to the ‘key actors’ node – in order to 
promptly answer the central question of the thesis, i.e. who sets the policy agenda 
as related to economic diversification policy across Canada and Australia in 2008-
2015. Both commonalities and divergences among the two country contexts are 
compared and contrasted. As mentioned earlier (i.e. in Ch. 3), due to the technical 
nature of the issue, it is largely the expert community, i.e. either academia or think 
tanks, that are expected to drive the policy agenda. Analysis-driven observations 
should be compared against those of violent crime as applied to two country cases. 
4.1 Economic diversification in Canadian context 
4.1.1 Quantitative analysis 
The Government 
 The search for documented mentions, e.g. bills and online publications, 
related to Canadian government activities on economic diversification over the 
span of 2008-2015 encompasses the following sources: 
- Canadian Parliament database LegisInfo, search “economic diversification” in 
both Title and Content. The search produced the total of 12 bills, of which four 
were selected into the final sample based on substance of content, i.e. with at least 
two mentions of the issue, and relevance. 
- all Government agencies with www.Canada.ca domain by using Google search:  
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"economic diversification" OR "diversif* econom* AND Canada" site:canada.ca, 
time span [2008-2015]. The search produced 42 documented Google files, of which 
21 files were finally selected for further analysis. 
 Thus, the total sample size for content analysis is 25 documented mentions 
on economic diversification. This includes 4 documented mentions in 2015, 7 in 
2014, 3 in 2013, 3 in 2012, 3 in 2011, 2 in 2010, 2 in 2009, and 1 in 2008 (Figure 
7). As Figure 7 demonstrates, the Canadian government remained somewhat 
inattentive to the issue of economic diversification throughout 2008-2013, followed 
by a spike around 2014, and then showing a downward trend again by 2015. More 
specific analyses of Canadian government’s key messages and narratives are 
presented in the subsection on Qualitative content analyses below. 
Figure 7 Trends in Canadian government activity on economic diversification 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
Media 
 The combined search (i.e. both Google search and LexisNexis) for 
documented articles of major national media outlets has led to the final selection of 
66 articles. In the process of selecting media articles it was found that nearly all 
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Google-generated media articles15 were also included in LexisNexis database. The 
most plausible explanation for this is because the search was grounded for major 
nation-wide media outlets, including National Post, Globe and Mail, Calgary 
Herald, Toronto Star, Edmonton Journal etc.16 
The search command employed is the following: 
- “Economic diversification OR diversif* econom* AND Canada” which would 
encompass all relevant pieces related to economic diversification, diversified 
economy, diversify the economy etc. The total number of Google articles over the 
period is 110, while LexisNexis produces 387 articles, and 68 unclassified articles, 
thus the total 455 sources were screened to further select articles for analysis. 
 The final sample of 66 media articles includes 27 documented in 2015, 
followed by 5 in 2014, 7 in 2013, 8 in 2012, 5 in 2011, 6 in 2010, 4 in 2009 and 4 
in 2008 (see Figure 8 below). As data suggest, Canadian media remained dormant 
throughout much of the time span, with a spike in attention in 2015, i.e. from 5 
documented articles in 2014 to 27 in 2015. 
Figure 8 Trends in Canadian media activity on economic diversification 
 
                                               
15 There were only 3 Google-unique articles vs. 63 generated by LexisNexis included into the final 
sample. 
16https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_newspapers_in_Canada_by_circulation 
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Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
The Public 
 The search for public sentiments encompasses the following sources: 
Google-generated blog pieces, i.e. short articles (4 documented sources), 
LexisNexis-generated media articles with public comments posted (12), and opinion 
articles (2). Due to the short nature of most comments posted online, for 
quantitative analysis readers’ comments are analyzed as a separate unit of analyses 
vis-à-vis media articles.  
 Thus, over the time span of 2008-2015, the total of 18 blog pieces, media 
articles (with comments) and opinion articles have been selected for analysis. These 
include 10 articles in 2015, followed by 2 in 2014, 3 in 2013, 0 in 2012, 2 in 2011, 
0 in 2010, 1 in 2009, and 0 in 2008 (Figure 9 below). The data reveal two interesting 
observations. First, the public remained somewhat dormant throughout 2008-2014, 
with a spike in attention around 2015. Second, generally over the time span the 
public’s attention has increased gradually although largely remained relatively low 
except the spike in 2015.  
Figure 9 Trends in Canadian (online) public activity on economic diversification 
 
Note: Blue – media articles, opinion pieces and blogs; Red – readers’ comments. 
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Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
 With regard to reader comments on economic diversification, in total 37 
comments have been identified both for media articles and blogs. These include 21 
comments posted in 2015 (a spike), 3 in 2014, 9 in 2013, none in 2012, 2 in 2011, 
none in 2010, 2 in 2009, and none in 2008. 
 Figure 9 demonstrates that the higher media and blog activity, the more 
intense the number of comments posted online. However, it is impossible to 
conclude whether media and blogging actually cause or drive higher levels of 
commenting online or it may be the other way around, i.e. higher intensity of 
comments causing higher media attention. Alternatively, the public may also set 
government agenda by using media as the platform; in other words, the public 
attentiveness may cause fluctuations in (mediatized) government attention. This 
should become clear once qualitative content analysis is employed to observe 
specific interactions. 
Academia 
 The search for academic publications related to economic diversification in 
Canadian context was carried out by using Web of Science and Scopus. The total 
sample size over the time span selected for analysis is 30. This includes 2 
publications in 2015, followed by 3 in 2014, 3 in 2013, 5 in 2012, and 2 in 2011, 
then a spike of 8 academic articles in 2010, followed by 4 in 2009 and 3 in 2008. 
 The trends for Canada-related academic articles published in 2008-2015 are 
presented in Figure 10 below. As the plotted data suggest, the peak of academic 
focus on the issue related to economic diversification policy in Canada is 2010. 
52 
 
Academic attention then gradually wanes, with a smaller peak (5 publications) in 
2012. 
Figure 10 Trends in Canadian academic publications on economic diversification 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
Think tanks 
          The search for relevant publications from the websites of Canada-based think 
tanks results in the selection of 47 publications over the time span. These include 7 
think tank publications in 2015, 9 in 2014, 7 in 2013, 4 in 2012, 8 in 2011, 3 in 
2010, 5 in 2009, and 4 publications in 2008. 
          The generated results are plotted in Figure 11 below. As the trends 
demonstrate, there are 2 distinct spikes in attention among the think tank 
community in relation to economic diversification issues – first, in 2011 (with 8 
documented publications), and then in 2014 (9 publications) – the difference 
between the spikes being negligible. Furthermore, with ups and downs, attention 
trends generally increase over the span. 
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Figure 11 Trends in Canadian think tank publications on economic diversification 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
 Finally, it is worth comparing the trends of academia with think tanks. Both 
expert actors show clear spikes, though with somewhat diverging directions. 
Academia first demonstrates a clear attention spike around 2010, followed by its 
second (more moderate) spike around 2012, and then followed by declining interest 
to the issue for the rest of the time span Thus academia precedes the attention of 
other actors to economic diversification and might be in the position to set the 
policy agenda. On the other hand, think tanks also seem well positioned to set the 
agenda since this actor demonstrates rather regular ups and downs, if not complete 
cycles of attention. Though it also appears to resemble non-experts in the sense of 
gradually increasing trends, it nonetheless shows its own distinct cycles of 
attention. Thus qualitative content analysis that follows should confirm whether it 
is the think tank community or academia that actually set the policy agenda, since 
the quantitative analysis fails to clearly differentiate between these two actors in 
terms of their agenda-setting capacity. 
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4.1.2 The descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes 
 Canadian-based media, when referring to economic diversification policy 
development over the 2008 – 2015 time span, first of all, demonstrates certain 
attention as measured by the number of explicit references to specific actors 
(Appendix 2a), e.g. the government (33 mentions), followed by academia (19) and 
the private sector (13), while other actors appear to receive less media attention. 
Second, some of the key sectors and industries in which economic diversification 
should be pursued include the primary resource extraction sector (total – 40 
references), including the “mining and other primary resource” industry (27) and 
“agriculture and aquaculture” (13), while an emphasis on “advanced industries” 
(total – 39), which include technology (16), green energy and renewable sources 
(10), the processing sector (8) and knowledge-based economy (5), also remain 
highly pronounced; the service sectors including transportation and tourism, on the 
other hand receive less attention (24 references in total). Third, with regard to the 
major types of economic diversification, media’s attention remains focused on 
pursuing market diversification (11 references) and industrial diversification, e.g. 
away from oil and gas dependency (9 references) vs. diversifying within the energy 
sector (6) and product diversification (1). Next, in terms of producing cause and 
effect links, media suggests 8 references to causes and 4 diversification effects. 
These are roughly comparable to 6 and 3 references suggested by the public, 
accordingly, as in Appendix 3a, and 6 and 0 by the government agencies, as in 
Appendix 4a. The experts, on the contrary, demonstrate higher intensity with regard 
to suggested causes and effects: (11, 10) by academia, as in Appendix 5a, and (11, 
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12) by think tanks, as shown in Appendix 6a. This suggests that it is largely the 
expert community that appears to pay more sustained and systematic attention to 
the policy issue of economic diversification vis-à-vis the non-experts and 
government. The content analysis of the ‘key actors’ node below should confirm 
whether this is a plausible observation. 
 Among the experts, academia suggests the following key actors as related 
to economic diversification: their academic fellows (with 20 references), followed 
by the public (16) and the government (15), as in Appendix 5a. Second, with regard 
to the major industries, these can be grouped into three broad categories: primary 
resource extraction sectors (total 26) – mining (13) and agriculture (13) industries; 
advanced industrial sectors (total 15) – technology e.g. ICT and software (6), bio-
energy and processing (3), renewable and green energy (5) and boosting the 
knowledge sector (1); and the service sector (14). Thus, while media attention 
largely focuses on developing primary resource extraction and advanced industries, 
academia’s attention is more concentrated around primary resources, i.e. mining 
and agriculture industries, with less priority given to boosting high-technology and 
service sectors. This might be due to academia’s attention being focused on 
diversifying away from mining (e.g. oil and gas) dependency either by pursuing 
industrial or product diversification strategies. Third, regarding types of 
diversification, academia emphasizes the need to push product diversification (11), 
followed by market diversification (8), diversifying within the energy sector (6), 
and industrial diversification (5). This is different from media, which places higher 
priority on boosting market diversification, followed by industrial diversification. 
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 The other part of experts – the think tank community – suggests the 
following key actors: the government (33 references), the private sector (26), 
followed by the public (17). It is worth noting that both media and think tanks, but 
not academia, refer more frequently to government agencies than to other actors, 
e.g. the public. It is not yet clear whether these references actually suggest the 
government’s stronger role in driving diversification agenda or whether some refer 
to criticism regarding the government’s less than desirable performance. The 
semantics analysis of NVivo codes related to the ‘key actors’ node below should 
test this proposition. Second, the major industries emphasized by think tanks 
predominantly include the primary resource extraction sector (total 54) – mining 
(38) and agriculture (16) industries – followed by the advanced industrial sector 
(total 28) – technology (10), knowledge (9), and green and renewable energy (9) 
industries – and the service sector (total 24). Thus, similarly to academia, the 
Canadian think tank community tends to give more attention to the primary 
resource sector vis-à-vis advanced industries and the service sector. Third, the 
major types of diversification are market diversification (37), followed by product 
(18) and industrial diversification (12), while diversification within the energy 
sector (8) receives moderate attention. This slightly differs from trends 
demonstrated by academia, which seems to emphasize product diversification 
higher than market diversification. 
 The Canadian online public, i.e. so-called netizens, first refer to the 
following key actors in their web-based discussions: the government agencies (24 
mentions), followed by the role of the public (13), academia (7), and the private 
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sector (6), while the role of media appears insignificant at least explicitly (2 
mentions), as in Appendix 3a. Second, the key industries and sectors include 
primary resource extraction (total 23) – mining and other primary resources (19 
references) and agriculture (4) – followed by advanced industries (15), e.g. high 
technology (6) and green energy (6), while public attention to the service sector (6 
in total) and “other”, i.e. manufacturing (5) remains less significant. Finally, with 
regard to the major types of economic diversification, the online public more 
frequently refers to market diversification (11 mentions), followed by industrial 
diversification (9), while diversification within the energy sector receives less 
attention (4 references). It is worth noting here that not only does the Canadian 
public seem focused on market and industrial types of diversification, but more 
importantly, its attention is rather selective, leaving product diversification aside 
entirely and only moderately referring to diversification within the energy sector. 
It could be that the area of diversification policy is not so much of public interest 
but instead is the purview of policy and academic experts. 
 Last, but not least, the Canadian government refers to the following actors 
in its discourse on economic diversification policy: its own government agencies 
(mostly when making references to certain policies adopted, legislation 
amendments, earlier reforms etc.) – with 28 documented mentions, – followed by 
the public and NGOs (7 references), while other actors receive negligible attention, 
i.e. the private sector – 3 references, and academia – 1 reference (Appendix 4a). 
This observation produced by NVivo descriptive analysis, i.e. the government’s 
highly selective reference to its own agencies with little appreciation of other key 
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actors especially the public and the expert communities, further reinforces the 
observation (see the analysis of comparative resilience of Canadian vs. Australian 
governments in Section 4.2.2) with regards to Canadian government’s resilience 
against agenda-setting pressure from external actors, including the public. Second, 
the government highlights the following key industries and sectors in its discourse: 
the advanced industrial sector (total – 19 references), including technology (8), 
knowledge and research (8), and green energy and renewable sources (3), closely 
followed by primary resource extraction (total – 18 references), including mining 
(10) and agriculture (8) industries, and the service sector (total – 13 references) 
including tourism (8) and entertainment (2) industries, while other industries 
receive less attention, i.e. manufacturing (8). Third, the following major types of 
economic diversification policy are emphasized in Canadian government’s 
discourse: market diversification (10 references), followed by product (5) and 
industrial diversification (5). It is worth noting certain correlation between the 
Canadian (online) public and government agencies in terms of attention to the types 
of economic diversification – both actors explicitly refer to only three types of 
diversification with market diversification   being most predominant (11 references 
by the public vs. 10 by the government). Both actors demonstrate limited attention 
to the issue. Yet it is also interesting to observe certain differences in their attention 
spans: while the public also emphasizes the importance of pursuing industrial 
diversification (9 references), the Canadian government seems to give somewhat 
lower priority to this (with 5 references to both industrial and product 
diversification). This could be explained by the government’s vivid realization of 
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costs and challenges embedded in implementing (high-quality) industrial 
diversification policy measures vis-à-vis, plausibly more appealing, market 
diversification of existing industries especially in the context of close proximity to 
the US. It is further interesting to note the government’s lack of emphasis on 
diversification within the energy sector, which again supports the earlier 
observation with regard to Canadian government’s higher resilience toward 
external pressure, e.g. from the mining industrial groups. 
 To summarize, nearly all actors (except academia) mainly point to the 
government as the key actor. The second key actor is academia (with academia 
pointing to itself as the primary key actor and media suggesting that academia is 
the second key actor), while the third key actor is the public (with the public and 
academia pointing to it as the second key actor). Furthermore, with regard to the 
‘Causes and effects’ node, it is largely academia and think tanks that show greater 
systematic attention than other actors. Thus the major agenda-setting interactions 
as applied to economic diversification in Canadian context should unfold 
predominantly among the government and academia, while the public and think 
tanks might serve as (slightly) less robust actors. Next, regarding the key industrial 
sectors, nearly all actors unanimously point to the need to pursue diversification 
agenda in the context of primary resource industries, and though the government 
slightly emphasizes advanced industries (19) over primary resources (18), the 
difference is negligible. Finally, with regard to types of economic diversification, 
nearly all actors point to market diversification, except academia that stresses the 
need to focus on product diversification (11) instead, though its attention to market 
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diversification remains significant (8). The next section below should look into the 
‘key actors’ node to develop a comprehensive picture of agenda-setting interactions 
and identify the key actor(s) that actually sets the policy agenda on economic 
diversification in Canadian context. 
 
4.1.3 The content analysis of the ‘key actors’ node 
Media 
 As NVivo-generated transcripts suggest, media-produced references are 
coded with regard to the economic diversification issue in Canadian context17. First, 
as the descriptive analysis of nodes suggests above, Canadian-based media 
discourse predominantly points to the government (33 references) and academia 
(19) in terms of the number of references. Second, the semantic content analysis of 
specific media codes with regard to the two key actors is carried out.  
 Regarding the Canadian government agencies, media references can be 
categorized into the following three groups: negative references that criticize the 
government and its organizations for their inability to effectively pursue the policy 
agenda on economic diversification (18 references), generally positive references 
that emphasize a stronger role of the government (11 references), followed by what 
can be referred to as neutral references (4), defined as those with plain description 
of government-led diversification projects, i.e. in Reference 29 where the 
                                               
17 Due to a large size of NVivo transcripts, these are stored on the Researchgate.net platform 
available here: https://www.researchgate.net/project/PhD-thesis-1348. Specifically, the file titled 
“NVivo transcripts, key actors – Media” contains codes which represent media’s references to a 
range of key actors, e.g. Canada-based media with regard to the government and academia, as in 
Part a) Diversification, CAN. 
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government announces a contribution of $3.7 million to support a local airport 
infrastructure project (without any specific assessment), and as those references 
that contain somewhat opposing assessments, e.g. in Reference 7 where media 
points to the benign intention of the newly elected Notley’s NDP government to 
develop capacity across refinery and petrochemical industries and yet describing 
all these efforts as driven by the ‘diversification mantra’. Negative media 
assessments generally point to inefficiencies of costs incurred by government 
organizations (i.e. References 25 and 32 suggest that government loans for 
diversification are often not paid back, Reference 4 strongly recommends the public 
to “keep an eye on your wallets, folks”, concluding that efficient diversification 
policy is not defined by government decrees but rather in “an unpredictable, messy 
way…” involving research units, the private sector and technological firms, and 
References 12, 27 and 28 similarly point to subsidy cost inefficiency; Reference 9 
describes the NDP government as a “grand industrial machine” and downplays its 
effort to intervene in diversification agenda processes, while References 10 and 16 
refer to government failure in developing sound diversification policies, and 
References 11 and 20 similarly point to the failure of the Heritage Fund to diversify 
the Alberta economy due to the actions of government appointees. On the other 
side, positive references to the government efforts to develop economic 
diversification reflect on “bold steps” in minimizing the economic dependence on 
oil through investments in infrastructure projects and pushing new export pipelines 
thus by “showing equal care for the energy economy, not displace it” (as in 
Reference 2, and also Reference 18); furthermore, government-led diversification 
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efforts appear to show value in ‘low-hanging fruit’ industries e.g. agriculture and 
energy such as liquefied natural gas and renewable energy (References 1, 8, 13, 
14), and driving asbestos production and export policy (References 21 and 26) till 
the Tory government stopped financing diversification initiatives within the 
asbestos economy in 2012 as a result of international pressure (Reference 22). The 
overall breakdown of positive versus negative assessments is in Figure 12 below. 
Figure 12 Media semantic assessment of government activities on diversification 
in Canada 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on NVivo codes 
 In overall, it is quite interesting to note media’s rather negative assessments 
with regard to government-led diversification policy. This may appear surprising 
at first glance, especially taking into account the descriptive analysis of nodes (with 
multiple key actors referring to the government in the context of diversification). 
However, as the quantitative analysis initially suggests (as in Figure 6), the Canada-
based government agencies remain generally inattentive to the policy issue of 
economic diversification throughout the time span, thus unlikely to set the agenda. 
Thus, these two sub-parts, i.e. quantitative and semantic content analyses, 
triangulate to effectively conclude that the government is largely not in the position 
to set the agenda on diversification as applied to Canadian context. On the contrary, 
Media references to Canadian government 
agencies on diversification
Positive
Negative
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while media discourse suggests the government’s limited ability to lead 
diversification policy in contexts of basic industries (e.g. agriculture, energy and 
asbestos mining) and infrastructure projects, Canadian government agencies appear 
unable to effectively set the policy agenda on economic diversification in general 
at least with regards to the ‘key actors’ node, specifically due to the perceived 
inefficiency of subsidized expenditure and the failure of government-led policies. 
 Next, the 19 references to the role of academia as produced by media 
discourse on economic diversification can be categorized into the following groups: 
general references that point to a stronger role played by academia and its 
contribution to pushing the policy agenda on economic diversification (14 
references), and instances of academic and research evidence employed to disprove 
some of the inaccurate government policy statements (5 references), as in Figure 
13 below. Both groups of references suggest the robustness of academia in setting 
diversification policy agenda. As a final note, none of the references point to 
negative assessment toward (the otherwise weaker role of) academia or its inability 
to set policy agendas on economic diversification in the Canadian context. Thus it 
is academia that effectively appears to set the policy agenda on diversification in 
Canadian context, with regard to the ‘key actors’ node. 
 
Figure 13 Media semantic assessment of academia on diversification in Canada 
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Source: The author’s own analysis based on NVivo codes 
The Public 
 As identified earlier (as in Appendix 3a), the two key actors with the larger 
number of public perception references are the Canadian government organizations 
and the public. Thus the next step here is to conduct semantic content analysis of 
specific codes related to these actors. 
 Regarding the public references to the government, these (the total of 24) 
can be divided into the following three categories: negative sentiment references 
(17), positive sentiments (4 references #6, 17, 23, 24), and neutral references (3 
references #2, 12, 13), as in Figure 14. 
Figure 14 Public semantic assessment of government activities on diversification 
in Canada 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on NVivo codes 
Media references to Canadian academia on 
economic diversification
General (positive) references to academia
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 The negative sentiments are emphasized inter alia in the following 
instances: Reference 1 links increased regional unemployment in Alberta among 
oil industry employees with the incompetency of NDP18 and Liberal governments, 
while Reference 4 specifies the NDP’s way to frame the economic diversification 
issue as through raising the taxes due to the challenges associated with replacing 
the mining sector with new industries, and Reference 5 bluntly links the NDP 
success at recent elections with its slogan “all their eggs in one basket”, which 
suggests the party had never been serious about pursuing economic diversification 
in the sense of moving away from dependency on mining. Then, at the federal level 
Reference 7 suggests that Harper premiership, by supporting the tar sands and 
energy industries, did nothing but raised the currency and thus slowed down exports 
and economic diversification processes. Reference 8 runs parallels between 
Canada’s tar sands policy of “putting all eggs in one basket” with characteristics of 
an underdeveloped nation, e.g. soy beans in Argentina and gold mining in Peru. 
 The positive sentiment references include Reference 6, where despite the 
challenges linked to economic diversification optimism is expressed with a 
suggestion (for the incumbent government) to support the private sector 
(entrepreneurs) and applied research as drivers of the commercialization process, 
while targeted programs would improve the capacity to grow further. Next, 
Reference 17 suggests that Alberta Premier Redford’s decision to invest in 
economic diversification of the region is well-grounded, though Reference 16 
points to certain flaws in her rationale, e.g. the economy cannot be assumed to be 
                                               
18 New Democratic Party 
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diversified in short term and that would require substantially more investments than 
what has been committed. Then, Reference 23 shows certain support for Harper 
government efforts to stimulate diversification by reducing public service and 
promoting small government agenda; and finally, Reference 24 broadly mentions 
Canada’s diverse economy and the government that plays a major role in healthcare 
and service (e.g. transportation and utility) sectors. 
 Specifically regarding agenda-setting interactions, Reference 6 (as 
mentioned above) suggests the major role of the private sector (entrepreneurs) and 
academic research as drivers of government-led economic diversification policy, 
yet Reference 7 vividly reminds us of the continuing agenda-setting influence of 
tar sands and energy industries; closely related Reference 9 points to the continuing 
agenda-setting influence of mining and energy industries and academia (e.g. 
University of Alberta) on Alberta provincial government, while it suggests 
economic diversification should be pursued instead by a range of actors such as 
researchers, media and entertainment (e.g. artists, writers and film-makers), and 
private non-mainstream businesses; Reference 13 expresses an agreement with an 
economics professor from University of Calgary, who notes that the real issue is 
Alberta’s historic reliance on resource extraction, while a focus should be directed 
toward diversifying the provincial economy to mitigate longer-term risks. Next, 
Reference 14 suggests the public being susceptible to media narratives; and finally, 
Reference 21 suggests that contrary to common sense, Harper undertook policy 
measures aimed at reducing the taxes imposed on the largest (most profitable) 
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corporations that rely on commodities to develop their operational bases. These can 
be summarized in Figure 15. 
Figure 15 Public perceptions toward the government on diversification in Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Note:As perceived by the public, it is the energy industry, academia and the private 
sector, including big corporations (to a greater degree), and media (to a lesser 
degree) that drive policy agenda on economic diversification and exert agenda-
setting influence on the government. 
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
 Next, with regards to public references to itself (the total of 13 references), 
these can be broadly divided into positive sentiments, i.e. those suggesting the 
public’s (potentially) robust role in driving policy agenda – 4 references; negative 
sentiments, i.e. those that point to the public being manipulated by other actors such 
as media and political figures – 4 references, while the remainder is either neutral 
or unclassified (Figure 16).  
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Figure 16 Public semantics toward itself (the public) on diversification in Canada 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on NVivo codes 
 First, regarding positive sentiments (4 in total), these include Reference 1 
that suggests the public should continue to push the agenda on diversifying Canada 
energy markets away from overdependence on the US so that to prevent the 
government from further boosting the budget deficit, while Reference 4 points to 
Alberta-based young people and aboriginal communities who are yet 
underrepresented (on the advisory group for Alberta Premier) but should be 
involved as they would better represent a range of non-mining industry actors, e.g. 
Alberta Federation of Labor and Calgary YMCA (NGOs), Health Sciences 
Association (academia and research experts), and Maclab Enterprises and GE 
Canada (the private sector and industry). Next, Reference 7 points to the 
manifestation of public opinion, which suggests that weaker demand for mining 
resources in China would have negative effects on Canadian economy (although it 
is further refined as lower prices for oil and gas would also open an opportunity to 
pursue the economic diversification agenda), and finally Reference 8 points to the 
need to promote a public dialogue on energy policy to contribute to diversification 
of Canada’s energy exports, as this policy issue is viewed to be of national interest 
as opposed to narrow private interest and thus the issue should remain under the 
scope of public interest. To summarize this part, the public should not be only 
P-2-P references on diversification
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Neutral
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viewed as the platform through which other actors exert agenda-setting influences 
on the government (as in Figure 15), but it can also effectively manifest itself as a 
(potentially) robust actor provided it can mobilize its resources and systematically 
focus on pursuing the policy agenda. However, it remains actually limited in its 
ability to lead the policy agenda not only due to its current mobilization inability 
but also due to its own perception, i.e. only 4 positive sentiments out of 13 in total, 
or 30.7%.  
 The negative sentiments (4 in total) are presented in the references that 
follow. First, Reference 3 suggests the NDP’s ability to relatively easily manipulate 
public perceptions, particularly that it is ostensibly simple to diversify the economy 
as it won the Alberta elections with their “all their eggs in one basket” slogan. 
Second, somewhat similarly Reference 9 points to media’s effect on public minds 
as the local public now wonders whether Alberta is indeed becoming more like a 
“banana republic” as it continuously suffers from budget deficits possibly in excess 
of $10 billion. Third, Reference 13 raises the negativity related to the public’s 
irresponsible attitude to recklessly burning oil for its daily needs while giving little 
thought for future generations. Thus, considering the public’s susceptibility to 
agenda-setting influence by other actors (references 3 and 9), it is not surprising 
that as Alberta Premier Redford was pushing for diversification agenda in 2013 she 
was criticized for ignoring the public message, i.e. responsible fiscal management 
(as in Reference 11). In other words, had the public been able to mobilize and 
present itself as a more robust and independent actor, politicians would be more 
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likely attuned to what the public has to say on policy issues such as economic 
diversification. The agenda-setting interactions are summarized in Figure 17 below. 
Figure 17 Public perceptions toward itself (P-2-P) on diversification in Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:the public is presented both as the platform and as an independent actor that 
can potentially set the policy agenda on diversification in Canadian context. The 
government may occasionally ‘reject’ public messages, and further can shape 
public perceptions; another actor that can shape public minds is media (though to 
a lesser degree) plausibly due to the technical nature of the issue. The actual 
agenda-setting power remains with academia, the industry and the private sector. 
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
 
The Government 
 As the descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes (and as in Appendix 4a) 
suggests, the two actors that generate the larger numbers of references in the context 
of Canada-based economic diversification are Canadian government agencies (28 
references) and the public (7 references)19. 
                                               
19 For the complete content of NVivo transcripts for the government please follow the link: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327551782_NVivo_transcripts_Key_Actors_-_GOV 
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 First, with regard to government-to-government (G-2-G) references, it is 
worth noting that all 28 references point to the positive semantics related to 
government activities and contributions to promoting the economic diversification 
policy agenda, e.g. Reference 1 says that the purpose of Western Economic 
Diversification (WED) Act is to “lead and coordinate the efforts of the 
Government” and to develop cooperation with Western Canada provinces, 
business, NGOs and other organizations with the ultimate goal of diversifying 
Western Canada’s economy, while Reference 7 suggests that the Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities Agency (ACOA) was established to provide opportunities conducive 
to economic growth in Atlantic Canada provinces; Reference 8 points to the role of 
the Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency (CanNor) in building 
sustainable and dynamic economic diversification through funding programs that 
involve Northern residents and Aboriginal communities, etc. 
However, more importantly, it is worth looking into specific agenda-setting 
interactions unfolding with regard to economic diversification. First, the role of the 
private sector is emphasized (10 references). References 1 (developing cooperation 
between WED and the business segment), 7 (with ACOA providing extensive 
assistance to business in becoming more competitive by capitalizing the strengths 
of Atlantic Canada provinces), 10 (The Economic Diversification Agency for the 
Regions of Quebec promoting start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises 
and NGOs on both domestic and international markets), 11 (with the Federal 
Economic Development Agency for Southern Ontario [FedDev Ontario] 
cooperating with communities, businesses and NGOs to promote the region’s 
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economic interests), 12 (again FedDev Ontario through the Southern Ontario 
Prosperity Initiatives focusing on business growth, innovation and productivity for 
the local manufacturing industry), as well as references 14 (with RAD 
Technologies Inc. selected for government funding), 15 (with B.C. government 
boosting ties with Chinese partners while region-based manufacturing and tech 
firms acting as drivers of such international economic development), 17 (2014 
Ontario budget allocates $25 MLN over three years to support aboriginal business 
and communities), 22 (Regional Development Agencies [RDAs] providing grants 
to NGOs and businesses across the regions to push technology and product 
diversification), and Reference 26, where the tripartite involvement of Canada’s 
federal government, Ontario, and the US government seeks to assist the 
restructuring of Chrysler and GM car manufacturers by financing loans. 
 Yet, another actor frequently emphasized in government discourse is the 
public (with 10 references in total), specifically NGOs and aboriginal communities. 
NGOs are referred to in 5 references (#1, 10, 11, 22, and 23, with various 
government agencies providing financial assistance to NGO-led projects), and 
another 4 references (#8, 17, 18, 24) prominently feature aboriginal communities 
as recipients of funds to develop business projects, while a single reference (#7) 
emphasizes cooperation with local communities (apart from aboriginal). 
 The third key actor is academia and researchers, whose role is highlighted 
in 5 references. Particularly, Reference 4, where the Canadian government 
establishes the Consolidated Revenue Fund as a channel for funding up to $51 MLN 
to foster science and technology projects as part of economic diversification 
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agenda; Reference 9, where CanNor budget for 2013 allocates $5.6 MLN over 4 
years to fund Yukon College Center for Northern Innovation in Mining; then in 
Reference 19, Minister for WED Michelle Rempel announces the funding of $5.5 
MLN to support a new cyclotron and medical isotope project; in Reference 27 WED 
funds the purchase of research and processing equipment for the Canadian Malting 
Barley Technical Centre; and finally Reference 28 where the federal government 
supports the B.C. Institute of Technology by funding skills and knowledge for 
students. To summarize this part, the private sector and the public (NGOs and 
aboriginal communities) feature as key actors pushing their government agenda (at 
least with regard to funding and subsidies secured), while academia appears less 
pronounced within government discourse on economic diversification (Figure 18). 
Furthermore, the key actors do not seem to dominate entirely but rather cooperate 
with the government. 
Figure 18 Key actors within government-to-government discourse on 
diversification in Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: As perceived by the government, it is the private sector and the public (to a 
greater degree), and academia (to a lesser degree) that drive policy agenda on 
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economic diversification. The government has effectively established cooperation 
with these actors through its key agencies, e.g. WED, CanNor etc. 
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
 Next, with regard to government references to the public (7 references), all 
point to the positive semantics as related to the public. It is also worth stressing a 
small N issue: indeed, while the public is referred to in G-2-G references, these 
predominantly tend to emphasize the leading role of the government as the 
coordinator and provider of funds. Nevertheless, the public contributes to 
government discourse on economic diversification (though to a lesser extent), e.g. 
as relates to the formation process of the Thompson Economic Diversification 
Working Group (TEDWG 2013, as in references 6 and 7). Specifically, the 
TEDWG process is viewed to be the best practical case of capacity building for 
Canada’s northern communities with significant numbers of aboriginal residents in 
order to more effectively engage local stakeholders in building longer-term 
sustainable communities (ibid). The TEDWG was formed with inputs from not only 
government agencies, but predominantly NGO and service organizations and the 
broader (northern) community (ibid, as in Reference 7). 
Academia  
 To begin with, as found in the descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes, 
academia is the only key actor within the academia discourse, thus this content 
analysis of specific codes looks into a single actor. As mentioned earlier in the 
descriptive analysis section, the total number of references to academia (A-2-A 
references) is 20. One way of classifying the references is by grouping these into 
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specific policy areas analyzed. These include mining, forestry and other resource 
sectors (4 references, #7, 13, 15, 17), followed by agriculture policy sub-issues (3 
references, #1, 10, 15), tourism (3 references, #6, 14, 15), then climate change and 
mitigation (2 references, #2, 11), energy security (2 references, #3, 16), bio-fuels 
(2 references, #1, 18), and renewable energy (2 references, #8, 9). Two aspects are 
worth noting here: first, despite the academia-driven rhetoric on the need to analyze 
economic diversification policy processes, its discourse significantly revolves 
around primary resource use and extraction (12 references out of 20 in total), 
including mining and forestry (4 references), agriculture-related issues (3 
references), tourism (3 references) and primary energy security policy (2 
references), while a focus on more advanced and processed industries encompasses 
4 references (2 for bio-fuels and renewable energy policy each), as in Figure 19 
below. The second aspect is with regard to energy-related discourse (6 references 
in total, i.e. energy security, bio-fuels and renewables), 4 references point to 
advanced energy sub-sectors, i.e. bio-fuels and renewable energy sources. This may 
suggest a promising direction with regard to propelling meaningful discourse on 
economic diversification in Canadian context, i.e. by primarily focusing on the 
(broadly) energy industry as an engine for diversification, although the reader 
should always keep in mind a small N issue, and thus further research is needed to 
reinforce this tentative observation. 
Figure 19 The breakdown of Canadian-based academic attention by primary vs. 
advanced areas 
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Note: despite the ongoing academia-led discourse on the need to address economic 
diversification policy issues, its major focus remains on primary resource use (12 
references), while an emerging focus on advanced sectors broadly remains within 
the energy industry (4 references out of 20 in total). 
Source: The author’s own analysis 
 The other way to categorize the academia-led references (A-2-A) is with 
regard to key actors, both to itself and others, e.g. government agencies, the private 
sector and industry, to possibly develop a picture of plausible agenda-setting 
interactions as related to economic diversification discourse in the Canadian 
setting. These include the public – 9 references (#2, 3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17); 
government agencies (federal, provincial and local) – 8 references (#2, 7, 11, 13, 
14, 18-20); and the private sector – 7 references (#5, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 19). It is 
worth noting that generally the references suggest the prevailing role of academia 
in setting the policy agenda on diversification, while the role of other actors appears 
rather passive, i.e. presented as dependent variables. Particularly, references 2 and 
11 point to academic studies that focus on the effects of climate change both on 
local municipal government organizations (2) and local communities (both 2 and 
11); in Reference 3, it is suggested that the Canadian public’s functionality is itself 
a function of diverse energy (security) inputs as identified by academic research; 
Canadian academia discourse focus
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77 
 
Reference 5 points to an academic survey focused on a subgroup of private sector 
units (i.e. firms) as related to diversification activities; according to Reference 6, 
contrary to earlier studies, this study finds that local residents can be ready to accept 
diversification opportunities through protected-area tourism; in Reference 13 
academia further criticizes Western Canada’s policy for its one-size-fits-all 
approach to addressing regional diversification based on investments aimed at 
developing targeted industries, whereas it should have paid more attention to 
specific (more complex) locational rather than sectoral inter-provincial factors; 
Reference 18 where academia criticizes federal and provincial governments for 
inefficient policy intervention through subsidies and mandates aimed at bio-fuel 
production which barely had an effect on rural economic diversification but came 
at taxpayer cost, with the cost of ethanol production 10 times higher than its level 
prior to government intervention; and finally Reference 20 where academia 
assesses key trade policy development options and specifically recommends the 
government to pursue market diversification away from US dependency toward 
some of the developing nations with significant youth population and a rising 
economy, e.g. India, while further cooperation with the EU and Japan is not viewed 
as beneficial. Furthermore, a few references point to a potential cooperation 
between academia and other actors, i.e. Reference 9 where Manitoba presents 
opportunities for local firms, world-class research and skilled workforces to pursue 
economic growth agenda; Reference 10 where Saskatchewan presents invaluable 
opportunities both for farmers and academia to continue to bring innovative ideas 
as related to agriculture and develop technologies aimed at further crop product 
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diversification; Reference 14 that points to the need for close cooperation between 
academia, local community leaders, and governments to push the policy agenda on 
tourism and recreation as part of a diversification strategy in the context of rural 
Canada; and Reference 17 regarding non-timber forest product development, where 
the Northern Forest Diversification Centre based in Manitoba, which ended its 
operation in 2006, resulted in closer cooperation between local communities, 
business units, and academia, i.e. University College of the North. Based on the 
above, Figure 20 summarizes the essence of agenda-setting interactions in 
Canadian context.  
Figure 20 Key actor interactions in Canada-based (A-2-A) economic 
diversification context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Canadian-based academia, as perceived by itself (A-2-A), sets government 
and public policy agenda on economic diversification (and to a less degree 
affecting the private sector), while viewing the private sector as its partner. 
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Source: The author’s own analysis 
Think tanks 
 First, the think tank references to government agencies (TT-2-G, 24 in total) 
can be categorized along the major policy areas (or sub-issues) emphasized within 
economic diversification discourse as applied to Canadian context. These include 
mining (e.g. oil and gas) and energy policy (10 references, #1, 3-5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 
16, 19, and #23 with the need to pursue diversification centered around mining and 
energy resources), agriculture (3 references, i.e. #8, 19, 22), forestry (2 references, 
i.e. #2, 6), the need to move away from mining to manufacturing (3 references, #7, 
9, 18) and to renewable energy (4 references, #5, 7, 14, 20), R&D (including 
education services) and technology (5 references, i.e. #11, 17, 18, 19, 20). In other 
words, economic diversification discourse led by Canada-based think tanks largely 
revolves around the primary industrial sector (i.e. mining, and to a less degree 
agriculture and forestry, with 15 references combined), while the need to move to 
higher-value advanced industries (i.e. research, technology, and renewable energy, 
with 9 references) is less emphasized, and manufacturing being least pronounced 
(largely related to the other category). Yet it is important to note there appears to 
be a plausible policy path to pursue economic diversification agenda, i.e. based on 
a transformation of the energy industry away from primary oil and mining toward 
renewable energy sources and technology. 
 Next, these references can be divided into the key actors, with the most 
important being government agencies. These can be assessed in terms of positive 
versus negative and neutral (or mixed) sentiments as emphasized in think tank 
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discourse. The relative majority of these (TT-2-G) references appear to include 
rather positive sentiments which are reflected in the following references (12 in 
total, i.e. #4 where the government should partner with the private sector to 
introduce new bitumen and oil sands investment projects, #6 where the government 
is praised for its regulations to preserve forestry to future generations, #7 where 
government and business leaders understand the importance of diversification 
toward emerging markets, along with pursuing product and industrial 
diversification, #9 where Manitoba’s rural development suggests the government’s 
partnership with non-state actors [specifically aboriginal and other local 
communities within multi-level governance] in the context of knowledge-driven 
systems and the need to move away from oil to manufacturing, #11 with 
introduction of broadband internet technology in the context of government and 
citizen intercommunications, #12 where the government partners with the private 
sector in pursuing regional diversification across West Canadian provinces, etc.). 
Yet, negative assessments of government activities are quite significant (8 
references, i.e. #1 where Alberta government is criticized for failure to diversify the 
provincial economy, #2 where British Columbia’s interest in market diversification 
of non-processed raw materials away from US dependency toward China is viewed 
as an unsophisticated approach while product diversification agenda should be 
pursued and similarly #10 where the federal government is criticized for adopting 
export market diversification of oil as a top agenda item while ignoring climate 
impact, #5 where despite a need to move toward renewables, federal government 
policy remains based on coal fuel with limited room for wind, solar, and hydro 
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energy policy measures, #8 where the government put new rules on tobacco 
farming quotas effectively barring new entrants etc.). Last, neutral and mixed 
references to government policy measures (6 in total, i.e. #3 that outlines a scheme 
of driving forces behind Canadian oil industry development to 2030 with the 
government being only one of a range of actors that play a role, as in CERI, July 
2014; see also Figure 21 below; #16 where Canada’s Prime Minister raises the 
support for energy exports diversification [although references 2 and 10 emphasize 
negative sentiments to this policy measure]; #19 where in the context of India’s 
Prime Minister Modi visit to Canada in 2015 Canada’s key government officials 
stress the need to bolster market economic diversification toward Indian economy 
that sends mixed signals as sound investment projects faced challenges in their 
actual implementation; #20 where the government needs to carefully establish an 
effective framework for green energy agenda to allow the private sector to develop 
and yet avoid the temptation of exercising excessive influence in order to prevent 
unsurmountable bureaucratic procedures imposed on business and similarly #22 
related to government and business relations in the agricultural industry; #21 where 
the government is advised to craft sound fiscal policy in support of the private 
sector by countering the cycles in the oil and gas sector which has not been always 
successful in the past. 
Figure 21 Canadian Oil Pathways: Driving forces and the vision to 2030 
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Note: These driving forces should be viewed as key elements of the following 
actors: government (geopolitics, government policy); the private sector and 
industry (market access, demand and competition, environmental performance, 
technology, and crude oil supply), and the public (social license and aboriginal 
relationships). As this diagram suggests, government is only one, somewhat less 
emphasized, actor in the context of oil policy development to 2030, while the private 
sector appears to lead the policy agenda. 
Source: Canadian Energy Research Institute (2014, July). 
 To summarize this part, think tank references to government agencies 
suggest that though the government enjoys significant emphases in Canadian think 
tank discourse on diversification policy in overall, this actor fails to receive 
unanimously positive sentiments, a vital element of perceived capacity to drive 
policy agenda. The summary of sentiment content analysis can be outlined in Figure 
22. It is evident that the share of positive sentiments toward the government is 12/26 
(or 46%). Furthermore, as Figure 21 above suggests with regard to oil development 
policy, it is largely the private sector and industry that appear to outweigh the 
government’s influence in agenda-setting. This observation is triangulated with 
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positive sentiment (TT-2-G) references to government agencies where, as analyzed 
above, the role of the private sector features prominently. 
Figure 22 Think tank semantics toward government agencies on diversification in 
Canada 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on NVivo codes 
 Next, with regard to think tank references to the Canada-based private 
sector (TT-2-PS, 26 in total), it is worth noting all references point to positive 
sentiments and thus appear to assign a robust and positive role to the private sector 
in driving economic diversification policy agenda. First, the references can be 
classified by policy area. The major areas, or sub-issues within economic 
diversification agenda, include R&D and other advanced sectors (e.g. aerospace, 
bio-medical industries, education, green technology and renewables) – 9 
references, i.e. #1, 2, 6, 9, 13, 14, 16, 25 and 26 with renewables taking 6 references 
i.e. the majority; the primary resource sector (e.g. mining, agriculture) – 16 
references in total, including 11 references on mining (#3-5, 8, 10, 15, 16, 20, 21, 
24 including #13 with ongoing efforts by oil and gas firms to move away from 
crude oil production toward renewable energy) and 5 on agriculture (#7, 17, 18, 22, 
23). The summary of major policy areas can be outlined in Table 5. It is interesting 
to note significant part (though not the majority) of think tank discourse as related 
to the private sector focused on pursuing economic diversification in the advanced 
TT-2-G references on diversification
Positive
Negative
Neutral
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industrial sector mainly on renewable energy production, though the think tank 
community (along with the private sector) apparently realize the continuing need 
to ground their diversification policy discourse around mining (e.g. crude oil, sands 
oil and natural gas) and, to a less extent, agriculture. 
Table 5 Major policy areas within TT-2-PS discourse on diversification in 
Canadian context 
Policy areas, or sub-issues, within the economic diversification umbrella 
Primary resource industries Advanced industries 
Mining (e.g. oil and 
gas) 
Agriculture R&D, education, 
aerospace 
Renewable energy 
11 references 5 references 3 references 6 references 
Source: The author’s own analysis 
 Second, another way to group the references is according to the key actors 
emphasized in think tank discourse related to the private sector. Given the overall 
robustness of the private sector in driving the policy agenda on diversification as 
mentioned above, it is interesting to identify specific agenda-setting interactions 
vis-à-vis other actors. To begin with, 4 key references point to the private sector 
and industry setting the government policy agenda, i.e. #2 where the industry 
pushes federal government agenda on evolving bilateral cooperation with 
individual Asian states e.g. Japan, China, India into comprehensive trade and 
investment regional agreements in the context of China’s greatly increased 
economic power in the region, #10 where business dominates the private sector and 
government partnership as government’s proactive policy action is greatly 
described with private sector notions such as efficiency, profitability of 
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infrastructure projects and business acumen, #11 where government’s ongoing 
process of downsizing the civil service provides greater space for the involvement 
of business and industry in setting government agendas, and #24 where the 
discourse on furthering economic diversification revolves centered around the 
natural resource base, viewed as Western Canada’s core strength and with new 
products being originated in resource-based business activities, and thus the 
government is assigned the facilitator role by establishing a level playing field for 
all businesses and developing a vision for regional economic growth. 
 Next, references emphasize the private sector partnerships with other actors 
(4 references on partnerships with government agencies and 2 references with the 
public – one with NGOs and one with local communities). Private sector 
partnerships are emphasized mainly with regard to government agencies (i.e. #5 
and 6 where both actors recognize the need to push the exports of primary and 
renewable energy, manufacturing and services to emerging economies, #16 with 
both the private sector and government cooperate in a push for renewable energy 
technology to Asian states, #17 with the need to strengthen collaboration between 
the private sector, government, NGOs and media in joint efforts to ensure imported 
food substitution with local foods in the context of agricultural development in 
Nova Scotia, but also with local communities as in Reference 9, where the private 
sector alone is not deemed capable of developing broadband internet infrastructure 
in remote provinces e.g. Nunavut). Finally, two references point to the private 
sector occasionally being rather a dependent variable, i.e. #7 where the government 
is deemed to have caused trouble to the tobacco manufacturing private sector as a 
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result of a lacking sound government strategic vision with the new Tobacco 
Transition Program (TPP) barring new entrants into the market despite their 
investments already committed into these projects, and #19 where it is suggested 
the government should carefully craft a framework conducive to the development 
of green energy business and enabling the industry to overcome current constraints, 
while the government should not intervene excessively to reduce bureaucratic 
procedures imposed on the private sector. The summary is in Figure 23. 
Figure 23 Key actor interactions in Canada-based (TT-2-PS) economic 
diversification context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: As perceived by the Canada-based think tank community, the private sector 
tends to set government policy agenda on economic diversification, while the 
government (to a less degree) affects the private sector in terms of the amount of 
bureaucratic burden imposed on mostly new entrants or emerging industries (as 
opposed to well-established powerful sectors e.g. mining). The private sector 
further maintains stronger partnerships with government agencies and somewhat 
weaker links with the public. 
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Source: The author’s own analysis 
 
4.2 Economic diversification in Australian context 
4.2.1 Quantitative analysis 
The Government 
The search for documented publications and bills related to Australian federal 
government activities with a focus on economic diversification over the span of 
2008-2015 encompasses the following two major sources: 
- Search Hansard Parliamentary document database, search “economic 
diversification” filtered for “Bills” (Parliament of Australia, 2017). The search 
produced the total of 48 bills introduced by all chambers and committees over the 
period of 2008-2015, of which 20 were selected into the final sample based on 
substance of content and relevance. 
- all Government agencies with www.gov.au domain by using Google search:  
"economic diversification" OR "diversif* econom* AND Australia" site:gov.au, 
time span [2008-2015]. The search produced 197Google-generated files, of which 
16 files were finally selected for further analysis. The reason for such a low level 
of selected Google files for analysis is twofold. First, a large part of files are not 
substantial, i.e. only marginally, of briefly, referring to economic diversification 
without much analytical substance, e.g. when a local political candidate 
proclaiming the general importance of pursuing diversification agenda in a region 
without providing much detail as to how exactly this should proceed. The second 
reason is Australia being a developed democracy and thus in the position of 
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assisting developing nations in building their own diversification bases. Thus, the 
Google search for “economic diversification” AND Australia also brings out 
numerous instances when Australian experts discuss diversification potential in 
another nation such as Saudi Arabia (Morley 2015).  
          Thus, the total sample size for content analysis is 36 documented mentions 
on economic diversification in Australian context. This includes 17 pieces in 2015, 
6 in 2014, 2 in 2013, 3 in 2012, 4 in 2011, 1 in 2010, 1 in 2009, and 2 in 2008. As 
Figure 24 demonstrates, the Australian government, akin to its Canadian 
counterpart, remains largely inattentive to the issue, from 2008 to 2013, followed 
by a slight take-off in 2014 (with 6 mentions), and then a spike in attention by 
around 2015. The only significant difference is the spike in 2015 vis-à-vis the 
Canadian federal government, which produces its spike in attention to economic 
diversification policy in 2014 followed by a moderate downward trend by 2015. In 
essence, both governments increasingly pay attention to the issue at the end of the 
2008-2015 time span. 
Figure 24 Trends in Australian government activity on economic diversification
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
Media 
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 The search for media mentions of economic diversification in Australian 
context initially encompassed both Google search and LexisNexis engines. 
Surprisingly however, Google failed to produce any relevant media references over 
the time span, despite numerous search results, i.e. around 110 overall mentions, as 
these largely include the following three categories of sources: international 
organizations – either assessing the progress Australia made with regard to its 
economic diversification policy referring to another nation context while citing 
Australia as a model; academic research pieces – either short pieces published on 
social media or longer articles stored in online repositories; various Australian 
government sources – at the local, state and federal levels – reflecting on economic 
diversification issues. 
 Next, the LexisNexis search produced the total of 488 news articles over the 
time span, which then led to the final selection of 71 articles for further analysis 
based on relevance and significance criteria. The search command is the following: 
“Economic diversification OR diversif* econom* AND Australia” capturing all 
relevant articles on economic diversification, diversified economy, diversify the 
economy etc. in Australia. 
 The final sample size of 71 media articles includes 20 documented sources 
in 2015, 14 in 2014, 7 in 2013, 7 in 2012, 6 in 2011, 6 in 2010, 6 in 2009, and 5 in 
2008 (plotted in Figure below). Interestingly, both Australian and Canadian media 
largely remained inattentive to the issue related to economic diversification 
throughout the period, the difference being a more sudden spike from 2014 to 2015 
in Canadian context while Australian media began increasing its attention in 2014 
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(to 14 documented sources from 7 in 2013) with a further spike in 2015 (20 
sources). Still in overall, major media outlets across both nations began devoting 
their attention to economic diversification toward the end of the 2008-2015 time 
span. To this regard, they resemble the trends demonstrated by the federal 
governments over the same period. 
Figure 25 Trends in Australian media activity on economic diversification 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
 
The Public 
 The search for public sentiments in Australian context includes the 
following sources: Google-generated blogs (1 source), LexisNexis-generated media 
articles with public comments posted (4), opinion articles (2), a blog (1), and a letter 
to the editor (1). As mentioned in the Canadian case, due to the short nature of most 
comments posted online, readers’ comments are analyzed as a separate unit of 
analyses vis-à-vis media articles, opinion and blog pieces. 
 In 2008-2015, in total 8 media articles (with comments), a blog piece, and 
opinion articles have been selected for analysis. These include 6 documented 
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sources in 2015, none in 2014 and 2013, 1 in 2012, 1 in 2011, and none in 2010, 
2009, and 2008 (Figure 26). A number of interesting observations emerge. First, 
the public remained largely inactive throughout 2008-2014, with a sudden spike in 
attention around 2015. This is remarkably different from the Canadian case, where 
the public’s attention grew more gradually over the period. Furthermore, while the 
Canadian case demonstrates reasonable use of blogs (4 sources), the Australian case 
shows a negligible level (1). Instead, Australian public largely prefers posting 
comments on media articles. 
Figure 26 Australian (online) public activity trends on economic diversification 
 
Note: Blue – media articles, opinion pieces and blogs; Red – readers’ comments. 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
            Next, the total number of readers’ comments is 21, including 20 comments 
posted in 2015 (a sudden spike), none in 2014 and 2013, 1 in 2012, and none in 
2011, 2010, 2009, and 2008. Again, as in the Canadian case, the higher level of 
media activity is correlated with more intense commenting online. Both Australian 
and Canadian netizens largely remain either dormant (Canada) or simply inactive 
(Australia) over the much of the period, i.e. 2008-2014, followed by a spike in 
attention by 2015, with a more sudden jump in the Australian case. Furthermore, 
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all three non-expert actors – the government, media, and the public across both 
Canada and Australia – demonstrate remarkably similar trends, with attention 
spikes occurring toward the end of the 2008-2015 time span i.e. around the years 
2014 and 2015. 
Academia 
            As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, to search for academic publications, two 
databases were employed – Scopus and Web of Science. The combined search 
results in the final selection of the total of 40 academic articles on economic 
diversification in Australian context over the span of 2008-2015. These include 7 
publications in 2015, 5 in 2014, 3 in 2013, 7 in 2012, 6 in 2011, 4 in 2010, 3 in 
2009, and 5 in 2008 (plotted in Figure 27 below). These data point to interesting 
observations. First, Australian academia demonstrates two roughly equal spikes, 
first in 2011-2012 and then in 2015, while the Canadian counterparts produced a 
single spike around 2010. Second, Australian academia began paying increasing 
attention to the economic diversification issue in the middle of the time span (in 
2011-2012), while Canadian scholars did so in the first half of the period (around 
2010), followed by a weaker spike in 2012 (Figure 9). What is certainly common 
among across nations is academia’s earlier focus on the issue vis-à-vis the non-
experts and the government. As a final observation, Australian academia appears 
to show recurring spikes, including two visible spikes over the 2008-2015 span and 
a possibly invisible spike prior to 2008. This suggests that among the experts, at 
least academia perceives economic diversification as a policy issue of continuing 
importance in Australia. 
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Figure 27 Australian academic publication trends on economic diversification 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
 
Think tanks 
            The search for relevant publications from the websites of Australian think 
tanks results in the selection of 46 publications over the 2008-2015 period. These 
include 12 publications in 2015, 11 in 2014, 6 in 2013, 7 in 2012, 5 in 2011, 2 in 
2010, none in 2009, and 3 as documented in 2008 (as in Figure 28 below). 
Figure 28 Trends in Australian think tank publications on economic diversification 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
            The Australian think tanks produce 2 spikes over the time span, first in 
2012, and then a higher spike in 2014-2015. In overall, the think tank community 
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demonstrates a gradual increase of attention to the economic diversification issue, 
except in 2008-2009 and 2012-2013 with a slight decrease of attention. 
            Furthermore, it is worth comparing think tank trends with the trends of 
academia in Australia. While think tanks show gradually increasing attention trends 
over the time span which may suggest the growing importance of economic 
diversification as perceived by think tanks, academia shows recurring spikes 
perceiving the issue of continuing importance in Australian context. What is 
common among the two expert actors is their earlier growing focus on the issue vis-
à-vis the non-experts and the government: academia first paid increasing attention 
in 2011 and think tanks did so around the year 2012, while the public, media, and 
the government only increasingly noted in 2014-2015, i.e. at the end of the time 
span. Furthermore, as academia appears to show a complete cycle, i.e. 2009-2013, 
it suggests Australian scholars follow their own institutional agenda vis-à-vis think 
tanks that appear to resemble trends of non-experts and the government. In other 
words, with regard to the issue of economic diversification in Australian context, it 
is academia that seems to set its own agenda among the expert community. Thus it 
remains to be seen whether qualitative content analyses reinforce this tentative 
“litmus test” assessment. 
 
 
 
4.2.2 The descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes 
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 Australia-based media, when referring to economic diversification policy 
development over the 2008 – 2015 time span, first of all, refer to the following key 
actors in its discourse: the government-related agencies (19 references), closely 
followed by the private sector (17), and academia (9), while other actors receive far 
less media attention, e.g. the public and think tanks (with 4 references each), 
international organizations (3), as in Appendix 2b. It is worth noting that similarly 
to the Canadian case, Australia-based media mostly refers to the government and 
the private sector in driving economic diversification policy. Yet, the Canadian case 
(as in Appendix 2a) also refers to the role of academia, which is not observed in the 
Australian case. The more detailed content analysis of specific NVivo codes related 
to the ‘key actors’ node below should clarify whether this suggests the 
government’s stronger role in driving diversification policy or it may also point to 
certain criticism regarding the government’s less than desirable performance in 
pushing diversification agenda in Australian context. Second, in terms of major 
industries, Australian media emphasizes primary resource extraction (total 57 
references), including mining (33) and agriculture (24) industries, followed by so-
called “other” industries (total 41), including manufacturing (24), defense and the 
military (12), and construction (5), the service sector (total 35 references), including 
tourism (18) and arts and culture (4) industries, and closely followed by the 
advanced industrial sector (total 34), including technology (13), green energy (11), 
and knowledge and research (10) industries. Third, with regard to the major types 
of economic diversification, these include market diversification (with 14 media 
references), followed by industrial diversification (9), and diversification within the 
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energy sector (6), while product diversification and diversifying single-industry 
towns receive far less media attention (with 2 references each). Finally, regarding 
cause and effect links, Australian media suggests 10 references to causes and 4 
diversification effects. These are roughly comparable to 12 and 4 references 
produced by the government agencies, as in Appendix 4b, and significantly 
overweigh 0 and 3 references suggested by the public, as in Appendix 3b. The 
experts, furthermore, demonstrate yet higher intensity with regard to suggested 
causes and effects: (19, 19) by Australia-based academia, as in Appendix 5b, and 
(12, 11) by the think tank community, as shown in Appendix 6b. 
 With regards to the experts, Australian-based academia, first of all, 
emphasizes the following key actors in their discourse: its own academic fellows 
and counterparts (23 references), closely followed by the private sector (22), 
government agencies (20), and the public (13), as in Appendix 5b. It is worth noting 
that while the actors are generally similar to the Canadian case, the Australian case 
presents an interesting difference, i.e. higher emphasis of the private sector. The 
analysis of specific NVivo codes below should clarify whether this actually entails 
a stronger role attributed to the private sector or some mentions raise criticism 
toward the private sector’s lobbying efforts, a lack of expertise to set the agenda on 
diversification policy etc. Second, with regard to the industries, these are primary 
resource extraction (total – 38 references) including agriculture (21) and mining 
(17) industries, followed by the service sector (total – 29 references), including 
tourism (17), while advanced industries (10) and “other” sectors (total 7) receive 
moderate attention. Though generally similar to the Canadian case, Australian-
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based academia seems to give less attention to advanced industries, e.g. technology. 
Third, regarding the major types of economic diversification, academia appears to 
give higher priority to industrial (20) and product diversification (15) vis-à-vis 
market diversification (8) and diversification within the energy sector (2). This is 
somewhat similar to the Canadian case: their academic counterparts appear to 
prioritize product diversification over the other types, while Australian academia 
emphasizes the need to push for both industrial and product diversification. 
 The think tank community, first of all, emphasizes the following actors in 
their discourse: the private sector and government agencies (with 37 references for 
each), think tanks (28), the public and NGOs (27), while the remainder receives 
either moderate (academia – 13 references) or negligible attention (international 
organizations – 4, media – 2), as in Appendix 6b. It is worth noting a greater 
emphasis on the private sector vis-à-vis the Canadian case, while both cases appear 
to refer to the government as well. Second, the following sectors and industries are 
referred to: primary resource extraction (total 79), including mining (48) and 
agriculture (31), followed by the advanced industrial sector (total 46), e.g. 
knowledge (24) and technology (11), and the service sector (total 45), including 
tourism (17), while “other” industries (total 23) receive moderate attention, i.e. 
manufacturing (15) and military defense (8). This observation is similar to the 
Canadian case. Australian-based academia, while generally exhibiting similar 
trends, seems to give rather moderate attention to advanced industries. Third, with 
regards to the major types of economic diversification, think tanks place higher 
priority on industrial diversification (35 references), followed by market 
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diversification (22), while product diversification (9) and within the energy sector 
(5) receive far less attention. This is different from the Canadian case, which 
suggests greater attention to market diversification. Yet, this is somewhat similar 
to Australian-based academia, which places higher emphasis on industrial 
diversification, but also giving certain attention to product diversification. 
 The (online) public, first of all, largely refers to the following two key actors 
in its web-based discourse on economic diversification: the government (7 
documented references) and the public (6), while other actors appear less 
significant (Appendix 3b). It is worth noting that while the other non-expert, i.e. 
Australia-based media, similarly emphasizes the government, it also points to the 
private sector as the other key actor. The Canadian netizens appear to exhibit 
similar attention trends, i.e. emphasizing the government and the public as key 
actors. Second, the following sectors and industries are referred to: advanced 
industries (total 11 references), including technology (9) and green energy (2), 
followed by the primary resource extraction sector solely represented by the mining 
industry (7). As mentioned earlier, Australian-based media suggests different key 
sectors, i.e. primary resource extraction, followed by “other” industries (e.g. 
manufacturing), the service sector, and advanced industries. Such a divergence in 
attention span may be due to the public’s limited and possibly unsystematic interest 
in the (rather technical) area of economic diversification and due to media’s 
professional focus on various policy issues, including diversification. Interestingly, 
Canadian netizens exhibit somewhat similar trends as their Australian counterparts, 
except that the Canadian case emphasizes primary resource extraction (23) vis-à-
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vis advanced industries (15), as in Appendix 3a. Third, the only significant type of 
diversification emphasized is within the energy sector (3 references) while industry 
diversification receives negligible attention (1). The Australian online public does 
not appear bothered about types of economic diversification generally, which again 
supports the earlier observation that Australian netizens do not put diversification 
policy high on their agenda list. As mentioned earlier, Australian-based media 
emphasizes a range of diversification types, e.g. market diversification, followed 
by industrial diversification and within the energy sector (as in Appendix 2b). 
Interestingly, Canadian netizens show attention trends similarly to Australian 
media, not Australian netizens: they emphasize market diversification, followed by 
industrial diversification, and then within the energy sector (as in Appendix 3a). 
Thus Canadian netizens appear to pay more attention to the types of diversification 
than their Australian counterparts. 
 As in Appendix 4b, Australian government agencies, first of all, tend to 
refer to the following key actors in their discourse: their own government agencies 
(24 references), followed by the private sector (13), while others receive either 
moderate (the public and academia – 7 references each), or negligible attention 
(media – 1). It is worth noting that while the Canadian government similarly 
emphasizes its own institutions, the second key actor is the public, not the private 
sector (as in Appendix 4a). Second, with regards to the major sectors and industries, 
these include the primary resource extraction sector (total – 28 references), 
including agriculture (18) and mining (10) industries, followed by the service sector 
(total – 23), including tourism (8), and then advanced industries (total – 16), 
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including technology (8), knowledge and research (6), and green energy (2). 
Interestingly, the Canadian government appears to give higher priority to the 
advanced industrial sector, followed by primary resource extraction and then 
services. In other words, while the first priority industry is different among the two 
national governments, the top three sectors generally remain the same. Third, the 
Australian government refers to the following types of economic diversification: 
market (16), followed by industrial (11), then diversification of products and within 
the energy sector (7 references each). This is similar to the attention trends 
exhibited by the Canadian government: market diversification (10 references), 
followed by product and industry diversification (5 each). 
 Thus, to summarize this part, four of the five actors (i.e. media, the public, 
think tanks and the government) mainly point to government agencies in their 
discourse on economic diversification as applied to Australian context. Next, the 
think tank community equally emphasizes the private sector, while media, 
academia and government relate to the private sector as the second key actor. 
Finally, academia mainly points to itself, i.e. academic counterparts (23 references), 
closely followed by the private sector (22). Furthermore, it is academia that greatly 
outweighs the rest with regard to the number of causes and effects developed in its 
diversification discourse. Thus the core agenda-setting interactions should include 
the government and the private sector, while academia appears to be less robust. 
Next, regarding the key industrial sectors, nearly all actors emphasize the need for 
economic diversification policy discourse to be grounded in the context of primary 
resource industries, which suggests the continued dependency of the national 
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economy on resource extraction as perceived by the bulk of actors and thus these 
industries should be the foundation for further diversification efforts. Finally, 
regarding the types of economic diversification, unlike the Canadian case, the 
Australian context reveals a dilemma: on the one hand, media and government 
generally point to market diversification in their discourse, while on the other hand, 
the expert community i.e. think tanks and academia emphasize the importance of 
industrial diversification. It is interesting to note here a broad correlation between 
media and government trends, both emphasizing market diversification that appears 
relatively easier to achieve than promoting (perhaps higher-quality) industrial 
diversification policy, the latter being pointed to by the expert community. The next 
section should explore in detail the ‘key actors’ node to build a better understanding 
of agenda-setting interactions and identify the key actor(s) that drive(s) 
diversification policy agenda. The specific emphasis of the ‘key actors’ node is 
driven by the research question, i.e. to answer the question of who sets the policy 
agenda requires looking into this node in greater detail. 
 
 
4.2.3 The content analysis of the ‘key actors’ node 
Media 
 First, with regard to Australia-based media, its references to key actors are 
coded as applied to economic diversification 20 . As the preceding Descriptive 
                                               
20 A complete set of NVivo transcripts for media references can be found by following this link: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327552016_NVivo_transcripts_Key_Actors_-_Media 
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analysis of NVivo nodes suggests, media predominantly refers to government (19 
media references) and the private sector (17) in its discourse on diversification.  
 Regarding the Australian government institutions, media references, 
similarly to the Canadian case, can be divided into three groups: positive references 
in relation to government activities (10 references), neutral references (5), and 
followed by negative media sentiments toward government activities (4 
references). It is striking to note both similarities and differences with the Canadian 
case. Both country cases appear similar in terms of numbers of positive and neutral 
references to their respective governments (11 positive media references in 
Canadian context versus 10 in the Australian case; and 4 versus 5 neutral 
references, accordingly). What is remarkably different is the amount of negative 
media sentiments, i.e. 18 versus 4 in Canadian and Australian cases, accordingly. 
This may tentatively point to a relatively higher degree of democratic deficit in 
Canadian context, at least at the time of Stephen Harper premiership (2006-2015) 
as contrasted to the Australian case.  
 Among the positive media references in relation to government activities, 
some sources point to the Australian government’s active involvement in 
strengthening ties with the private sector and chairing business summits (i.e. 
References 1-3, 5, 6, 13), yet another source (Reference 7) serves as a vivid 
reminder that the government should intensify its activity to greatly reduce the 
regulatory burden facing the liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry. Other positive 
sentiments include government grants to support small and medium business 
(Reference 6), pushing Canberra as a regional hub and an engine for further 
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economic diversification (Reference 10), and support for Latrobe Valley authorities 
in shutting down heavy-polluting coal power (Reference 14). The overall 
breakdown of media references to government activities are presented in Figure 29 
below. As these data demonstrate, the Australian government appears to enjoy a 
greater degree of positive media perception vis-à-vis its Canadian counterpart, i.e. 
53% of all references in Australian context vs. 33% in the Canadian case. 
Figure 29 Media semantic assessment of government activities on economic 
diversification in Australia 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on NVivo codes 
 Next, with regard to the total of 17 media references to the Australia-based 
private sector as suggested earlier by the Descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes, these 
can be categorized into the following groups (as presented in Figure 30 below): 
references to the strong influence of the private sector in its interactions with the 
government with regard to pushing economic diversification agenda (14 
references) and the private sector also shaping the public sentiments and 
perceptions (2 references), and a single reference being rather neutral. First, media 
is extensively used as a platform for the private sector to pursue its own agenda on 
diversification issues (e.g. References 2, 5, 7 where the private sector takes part in 
business forums and summits pushing its own policy solutions to the government, 
Media references to Australian 
government agencies on diversification
Positive
Negative
Neutral
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and References 6 and 17 where the government allocates resources to further assist 
the private sector with expansion projects etc.), and to set the government (policy) 
agenda specifically on start-ups and technology policy under the umbrella of 
economic diversification [Reference 8 where the Abbott government allocates $200 
million over four years to push start-up development under the Industry, Innovation 
and Competitiveness Agenda program (Massola 2014, Oct 14); and then Reference 
4 where CEO of Freelancer outsourcing company further pushes the Australian 
federal government to “put start-ups and technology on its national agenda” 
(Businessspectator 2015, Oct 5)]. This particular case further reinforces the thesis 
that it is the private sector that effectively sets the Australian government agenda 
on diversification policy. Secondly, media is also employed by the private sector, 
though to a lesser degree, to shape the public sentiments. Particularly, according to 
Reference 1, Bobbi Lambright of ATCO Australia attempts to distill public 
overreactions with regard to economic cycle ups and downs by skillfully switching 
the attention to the need to push (exports) market diversification to China, India 
and other developing nations. This message is further supported with the opinion 
of Wesfarmers CEO Richard Goyder: “We are on the doorstep of the high-growth 
region of the world” (as in Smith 2015, Dec 31). Then Reference 14 states that 
media outlets under control of “multinational owners of the power plants” increase 
the fears of the local public with regard to job losses, while these big energy firms 
continue to lobby the government for “more billions” in funding. As a final note, 
none of the references contain explicitly negative sentiments towards the role of the 
private sector. On the contrary, the private sector (and the powerful energy 
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industry) extensively uses media as a platform to set its agenda on diversification 
policy and shape public perceptions.  
Figure 30 Media semantic assessment of private sector activities on diversification 
in Australia 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on NVivo codes 
The complexity of mediatized agenda-setting interactions between the 
private sector (and the energy industry, to a lesser degree) on the one side, and the 
government and the public on the other can be outlined schematically as presented 
below (Figure 31). As mentioned above, the private sector (and the industry) exert 
stronger agenda-setting influence on the government (14 references) than on the 
public (2 references), while the government transmits its feedback to the private 
sector through partnership agreements. 
Figure 31 Mediatized agenda-setting processes in Australian context on  
diversification 
 
    
 
 
Media references to Australia-based private 
sector on diversification
Partnering with government agencies
Shaping public sentiments
Neutral reference
The private sector 
and energy 
industry 
The private sector 
and energy 
industry 
Media 
Media 
Australian 
Government 
agencies 
The Public 
106 
 
Note: As perceived by media, the private sector largely sets the government policy 
agenda on economic diversification and, to a lesser degree, the public agenda by 
employing the media platform and shaping public perceptions to the policy issue. 
The government further seeks to establish partnership links with the private sector 
by organizing joint business summits and crafting policy measures to boost 
diversification agenda. 
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
 
The Public 
As mentioned earlier (in the descriptive analysis and Appendix 3b), the two actors 
to which the Australian public more frequently refer to in the discourse on 
economic diversification are the government (7 references) and the public itself (6 
references). Thus this sub-section seeks to incorporate the content analysis of 
specific NVivo codes to identify the public’s semantic perceptions toward the 
government and to itself in order to identify the degree of plausibility of a certain 
actor to set the policy agenda on diversification in Canadian context. 
 First, regarding public references to the government, it is rather shocking, 
or at least unusual, to observe total public (sentimental) negativity: indeed, all 7 
references point to Australian federal government failure to lead sound economic 
diversification policy, at least as perceived by the (online) public. Reference 1 
bluntly puts that “…trying to woo Abbott into behaving responsibly on climate 
change21 is a lost cause… He is working for fossil fuel interests”, while Reference 
                                               
21 A reference to climate change is the context of the need to diversify the economy away from 
fossil fuels 
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2 is closely related: Abbott’s oft-quoted “coal is good for humanity” has become 
an online meme to demonstrate the federal government’s backward-looking stance 
on climate change; Reference 5 suggests pursuing renewable and alternative energy 
agenda is unlikely to be part of government agenda as the current and successive 
governments remain financially dependent on AGL (Australian electricity and gas 
supplier) and other “Big Energy ugly sisters”; Reference 7 cites the example of the 
Pilbara region as a case of “infrastructure and strategic failure” and a clear 
manifestation of a lack of government leadership and funds to drive the agenda on 
diversification of a highly mining dependent region, with the government being 
influenced by the mining and energy industry and property developer firms, as well 
as mainstream media. This is an important observation. While Australian media 
largely perceives the private sector (and to a less degree the energy industry) to set 
the agenda on economic diversification, the public appears to emphasize the leading 
role of the mining and energy industry, followed by the private sector (property 
developers) and media (Figure 32). Yet, as a final note here, a small N issue should 
be taken into account. 
Figure 32 Agenda-setting processes, perceived by the public, on diversification in 
Australia 
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Note: As perceived by the public, it is the mining and energy industry (to a greater 
degree), and the private sector and media (to a lesser degree) that drive policy 
agenda on economic diversification and exert agenda-setting influence on the 
government (with a small N). 
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
 Next, with regard to references to the public, these can be divided into the 
need to address aboriginal communities (references #1, 4) and the overall public’s 
role in pushing policy agendas (references #2, 3, 5), while Reference 6 raises doubts 
with regard to the plausibility of achieving sound economic diversification. 
Particularly regarding agenda-setting interactions, Reference 2 suggests the need to 
diversify the national (export markets) economy away from dependency on China; 
Reference 3 points to hasty decision-making by Abbott government and the need 
for the public to mobilize and “send… a pressing message”; in a similar vein 
Reference 5 raises the need to develop and implement efficient investment and 
planning policy for the resource rich Pilbara region to prevent it from becoming a 
ghost region, and order to ‘motivate’ the (somewhat ignorant) government it is 
necessary to start “sacking them”. All these references so far suggest the agenda-
setting potential attributed to the public (note expressions such as “need to 
diversify”, “need for the public to mobilize” etc.) rather than the actual capacity to 
set the government agenda on economic diversification. To this regard, Reference 
4 serves as a reminder that while the public may have the potential to drive the 
policy agenda, it is the Australian mining industry that continues to expand its 
projects at the expense of the land (formerly) owned by local aboriginal 
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communities. Combined with the earlier analysis of references to the government, 
these observations in overall point to the mining and energy industry and the private 
sector that effectively push their agendas on the government with regard to 
economic diversification.  
The Government 
 To begin with, it is rather unsurprising to observe, similarly to Canadian 
context, nearly total positive sentiments in G-2-G references: indeed, only a single 
idiosyncratic reference (#2) points to a negative sentiment, where it suggests that 
despite an earlier government allocation of $4.3 billion under the framework of the 
Automotive Transformation Scheme (ATS) to mitigate the consequences of the 
underperforming Australian-based auto manufacturing sector, the hopes failed to 
materialize and the industry eventually announced it was closing, which at least 
points to poor decision-making on the part of the federal government. 
 The remaining (positive sentiment) references can be broadly divided into 
the following major categories: references to infrastructure projects as developed 
or led by the Australian government (9 references, #3, 5, 8, 19, 20 [irrigation and 
other water infrastructure], #5 [ports and pipelines], #13 [IT and e-commerce 
infrastructure], #14 [roads], #12, 21 [other]); government-led projects to assist the 
private sector and industries (8 references, #5, 7, 8, 13, 17, 21 [the private sector 
and start-ups], #10, 16 [the auto industry]), and government contributions in terms 
of publically-appealing legal bills and free trade agreements with other nations, i.e. 
China and Japan (6 references, #1, 3, 9, 11, 15, 17), while the rest can be referred 
to as unclassified, or miscellaneous G-2-G references. 
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 Furthermore, in terms of the key actors which G-2-G references mainly 
emphasize the private sector and industry (to a larger degree), as already referred 
to above (8 references) and the public, e.g. local communities (to a lesser degree 
with 4 references, #3, 12, 18, 21). Specifically, with regard to the private sector 
(and industry), Reference 5 relates to the (government-funded) Northern Australia 
Infrastructure Facility that aims at developing partnerships with the private sector 
across WA, NT and Queensland in terms of providing loans for infrastructure 
development projects. The NAIF offers concession-based finance for 5 years to 
complement private sector commitments to building infrastructure e.g. airports, 
electricity, ports, railways and water (NAIF 2018). Reference 7 points to the role 
of the Geelong Region Innovation and Investment Fund (co-funded by the federal, 
state governments and the industry) that has assisted the private sector, e.g. textile 
and manufacturing, in expanding their employment and production capacities. 
 Then Reference 8 relates to a government-supported investment in a 
Tasmania-based irrigation water project (with $60 MLN by the federal government, 
and $30 MLN each from the state government and the private sector) that is 
expected to spur economic activity in the region. Next, Reference 13 suggests the 
importance of the introducing the National Broadband Network as a strong stimulus 
to spur community-based business activities across regions, by developing e-
commerce infrastructure. Reference 17 is related to a 2008 bill as an amendment to 
the Export Market Development Grants Act with the aim of providing funds for 
local firms to push their exports and seek new market opportunities. Finally, 
Reference 21 relates to the Blueprint for MidWest economic development of 
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Western Australia regions with a specific focus on developing aboriginal tourism, 
with key elements being infrastructure, business and industry. It is worth noting 
here that the MidWest largely remains dependent on natural resource extraction, 
i.e. primarily iron ore, gold mining, copper, lead, cobalt and nickel, as well as silver, 
oil and natural gas (to a less degree), as shown in Figure 33 below. It is thus 
unsurprising that pursuing economic diversification is high on regional government 
agenda, despite a growth in the combined production value of the region’s natural 
resources from $2.5 billion to $3.5 billion over the period (Mid West Development 
Commission 2015, Aug 25). Furthermore, with regard to the auto manufacturing 
industry (as opposed to the smaller-size private sector), References 10 and 16 relate 
to government efforts to sustain the industry afloat only to realize eventually that 
these would doom to failure (as in Reference 2 mentioned above). 
 
 
 
Figure 33 Combined Mid West minerals and petroleum production values (2009-
10 – 2013-14) 
 
Source: Mid West Development Commission (2015) 
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 Next, regarding the role of the public, this is emphasized in Reference 3 (a 
new bill introduced with regard to irrigation water projects expected to spur product 
diversification in agriculture for the local communities involved), Reference 12 
(where the minerals resource rent tax is used as the community dividend that should 
be spent strictly for those infrastructure projects needed by the local community), 
Reference 18 points to the Arts Leadership Group working with the community to 
obtain their feedback in order to develop a vision for developing the arts, culture 
and creative sector; and Reference 21 (as mentioned above) that points to the 
Blueprint for Mid West economic development focusing on aboriginal tourism. 
 To summarize, G-2-G references in the context of Australia-based 
economic diversification primarily emphasize the role of the private sector, while 
less emphasis is given to the local community in driving the policy agenda (Figure 
34).  
 
Figure 34 Key actors within government-to-government discourse on 
diversification in Australia 
 
 
 
 
Note:As perceived by the government, it is the private sector (to a greater degree), 
and the public, especially local communities (to a lesser degree) that drive policy 
agenda on economic diversification in Australian context. Similarly to the 
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NAIF, GRIIF 
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and car manufacturers) 
The Public (local and 
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Canadian case, the Australian government has established cooperation with the 
private sector via various schemes (loans, infrastructure) and with the public via 
infrastructure projects. 
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
 Next, with regards to government references to the next key actor, the 
private sector (the total of 13 references), it is interesting to observe that, apart from 
the private sector and government interactions, some references (4 references) point 
to the strong role of research that contributes to successful implementation of 
economic diversification projects. So, Reference 5 points to a space innovation 
industry-led project, further supported by the government (with $6 million 
commitments) and research sectors; Reference 7 relates to the case of heavy 
industrial city of Newcastle that also positions itself as a hub for research and 
knowledge-intensive manufacturing industries; bolstered with a robust skills base, 
the city enjoys a multi-sector diversified economy, now on the path toward 
developing clean energy research; then Reference 11 suggests the need to develop 
digital economy in NSW by attracting workers into the knowledge intensive 
sectors; and Reference 12 related to Canberra’s knowledge economy supported 
with sound research, innovation and entrepreneurial resources, thus well positioned 
to further develop the emerging clean economy. The summary of agenda-setting 
interactions can be presented in Figure 35. Similarly to the Canadian case, the 
partnership of the government and the private sector remains central, while the role 
of academia is somewhat less pronounced. 
Figure 35 Key actors within G-2-PS discourse on diversification in Australia 
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Note: As related to the private sector, government discourse on diversification 
emphasizes the role of the two-party partnership (government and the private 
sector), yet academia appears increasingly an important actor as the economy 
moves to become knowledge-based.  
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
Academia 
 As mentioned earlier (as in Appendix 5a), the total number of A-2-A 
references in Australian context is 23, closely followed by 22 academia-to-the-
private-sector (A-2-PS) references. With regards to A-2-A, these references can be 
broadly divided into policy areas emphasized in academia discourse: agriculture 
and nutrition policies (8 references, #4-6, 9, 12, 15, 20, 21), tourism policy (5 
references, # 1, 11, 18, 22, 23), industrial and economic growth (4 references, #2, 
3, 13, 19), climate change adaptation (3 references, #10, 11, 15), and social policy 
(2 references, i.e. #16, 17). Furthermore, Reference 20 points to the initial 
development of bio-products in the 20th century that laid the basis for diversification 
within mining and fishing industries, while Reference 21 points to the emerging 
bioenergy markets as a factor conducive to spur the diversification of the 
agricultural industry. Compared to the Canadian case, the Australian context 
Academia (research) in 
the context of 
knowledge economy 
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exhibits even a lower share of references to push the economic diversification 
within advanced industries, i.e. 2 references (#20, 21) on bioenergy versus 4 
references in the Canadian setting (2 on bio-fuels and 2 on renewable energy). This 
may point to Canada’s economy being somewhat better positioned vis-à-vis 
Australia’s in terms of readiness to move to knowledge-based economy and pursue 
advanced industrial diversification agenda, though this is not a definitive 
observation due to a small N issue. Yet, similarly to the Canadian case, the 
Australian setting generally revolves around primary industries (13 references, 
including agriculture and tourism), and other policy areas (9 references), as in 
Figure 36. 
 
 
 
Figure 36 The breakdown of Australian-based academic attention by primary vs. 
advanced areas 
 
Note: similarly to Canadian context, the Australian case shows that despite the 
academic discourse on economic diversification policy, its major focus remains on 
primary industries (13 references), with little focus on advanced sectors (2 
references) and the remainder (9) related to other (unclassified) references. 
Source: The author’s own analysis 
Australian academia (A-2-A) discourse
Primary industries
Advanced industries
Other (unclassified)
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 Next, another way to classify the references is through the prism of key 
actors as related to academia discourse on diversification (A-2-A) in Australian 
context. Apart from academia itself (that features prominently across all references 
due to its research findings, policy recommendations, literature review etc.), other 
actors in academia’s discourse include the private sector (i.e. business and industrial 
units of all sizes, both local firms and international corporations) – 9 references, #5, 
10, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 22, 23; the public (i.e. local communities) – 5 references, i.e. 
#4, 6, 11, 12, 16; and government agencies both local and federal (4 references, #2, 
3, 17, 23). It is worth noting that all references to the role of the private sector 
include positive sentiments, thus this actor is viewed as the second key actor 
following academia, which is then distantly followed by the public, i.e. local 
communities. Lastly, the government’s 4 references, as perceived by academia, 
include a single negative sentiment (as in Reference 3, where it is suggested that 
the government’s traditional tariff protection policy eventually failed to achieve 
industry diversification that had been its major goal. 
 Specifically, the private sector manifests itself in the following examples: 
Reference 5 points to farmers’ efficient use of diversification among their projects 
as a means to minimize business risks; references 10 and 11 where local firms seek 
to reduce their vulnerability to climate change through diversification; #13 and 19 
point to the role of industry players in pushing diversification agenda in the 
knowledge economy; #15 suggests usefulness of enterprise mix diversification in 
agriculture as a tool to mitigate climate change effects and as an effective strategy 
to protect against risks caused by climate change; #18 and 22 point to the tourism 
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industry as a leading actor in pushing Flinders Ranges region’s diversification 
activities in South Australia; finally Reference 23, where the tourism industry is 
viewed as an engine for diversification in resource dependency context, and is 
regarded as a partner with the government to promote regional development; the 
role of the industry is especially commendable since past research indicates (e.g. 
Howlett and Brownsey 2008) that it is often challenging to pursue effective 
diversification in the face of ‘staples trap’ constraints. The summary of agenda-
setting interactions can be presented in Figure 37. 
Figure 37 Key actor interactions (A-2-A) in Australia-based economic 
diversification context 
 
 
 
Note: Australian-based academia, as perceived by itself (A-2-A), largely drives 
government policy agendas on economic diversification. The private sector is 
another key actor that pushes government agenda, while the government 
occasionally views the private sector as a partner. 
Source: The author’s own analysis 
 Next, with regard to academia’s references to the private sector (A-2-PS), 
22 in total, these can be divided into the following policy areas: tourism policy (7 
references, #1, 6, 7, 9, 18, 19, 22), agriculture and forestry (6 references, #4, 6, 10, 
14, 16, including the role of scientific research as in Reference 21), then distantly 
followed by climate change (3 references, #8, 9, 14), natural resources (3 
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references, #11, 13, 17), the automotive industry support policy (2 references, #2, 
3), and renewable energy (a single reference, #15). Similarly to A-2-A references, 
these A-2-PS references generally point to the discourse focused on primary 
resource use – 15 references including tourism, agriculture (except Reference 21 
that emphasizes the role of scientific research in driving agriculture policy), and 
natural resources, with negligible attention falling on advanced sectors (2 
references, one on scientific research as mentioned earlier, and another one on 
renewable energy) and 5 references classified as other (as in Figure 38). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38 The breakdown of Australian-based A-2-PS attention by primary vs. 
advanced areas 
 
Note: similarly to Australian-based A-2-A discourse, A-2-PS references show the 
prevalent focus of (academia-perceived) private sector discourse on primary 
industries (15 references), with little focus on advanced sectors (2 references) and 
the remainder (5) related to other (unclassified) references. 
Source: The author’s own analysis 
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 Another possible way to classify the A-2-PS references is with regard to 
key actors, which, apart from the private sector, include (all-level) government 
agencies (7 references, # 2, 3, 11-13, 16, including the role of public sector leaders 
as in Reference 18) and the public (with 4 references, i.e. #7, 8, 16, 17). It is worth 
noting that the 7 references to the government include 4 with rather negative 
sentiments, i.e. #3 where the Australian government by taking a short-term focus 
failed to proactively develop a competitiveness strategy for the national automobile 
manufacturing industry and instead opted for a single industry support scheme (in 
2000-2005) which did not prevent the industry from bankruptcy and cost AU$2.4 
billion to taxpayers; Reference 11 where it is suggested that the government does 
not have the sufficient capacity or capital funds to spur oil development projects so 
there is often a need to attract international oil corporations especially at the initial 
phase of natural resource development; references 12 and 13 suggest that while the 
Norwegian government intensified its own efforts to boost the industrial 
diversification rather than solely relying on market forces, while the Australian 
government largely relied on the market which then led to minimal cross-sectoral 
linkages but instead to a slowdown in the national industrial sector. Other 
references include #2 that provides an overview of different government 
approaches taken with regard to auto plant closures across England (based on 
competitive advantage by modernizing the auto sector) and Australia (based on 
comparative advantage vis-à-vis other domestic industries); Reference 16 suggests 
that with regard to managing rural-area pastoral properties, the Indigenous Land 
Corporation assists local aboriginal communities to acquire land for cultural, 
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economic and social purposes, while the government develops diversified carbon 
reduction opportunities for local farmers; and Reference 18 points to the role of 
imported externally-trained entrepreneurs with fresh minds (as opposed to local 
businesses) and public sector leaders in driving the economic diversification agenda 
and overcoming structural weaknesses in the Flinders Ranges region of South 
Australia. Thus, the government’s role in the Australian agenda-setting mosaic as 
perceived by the private sector (A-2-PS) is moderate. Finally, the public contributes 
to economic diversification discourse in the following cases: being rather a passive 
recipient of policy messages in contexts of ecotourism sustainability from the 
industry (# 7), the social system being exposed to climate change extremes (#8), 
and communities being exposed to the often negative influence of the staples (i.e. 
resource dependent) economy on demographics in terms of race, class, and gender 
(# 17), and on the other hand local aboriginal communities acting as a partner (along 
with government agencies and the more dominant private sector) in setting the 
policy agenda on carbon farming (#16). The summary of agenda-setting 
interactions can be presented in Figure 39. 
Figure 39 Key actor interactions (A-2-PS) in Australia-based economic 
diversification context 
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Note: The Australian-based private sector, as perceived within academia discourse 
(A-2-PS), largely drives both government and public agendas on economic 
diversification. 
Source: The author’s own analysis 
Think tanks 
 As in Appendix 6b, the total numbers of think tank references to 
government agencies (TT-2-G) and to the private sector (TT-2-PS) in Australian 
context are 37 each. First, with regard to TT-2-G references, interestingly only 4 
references point to negative sentiments toward government activities (#19, 20 
where the Western Australia government’s higher state taxes constrain the 
development of economic diversification in the region, and #29, 30 where two 
provinces – South Australia and Tasmania accordingly – are described as one of 
the least dynamic provincial economies in the country due to higher state taxes with 
both states in need of greater involvement of the private sector in pushing 
investment projects), while 3 references (#4, 32, 35) include neutral or mixed 
sentiments. The remaining 30 references generally point to the positive think tanks’ 
semantic perceptions, as in Figure 40. 
Figure 40 Think tank semantic assessment of the government on diversification in 
Australia 
 
Think tank references to Australian 
government agencies on diversification
Positive
Negative
Neutral
122 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on NVivo codes 
 The TT-2-G references, first, can be divided into policy areas. These include 
primary resource industries (with 20 references in total), e.g. agriculture (9 
references, #1, 4, 10, 24-28, 36), mining and basic energy such as oil, gas, 
electricity (5 references, #4, 5, 19, 20, 36), tourism (3 references, #1, 9, 26), forestry 
(3 references, #6, 7, 11); advanced industries (with 9 references in total), e.g. 
[transitioning towards] renewable energy (3 references, i.e. #1, 3, 21), bio-energy 
(2 references #3, 8), technology (2 references, i.e. #21, 35), R&D and vocational 
training (2 references, #36, 37); and other unclassified, i.e. manufacturing (7 
references, basically on the closure of car manufacturing, #14-18, 33, and other 
manufacturing, e.g. in Tasmania #6). Somewhat similarly to the Canadian case, 
Australian context demonstrates the (government-related) think tank discourse 
mainly focused on economy’s dependency on primary resource industries, while 
attention to the advanced sector in general seems evenly distributed among specific 
industries with renewable energy receiving slightly higher attention (though this is 
not strongly emphasized due to small N). 
 Next, these references can be classified in terms of the key actors. Apart 
from the generally positive sentiments toward government agencies as perceived 
by the think tank community in the context of Australia-based diversification 
policy, the other key actors prominently featured in the [actor-centric] agenda-
setting equation include the following: the private sector and industry (15 
references in total, including 5 references #10, 12, 19, 29, 30 emphasizing the 
industry’s leading position in pushing government policy agenda, and 7 references 
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#6-8, 23, 24, 26, 28 pointing to the partnership with the government and #12, 23, 
24 in partnership with local communities), academia and research (4 references 
emphasizing the need to act in partnership with government agencies in setting the 
agenda on diversification, i.e. #2 related to higher education, #3 on renewables and 
bio-energy, #11 in partnership with government, local communities and the private 
sector with regard to forestry development policy in Tasmania, though the next 
reference #12 provides greater detail by pointing to both the industry and local 
communities being the more robust players in this context), the public (6 references 
i.e. #9 where the role of aboriginal communities is emphasized, in partnership with 
government and industry in Northern Territory and #23 and 24 similarly on local 
community partnership with government agencies, #10 with the aboriginal 
community and government being the other actors in addition to the small-sized 
private sector as the leader in pushing agricultural land lease reforms in Northern 
Australia, #12, as mentioned above, where the local community along with the 
forestry industry are viewed as the two robust actors in Tasmanian forestry policy 
agenda context, #22 with the local community setting its economic policy agenda 
on NSW government). The summary of agenda-setting interactions is in Figure 41 
below. 
Figure 41 Key actors within think tank-to-government discourse on diversification 
in Australia 
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Note: As perceived by think tanks, it is largely the private sector and industry that 
drive policy agenda on economic diversification in Australian context. Compared 
to the Canadian case, the Australian setting exhibits multiple (often tripartite, e.g. 
community-academia-industry, industry-community-government) partnerships 
among the key actors. 
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
 
 Second, with regard to think tank references to the private sector (TT-2-PS, 
37 in total), first of all, it should be noted nearly all references portray positive 
sentiments toward the role of the private sector and industry, except a single 
reference (i.e. #8), where it points to Tasmania’s continuing dependence on primary 
resources, mainly the fishery industry, and the dependent relationship that evolved 
over time between the government and the industry further entrenched inefficient 
policies. Compared to TT-2-G references that include a slightly larger share of 
negative sentiments toward government inefficiencies (4 negative and 3 mixed) and 
given that the private sector is found to drive the policy agenda, it can be concluded 
now that it is the private sector and industry that set the government and public 
agendas on diversification as applied to Australian context. 
The Public (local and 
aboriginal 
communities) 
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4. 3 The Summary: Economic diversification across Canada and Australia 
            The major purpose of the quantitative analysis is to observe and contrast 
attention trends among the key actors over the time span of 2008-2015 in relation 
to economic diversification in both country cases and to build a ‘litmus test’ picture 
in terms of agenda-setting processes among key actors. The analysis leads to a 
number of observations. First, regarding economic diversification in Canadian 
context, three actors – media, the public, and government – generally remain 
inactive with their attention increasing only around 2014 (media, government) and 
2013 (the public), as in Figures 7-9. Thus it is largely the expert community, i.e. 
academia (with an attention spike around 2010 and recurring cycles, though 
somewhat downward as in Figure 10) and think tanks (with a distinct peak in 2011 
and then 2014 and recurring and increasing attention cycles, as in Figure 11) that 
appears to act as more vital actors in agenda-setting processes. Second, similarly to 
Canadian context, the Australian case demonstrates that the same three actors – 
media, the public, and government – remain inattentive throughout much of the 
period, i.e. to 2014 followed by an increase by 2015 (Figures 24-26). Among the 
expert community it is academia that exhibits a more distinct attention cycle with 
two clear peaks as compared to think tanks, first around 2011-2012 and then by 
2015. Thus both across Canada and Australia the major agenda-setting interactions 
are likely to involve think tanks and academia, as well as possibly another actor (or 
actors) as demonstrated by content analyses.  
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            The descriptive analysis of NVivo-generated nodes reveals a number of 
interesting observations. First, with regard to the ‘causes and effects’ node (Table 
6 below), both Canadian and Australian cases demonstrate an unambiguous 
division among actors in terms of evidence-driven attention intensity as measured 
by numbers of causes and effects. Particularly, while media, the public and 
government agencies appear to show limited attention, the experts – both academia 
and think tanks – largely demonstrate higher intensity of attention. This observation 
is important as this suggests that with a higher degree of evidence-driven attention 
intensity, i.e. interest to the issue, there is a greater plausibility of the experts’ ability 
to set their own agenda on other actors, e.g. the government. Among the experts, 
while the Canadian case does not reveal substantial differences among academia 
and think tanks, the Australian case clearly suggests it is academia that well 
outweighs the think tank community in terms of the number of causes and effects. 
This possibly suggests academia’s stronger evidence-driven interest in the issue 
vis-à-vis think tanks, possibly due to professional bias (i.e. focused on developing 
causal linkages) and thus its ability to set the agenda on other actors, i.e. non-experts 
and the government. 
Table 6Causes and effects on diversification across Canada and Australia 
Canada Australia 
 Causes Effects  Causes Effects 
Media 8 4 Media 10 4 
The Public 6 3 The Public 12 4 
The Government 6 0 The Government 0 3 
Academia 11 10 Academia 19 19 
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Think tanks 11 12 Think tanks 12 11 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on NVivo-generated nodes 
 Second, with regard to the ‘key actors’ node, two country cases present both 
commonalities and divergence (Table 7). To begin with, all actors except academia 
appear to emphasize the government in their discourse on economic diversification 
in the context of both Canada and Australia over the period. However, it remains 
to be seen whether this actually suggests the government’s stronger role in driving 
diversification policy agendas vis-à-vis other key actors or some references point 
to criticism toward government agencies for their policy failure and deficiencies in 
effectively driving the agenda on economic diversification. Next, both country 
cases demonstrate certain divergence. In the Canadian case, three actors – the 
public, government, and academia – refer to the public as the second key actor after 
the government, while media does so with regard to academia and think tanks with 
regards to the private sector. In the Australian example, it is largely the private 
sector that appears to be the second key actor (while think tanks co-assign the top 
spot both to the private sector and government agencies), except the government 
which, as in the Canadian case, views the public as the second key actor. Finally, 
the role of academia is also recognized though to a lesser degree than the 
government and the public: not only does academia view its own academic fellows 
as the top key actor in both countries, but Canada-based media considers academia 
the second key actor. 
 Lastly, it is interesting to contrast the two national governments in terms of 
resilience against external pressure. As mentioned earlier in the Quantitative 
analysis section, with regard to diversification the Canadian government mostly 
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refers to its own agencies (28 references), distantly followed by the public (7) as in 
Appendix 4a, thus further supporting another observation (in the case of violent 
crime) regarding Canadian government’s stronger resilience vis-à-vis its Australian 
counterpart. The Australian government, on the contrary, though predominantly 
referring to its own government agencies, pays certain attention to other actors, 
such as the private sector, followed by the public and academia. Such a diffusion 
of attention across a wider range of actors in the Australian case further reinforces 
the observation regarding Canadian government’s stronger resilience vis-à-vis its 
Australian counterpart. 
 
 
 
Table 7 Key actors on economic diversification across Canada and Australia 
Canada Australia 
 Key actors  Key actors 
Media  Government (33), 
academia (19),  
the private sector (13) 
Media  Government (19),  
the private sector (17), 
academia (9) 
The Public Government (24), 
the public (13), 
academia (7), 
the private sector (6) 
The Public Government (7), 
the public (6) 
The Government Government (28), 
the public (7) 
The Government Government (24),  
the private sector (13), 
the public (7), 
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academia (7) 
Academia Academia (20),  
the public (16), 
government (15) 
Academia Academia (23),  
the private sector (22), 
government (20), 
the public (13) 
Think tanks Government (33),  
the private sector (26),  
the public (17) 
Think tanks The private sector (37), 
government (37),  
think tanks (28),  
the public (27), 
academia (13) 
Source: The author’s own analytics based on NVivo-generated nodes 
 Third, as Table 8 below suggests, the actors across the two countries 
predominantly emphasize the following three major industrial sectors in their 
diversification discourse: first of all, the primary resource extraction sector, the 
followed by advanced industries, and the service sector, while the “other” sector, 
e.g. manufacturing and defense industries, is rather idiosyncratic. The focus by the 
majority of actors on the primary resource sector points to two important policy 
implications: first, the discourse is developed in the context of energy rich 
economy’s continued dependency on primary resources, i.e. mining, agriculture, 
and forestry, and thus with the need to diversify into other, more sustainable, 
industries; and second, the primary resource sector is widely viewed by the majority 
of actors to be the basis for further diversification (green energy constitutes a 
significant part of the advanced industry sector). 
Table 8 Industrial sectors for economic diversification in Canada and Australia 
Canada Australia 
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 Sectors/Industries  Sectors/Industries 
Media  Primary resources (40): 
-Mining (27), agriculture (13).  
Advanced industries (39): 
-Tech (16), green energy (10), processing 
(8), knowledge (5). 
Services (24), including: 
- Transport (10), arts and culture (7), tourism 
(6). 
Media  Primary resources (57): 
-Mining (33), agriculture (24). 
Other (41): 
-Manufacturing (24), defense (12), and 
construction (5). 
Services (35), including: 
-Tourism (18), arts and culture (4). 
Advanced industries (34): 
-Tech (13), green energy (11), and knowledge (10). 
The Public Primary resources (23): 
-Mining (19), agriculture (4).  
Advanced industries (15): 
 -Tech (6), green energy (6), and oil and gas 
refinery (3). 
Services (6), including: 
-Arts and culture (2), tourism (1). 
The Public Advanced industries (11): 
-Green energy (9), tech (2). 
Primary resources [Mining]: (7). 
 
The 
Government 
Advanced industries (19): 
-Tech (8), knowledge (8), green energy (3). 
Primary resources (18): 
-Mining (10), agriculture (8).  
Services (13), including: 
-Tourism (8), entertainment (2). 
Other [manufacturing] (8). 
The 
Government 
Primary resources (28): 
-Agriculture (18), Mining (10). 
Services (23), including: 
-Tourism (8), transport (1). 
 Advanced industries (16),  
-Tech (8), knowledge (6), and green energy (2). 
-Other [manufacturing] (12). 
Academia Primary resources (26): 
-Mining (13), agriculture (13).  
Advanced industries (15): 
Academia Primary resources (38): 
-Agriculture (21), mining (17) Services (29), 
including: 
-Tourism (17), transport (1). 
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-Tech (6), bio-energy (3), green energy (5), 
knowledge (1)  
Services (14), including: 
-Tourism (9), transport (2). 
Advanced industries (10):  
-Tech (4), green energy (3), and bio-fuels and 
processing (3). 
Other (7): -Manufacturing (5), and construction 
(2). 
Think tanks Primary resources (54): 
-Mining (38), agriculture (16)  
Advanced industries (28): 
-Tech (10), knowledge (9), green energy (9).  
Services (24), including: 
-Transport (10), tourism (3). 
Think tanks Primary resources (79): 
-Mining (48), agriculture (31).  
Advanced industries (46): 
-Knowledge (24), tech (11), bio-fuel and refinery 
processing (6), and green energy (5).   
Services (45), including: 
-Tourism (17) and transport (3). 
Other (23): 
-Manufacturing (15), defense (8). 
Source: The author’s own analytics based on NVivo-generated nodes 
 Lastly, among the major types of economic diversification, the following 
two types common among the majority of actors emerge: first of all, market and 
then followed by industrial diversification (as in Table 9 below). The remaining 
types of economic diversification, i.e. product diversification and diversifying 
within the energy sector, appear significantly less common. It is worth noting that 
media and governments tend to emphasize market diversification over other types. 
This appears understandable, as both media and government agencies tend to 
interact with the public: media’s interest lies in ‘selling’ digestible press articles to 
the mass audience based on a less technical market dimension of diversification 
than higher-quality product and industrial types that often require sophisticated 
technical analyses, and, furthermore, as a non-expert, media itself might face 
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challenges trying to comprehend the essence of often research-intense product and 
industry diversification policy. It is thus natural to expect these two types of 
diversification policy (i.e. product and industrial diversification) to be the focus 
area for the expert community, i.e. academia and think tanks (as Table 9 largely 
demonstrates). 
Table 9 Types of economic diversification across Canada and Australia 
Canada Australia 
 Types of diversification  Types of diversification 
Media  Market diversification (11), 
industrial (9), within energy (6). 
Media  Market diversification (14), 
industrial (9), within energy (6). 
The Public Market diversification (11), 
industry (9), and 
diversifying within energy (4). 
The Public Diversifying within energy (3), 
industry diversification (1). 
The 
Government 
Market diversification (10), 
industry (5), product (5). 
The 
Government 
Market diversification (16), 
industry (11), product (7), and 
within energy (7). 
Academia Product diversification (11), 
market (8), within energy (6), and 
industry (5). 
Academia Industrial diversification (20), 
product (15), market (8), and 
within energy (2). 
Think tanks Market diversification (37), 
product (18), industry (12), and 
within energy (8). 
Think tanks Industrial diversification (35), 
market (22), product (9), and 
within energy (5). 
Source: The author’s own analytics based on NVivo-generated nodes 
 Last, the content analysis of specific codes related to the ‘key actors’ node 
further reveals a number of interesting observations. First, with regard to 
diversification policy in Canadian context, media largely perceives academia to 
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drive economic diversification policy agenda, followed by a moderate role 
attributed to the government that is viewed to possess the capacity to lead policy 
agendas related to basic, i.e. primary resource, sectors (e.g. agriculture, energy and 
asbestos policies) and infrastructure-related projects, e.g. irrigation water supply in 
remote areas; similarly, the public also views academia, along with the private 
sector, to drive policy agenda-setting processes; government perceptions largely 
view the public to drive policy agenda-setting, though the importance of 
maintaining strong partnership relations with both the public and the private sector 
is also emphasized; academia views itself to be the key agenda-setter with the need 
to maintain partnership links with the private sector in order to sustain its own 
leadership position; and finally, the think tank community largely perceives the 
private sector and industry to set the policy agenda on economic diversification (as 
in Table 10). Thus, the leading role of academia is emphasized by three actors, i.e. 
media, the public and academia itself; the private sector is emphasized in the 
public’s and think tank discourse; and the public is emphasized by the government. 
Though academia appears to set the policy agenda overall, it is closely followed by 
the private sector (as academia emphasizes the need to partner with the private 
sector in order to retain the leading position in agenda-setting). This is a vital 
finding, as the private sector is initially an important, though not crucial, omitted 
variable, i.e. not included into the agenda-setting equation. This entails certain 
policy implications, i.e. the Canadian government should account for messages and 
policy recommendations both from academia (primarily due to the technical nature 
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of the policy issue) and the private sector if it aims to effectively transition from 
policy agenda-setting to sound implementation. 
Table 10 The summary of key actors in Canada-based diversification context 
 Media The public The government Academia Think tanks 
Key 
actors 
M-2-G: the 
government’s role 
is limited to basic 
sectors and 
infrastructure; 
M-2-A: academia 
sets the agenda 
P-2-G: the private 
sector and industry 
and academia set the 
agenda; 
P-2-P: academia 
and the private 
sector and industry 
G-2-G: partner 
with the private 
sector and the 
public; 
G-2-P: the 
public drives 
policy agenda* 
A-2-A: 
academia sets 
public and 
government 
agenda; partner 
with the private 
sector. 
TT-2-G: the private 
sector sets policy 
agenda;  
TT-2-PS: the private 
sector sets agenda 
Note: *denotes a small N issue, i.e. fewer than 10 references 
Source: The author’s own analysis 
 Another policy implication is with regard to designing next policy steps, as 
perceived by some of the actors, for Canadian government agencies to adopt. 
Specifically, according to the major agenda setter, i.e. academia, further discourse 
on economic diversification in Canadian context should be primarily focused on 
the mining and energy industry as an engine for diversification (see p. 62 and the 
note for Figure 19), thus government policy measures should address the 
transformation toward advanced industries specifically around renewable energy 
and bio-fuels. This policy message is further triangulated with a recommendation 
by think tanks whereby diversification agenda should be pursued based on 
transforming the energy sector toward renewables and technology (p. 66) with a 
vivid realization of the continuing importance of the mining and agriculture 
industries as the basis for diversification discourse (p. 70). 
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 Second, regarding economic diversification in the Australian case, media 
largely perceives the private sector to set both the government agenda on 
diversification policy (to a greater extent) and public agenda (to a lesser extent), 
while the government also pursues partnership relations with the private sector, as 
in Figure 31. Thus it is not surprising that based on government perceptions, the 
private sector should indeed seek to establish partnerships with government 
agencies, while the government also pursues partnerships with the public and 
academia (both to a lesser extent than with the private sector), as in figures 34, 35. 
Next, the public largely refers to government agencies with negative sentiments, 
thus undermining its capacity to lead diversification agenda (though with a small N 
issue in mind), while attributing a stronger role to the energy industry, followed by 
the private sector and media. With regard to the experts, both academia and think 
tanks attribute a robust role to the private sector and industry, while academia also 
views itself to be another key actor in setting the policy agenda on diversification 
in Australian context (see Table 11 below for the summary of key actors in setting 
the economic diversification policy agenda in Australian context). 
Table 11 The summary table of key actors in the context of Australia-based 
diversification 
 Media The public The government Academia Think tanks 
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Key 
actors 
M-2-G: the private 
sector partners with 
government; 
M-2-PS: the private 
sector largely sets 
the agenda, while 
also in partnership 
with government. 
P-2-G: the private 
sector and 
industry set the 
agenda*; 
P-2-P: the mining 
industry actually 
sets the agenda*. 
G-2-G: partner 
with the private 
sector; 
G-2-PS: partner 
with the private 
sector. 
A-2-A: 
academia and 
the private 
sector set the 
agenda;  
A-2-PS: the 
private sector. 
TT-2-G: the 
private sector sets 
policy agenda;  
TT-2-PS: the 
private sector sets 
agenda 
Note: *denotes a small N issue, i.e. fewer than 10 references 
Source: The author’s own analysis 
 Thus it is interesting to note that while the Canadian case suggests the 
relative prevalence of academia, followed by the private sector (still being another 
key actor), the Australian context demonstrates greater prevalence of the private 
sector and industry in setting the policy agenda on economic diversification, while 
academia is not viewed as a robust actor (except as perceived by itself). Given the 
near-monopoly position attributed to the private sector, as perceived by other key 
actors, it is thus unsurprising to observe Australian government’s use of partnership 
as a strategy to accommodate the agenda-setting ambitions of the private sector 
(e.g. see Figure 31 as perceived by media, figures 34 and 35 as perceived by the 
government, Figure 37 as perceived by academia, and Figure 41 as perceived by 
the think tank community). On the contrary, the Canadian government somewhat 
appears to ‘enjoy’ the privilege of occasionally rejecting the public’s calls for 
policy messages on diversification, primarily due to two reasons. First, economic 
diversification is rather a technical issue that requires deeper expertise often 
possessed by experts, e.g. academia, as well as the private sector. Second, Canadian 
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government apparently comprehends (or at least intuitively senses) that the policy 
agenda space is contested mainly by academia and private sector, while the public 
is also viewed by government figures as an actor that should not be ignored 
completely. The government, therefore, may occasionally reject public messages 
not out of ignorance but because of the ‘need’ to refer to the expertise provided by 
Canada-based academia and policy advice from the private sector. As a result, it is 
not surprising that the public in both countries largely views the government with 
negative sentiments (17 out 24 references, or 70.1% in Canadian context [see also 
Figure 14], versus 100%, or 7 out of 7 references, in Australian context, though a 
small N should be taken into account). Finally, in terms of policy implications, the 
Australian case similarly points to the continued importance of mining and energy 
sectors which should form the basis for further diversification discourse.  
Chapter 5. Data Analysis on Violent crime  
Similarly to the case of economic diversification policy, the three level 
analyses – the ‘litmus test’ quantitative analysis, the descriptive analysis of NVivo 
nodes, and the content (semantic) analysis of specific codes related to the ‘key 
actors’ node – are now applied to the violent crime policy case with regards to 
Canadian and Australian country contexts. As mentioned in Ch. 3, due to the social 
sensitivity around violent crime, the major assumption (Hypothesis 2) is that either 
the public or media is expected to drive the policy agenda. Thus this section should 
confirm, disprove, or more specifically refine this hypothesized assumption. 
5.1 Violent crime in Canadian context 
5.1.1 Quantitative analysis 
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The Government 
The search for documented mentions, e.g. bills and online publications, 
related to Canadian government activities on violent crime over the span of 2008-
2015 follows the same logic and procedure as for economic diversification (see 
Section 4.2 above). The search command employed is the following: “Violent 
crime AND Canada”. 
 The LexisInfo Parliamentary database search offered 11 results. Following 
a check based on substance of content and relevance criteria, the final sample 
selected for analysis is 5 bills. Google search (with the following command: 
“violent crime AND Canada” filtered for the time span of 2008-2015) suggested 
the total of 106 results, of which then 27 have been selected. Thus, the total sample 
size is 32 documented mentions by Canadian government agencies. 
 The total sample of 32 documents selected for analysis includes the 
following: 6 documents in 2015, 5 in 2014, 2 in 2013, 2 in 2012, 5 in 2011, 5 in 
2010, 5 in 2009, and 2 in 2008 (as in Figure 42 below). As plotted data suggest, the 
violent crime topic generally did not remain high on Canadian government agenda 
except two moderate spikes, i.e. in 2009-2011 (with 5 documented files), and then 
2014-2015 (5 and 6 files). 
Figure 42 Trends in Canadian government activity on violent crime 
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Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
Media 
The combined search (by employing Google search and LexisNexis) for 
media mentions on violent crime has led to the final selection of 155 articles. In the 
process of selecting media articles 5 Google-generated media articles and 150 
pieces produced by LexisNexis were selected. The search command employed is 
the following: 
- ["violent crime" AND Canada] for Google search as filtered for the time span of 
2008-2015. The search brought 105 mentions (including pieces by international 
organizations, research depositories, all levels of Canadian governments, 
Wikipedia pages etc.  
- ["violent crime" AND Canada and HEADLINE (Violent crime OR Violence), 
Geography - Canada] for the LexisNexis database, which then returned 240 news 
articles. 
 The final sample of 155 media articles includes 22 documented in 2015, 
followed by 19 in 2014, 14 in 2013, with a spike of 42 in 2012, 10 in 2011, 12 in 
2010, 17 in 2009 and 19 in 2008 (see Figure 43 below).  
Figure 43 Trends in Canadian media activity on violent crime 
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Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
As data suggest, Canadian media remained dormant in 2008-2011, with a 
sudden, if not sensation-driven, spike in 2012 (42 mentions) mainly due to two 
horrific mass shootings – at the Eaton Center in June and on Danzig street in July 
– both in Toronto. Since 2013 onwards, media attention to the issue remained 
significantly lower than in 2012 but with a steadily growing trend, unlike the 2008-
2011 period, which showed a downward trend. 
 
 
The Public 
The search for public sentiments employed the combination of Google (with 
the aim to collect any blog pieces), and LexisNexis (with the aim to collect media 
articles with public comments posted, letters to the editor, and opinion articles). 
The Google search did not generate any blog pieces over the analyzed time span, 
while LexisNexis produced the following: media articles with public comments 
posted (13), letters to the editor (4), and opinion articles (3). Due to the short nature 
of most comments online, for quantitative analysis readers’ comments are analyzed 
as a separate unit of analyses vis-à-vis media articles.  
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Thus, over the time span of 2008-2015, the total of 20 media articles (with 
comments), letters to the editor and opinion articles have been selected for analysis. 
These include 5pieces in 2015, followed by 4 in 2014, 3 in 2013, 3 in 2012, 4 in 
2011, 0 in 2010, 5 in 2009, and 2 in 2008 (Figure 44). The data suggest certain 
observations. First, while the public’s attention increased gradually in the case of 
economic diversification, with regard to violent crime in Canada the pattern appears 
more chaotic. This is possibly due to the effect of various focusing events, as well 
as correlations with media publications. The qualitative content analysis sub-
section below should offer specific reasons that would explain the observed 
phenomenon in greater detail. Second, the public’s attention trends demonstrate 2 
spikes – in 2009, and then 2015 (with 5 mentions each). Accounting for the number 
of reader comments, the 2015 spike appears to be more pronounced (with 7 
comments) vs. the 2009 spike (with 2 comments). 
 
Figure 44 Trends in Canadian (online) public activity on violent crime 
 
Note: Blue – media articles, letters, and opinion pieces; Red – readers’ comments. 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on the collected data 
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Academia 
The search for academic publications related to violent crime in Canadian 
context was carried out by using Web of Science and Scopus. The total sample size 
over the time span selected for analysis is 60. This includes 9 publications in 2015, 
12 in 2014, 9 in 2013, 7 in 2012, 7 in 2011, 6 in 2010, 6in 2009 and 4 in 2008 
(Figure45). 
 The plotted data suggest a couple of interesting observations. First, Canada-
related academia’s attention trends to the issue ofviolent crime policy generally 
gradually increase throughout much of the time span, except a slight downward 
slope in 2014-2015. Another related observation is a single spike in academia’s 
attention around the year 2014. Although its attention slightly went downward by 
2015, it nevertheless remained quite high (with 12 publications in 2014 and 9 in 
2015). Tentatively, academia’s overall pattern resembles the trends shown by non-
experts, i.e. lacking a distinct cycle of attention. 
Figure 45 Trends in Canadian academic publications on violent crime 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
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           The search for relevant publications on violent crime from the websites of 
Canada-based think tanks results in the selection of 27 publications over the 2008-
2015 time span. These include 7 publications in 2015, 6 in 2014, 2 in 2013, 1 in 
2012, 3 in 2011, 5 in 2010, 2 in 2009, and 1 in 2008. 
           The generated results are plotted in Figure 46 below. There are two 
observations worth noting. First, the trends demonstrate that there are 2 distinct 
spikes in attention among think tanks in relation to violent crime – first, around 
2010 (5 publications), and then a further spike in 2014-2015 (6 and 7 publications, 
accordingly).Furthermore, similar to economic diversification, the trends for 
violent crime generally demonstrate an increase over the time span. However, 
unlike diversification which does not show distinct cycles of attention, violent 
crime trends demonstrate a complete cycle, i.e. in 2008-2012 followed by a new 
take-off peaking around 2015. Academia, on the other hand, does not show cycles 
and instead resembles patterns attributable to non-experts. Think tanks, however, 
though resembling a pattern of an expert actor that follows its own agenda and not 
exposed to the pressure of other actors or critical events, do not produce a large 
number of documented mentions, i.e. 27 vs. 60 of academia. Thus it is unclear yet 
which actor is likely to set the agenda on violent crime in Canadian context. This 
should become clear as qualitative content analysis is completed. 
Figure 46 Trends in Canadian think tank publications on violent crime 
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Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
5.1.2 The descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes 
Canadian-based media, as it refers to the issue of violent crime over the 
period, first of all, demonstrates attention toward specific actors that is measured 
by the number of media references (Appendix 2c). The key actors to which media 
refers to in its discourse on violent crime include government agencies (with 74 
references), including police (31), closely followed by the public and NGOs (69), 
including aboriginal communities (15), while the rest receives either moderate (i.e. 
academia – 29 references and other media counterparts – 22) or negligible attention 
(i.e. think tanks, with 6 references). The semantic (content) analysis of specific 
codes related to the ‘key actors’ node below should clarify whether relatively 
frequent media references to the government actually means a stronger role 
assigned to this actor in setting violent crime policy agenda on or whether some 
references include criticism raised with regard to government, or police, 
inefficiencies in the area of violent crime policy. It is interesting to note a difference 
among the two policy issues in Canadian context: while the descriptive analysis of 
NVivo nodes on diversification suggests that the second key actor is academia 
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(following the government), this analysis on violent crime suggests that the second 
key actor is the public closely following the government. Again, the semantic 
analysis should clarify the degree of robustness of the public, as an actor, in setting 
the agenda on violent crime. Second, another important node is types of violent 
crime. Media pays more attention to the use of guns and firearms (60 references) 
and cases of murder and homicide (58), distantly followed by gang violence (34) 
and violence against youth and children (33), while the other types of violent crime 
receive less attention. Last, but not least, the third NVivo node is a set of causes 
and effects of violent crime: media develops the total of 67 causes and 7 effects 
over the time span. 
The other non-expert, i.e. the (online) public or netizens, though exhibiting 
less attention to the issue vis-à-vis media outlets, first tends to emphasize the role 
of the public (21 references) in driving the agenda on violent crime in Canada, 
followed by government agencies (16), and then media (8) and academia (6), as in 
Appendix 3c. Second, the public-led discourse highlights the following two major 
types of violent crime: use of guns and firearms in committing violence (11 
references) and violence against women (9), while the other categories receive less 
attention, e.g. murders and homicide (6), gang violence (4) etc. It is worth noting 
significant correlation in attention among the non-experts: both appear to 
predominantly focus on guns and firearms, and although the public’s next priority 
is violence against women, both actors’ attention also appears to be attracted to 
murder and homicide cases, which are the second priority item to media and the 
third to the public. Last, the public develops the total of 20 causes and none of effect 
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of violent crime. This appears plausible as establishing or suggesting possible 
causal and effect links generally presupposes regular institutionalized attention, 
while the public appears to exhibit sporadic and unsystematic attention, as noted 
earlier in Section 4.1.2 with regard to economic diversification in Australian 
context. Yet, it is interesting to observe that compared to the issue of economic 
diversification, the public demonstrates higher, though rather unsystematic, interest 
to violent crime as measured by the number of causes and effects overall, i.e. 6 and 
3 versus 20 and 0 accordingly. Furthermore, the nature of the public’s unsystematic 
attention is demonstrated by the quantitative analysis above (Figure 44, p. 118). 
Among the experts, academia first of all, refers to contributions of their 
academic colleagues to violent crime discourse (55 references), distantly followed 
by the public (25) and the government (23), as in Appendix 5c. The other actors, 
i.e. media (10) and think tanks (1) receive significantly less credit. Second, 
academic interest appears to be spread across a range of types of violent crime: 
youth and child violence (18), closely followed by murder and homicide cases and 
violence against women (with 15 references each), and drug-fueled violence (14), 
while the rest receives less attention. Finally, academia appears to suggest a number 
of causes and effects of violent crime similarly to media, i.e. 63 causes and 7 effects 
(academia) vs. 67 causes and 7 effects (media), accordingly. 
The other expert, i.e. think tanks, predominantly refer to government 
agencies (43 references) in their discourse on violent crime, distantly followed by 
the public (24), while the other actors receive less attention, i.e. think tanks (12), 
academia (10), and media (5). This differs from academia, which largely refers to 
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its own colleagues (academia – 55), followed by the public (25) and the government 
(23). Second, with regards to types of violent crime, the Canadian think tank 
community’s interest appears to be concentrated around murders and homicide (17 
references), while other categories are of less interest, e.g. physical violence (8), 
youth (6) and gun violence (6) among others. Finally, think tanks develop the total 
of 16 causes and two effects, thus failing to resemble the systematic and profound 
attention typically attributed to expert communities. This drastically differs from 
the Australian case that produces 64 references to causes and 11 effects as related 
to violent crime discourse (Appendix 6d). 
The last remaining actor, i.e. the government, largely refers to its own agencies 
(23), distantly followed by the public (7) while other actors receive negligible 
attention (i.e. media with 2 references and academia with 1), which again supports 
the notion of government resilience against external pressure. Interestingly, the 
Australian government mostly refers to the public and NGOs (with 33 references, 
including 10 for aboriginal communities) in its violent crime discourse, followed 
by its own agencies (26, including 8 for police), while other actors receive moderate 
attention (Appendix 6d). With regard to types of violent crime, the government 
appears to focus mainly on physical violence (18), youth violence (13), and murder 
and homicide (12), while guns and firearms (9) and violence against women (9) 
receive moderate attention, and the rest even less so. Finally, the government 
produces the total of 10 causes and 4 effects of violent crime as related to Canadian 
context over the time span. This may resemble attention trends typically 
demonstrated by non-experts. 
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            To summarize, nearly all actors (except academia) point either to 
government agencies or the public as key actors in their violent crime discourse, 
with government being the first key actor (as suggested by media, think tanks, and 
the government itself) and the second being the public (as suggested by media, 
academia, think tanks, and government). This may, at first glance, appear at odds 
with the domination of media and academia in the ‘Causes and effects’ node. 
However, this phenomenon can be explained as follows. Media’s high interest to 
violent crime is understandable, as it is plausibly driven by its desire for sensation, 
which is tentatively found earlier (see Figure 43 and an analysis of trends) 
specifically related to high-profile cases of gun violence and mass murder. 
Academia’s overreaction to developing a relatively high number of causes and 
effects (67 and 7 respectively) can be plausibly explained by professional bias, i.e. 
the very nature of conducting sound academic research that is based on building 
causality links. Thus the agenda-setting interactions are likely to include 
government agencies (at all levels) and the public, with a possibility of engaging 
yet another actor unobservable at this stage, i.e. omitted variable bias. Next, 
regarding types of violent crime, both media and the public emphasize gun 
violence, which further reinforces an earlier observation regarding media’s quest 
for sensation. Another key type of violent crime is murder and homicide as pointed 
to by the majority, i.e. all actors except the public (and being the third priority to 
the government, closely following youth violence). As a final note, the next section 
analyzes the ‘key actors’ node in detail in order to better understand agenda-setting 
processes among various actors in violent crime policy context. 
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5.1.3 The content analysis of the ‘key actors’ node 
Media 
As the descriptive analysis above suggests, the two key actors with the 
larger numbers of media references are the Canadian government agencies (74 
references) and the public (69). These references are further analyzed in terms of 
semantic assessments based on specific codes as related to violent crime22. 
With regard to Canadian government agencies, media references, similarly 
to the case of economic diversification, can be divided into the following three 
broad groups (as in Figure 47 below): positive references to government activities 
focusing on violent crime (36 references), negative sentiment assessments (30), 
followed by neutral references (8), i.e. those with the plain description of 
government (or police) reactions to certain cases of violent crime and those 
containing mixed assessments (i.e. Reference 8, where the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police first issues a report on murder cases of indigenous women, that is 
an example of positive contribution to analytical debates, and yet the Conservative 
government rebuffs public calls for an inquiry to thoroughly investigate the causes 
of large-scale tragedy, an example of negative sentiment). It is worth noting that 
vis-à-vis the policy issue of economic diversification, the case of violent crime 
suggests that the government receives less negative assessments. This observation 
is due to two primary factors: first, given a higher degree of social sensitivity of 
violent crime versus diversification, the government appears to pay serious 
attention to this issue and thus attempts to craft efficient policies to address the evil; 
                                               
22 The complete content of NVivo transcripts can be accessed by following this link: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327552016_NVivo_transcripts_Key_Actors_-_Media 
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second, the nature of the issue presupposes the greater involvement of police 
agencies (that function under the umbrella of public organizations). Indeed, among 
the 36 documented positive sentiment references, the role of police agencies (either 
by issuing worthy analytical reports or by conducting effective criminal 
investigations) features prominently in 20 sources; 10 sources refer to government 
ministries (e.g. the Ministry of Labor with its effective inspections aimed at 
reducing workplace violence, as in References 2 and 12), the role of Prime Minister 
and federal laws (Reference 38 where Ontario Premier McGuinty expresses his 
government’s commitment to funding a Toronto-based special police squad; 
Reference 45 where residents of Samson Cree in the Edmonton area vote on a new 
bylaw entailing the imprisonment of individuals in connection with acts of violence 
that have devastating effects on the local aboriginal community); and the remaining 
6 references point to the role of government agencies as a source of valuable data 
(primarily Statistics Canada, as in References 1, 11, 14, 16, 23 [Justice Canada], 
and 29 [police data]). Next, though outnumbered by positive sentiments, the 30 
documented negative references include the following types: lack of proactive 
action on the part of key figures such as Prime Minister, provincial governments 
etc. (15 references # 3, 9, 10, 15, 17, 19, 21, 28, 47 – 49, 53, 59, 66, 69), criticism 
toward police agencies (9 references # 4, 5, 31, 32, 34, 36, 44, 50, 73), and, to less 
degree, inaccuracies in Statistics Canada reporting (references 6, 46, and 72 but 
particularly Reference 37, which shows a clash between what appears to be a drop 
in violent crime as recorded by Statistics Canada and Forum Poll (a public opinion 
poll) conducted for the National Post media indicating growing fears among the 
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majority of Canadian population (54% of those surveyed versus one third who 
disagreed). The latter episode is quite revealing, as it points to the potential of the 
public to push their own agenda on the government by effectively disproving 
official government statistics on levels of violent crime. The semantic content 
analysis of media references to the public should confirm this tentative (and rather 
idiosyncratic) observation. Further, it is worth noting that while Canadian police 
agencies enjoy relatively higher positive media semantic references (20 positive 
versus 9 negative), federal and provincial governments receive rather negative 
assessments (15 negative versus 10 positive references), which further supports the 
(triangulated) observation on the government’s limited ability to set the policy 
agenda specifically on violent crime in Canada, though it appears resilient in 
pursuing its own agenda (as identified, first in Quantitative analysis, and then 
further reinforced in the Descriptive analysis above). 
Figure 47 Media semantic assessment of government activities on violent crime in 
Canada 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on NVivo codes 
Next, regarding media references to the role of the public in the context of 
violent crime discourse, it is worth noting that unlike media references to the 
government, the public largely avoids explicitly negative sentiments, i.e. 3 
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documented negative assessments out of the total of 69 media references. The 
remaining 66 media references to the public broadly include the following 
categories: NGOs and activists (26 media references), aboriginal communities (17), 
followed by the role of public opinion (16), and local communities and 
neighborhoods other than the aboriginal community groups (10)23. The role of 
NGOs, due to their institutionalized presence on the policy arena, tends to be mainly 
related to launching new projects and/or reports and data that spur analytic debates 
(e.g. references 3, 9, 23, 33, 37, 38 etc.) or providing assistance to victims of violent 
crime (references 7, 15, 16, 18, 19, 24, 35 etc.). In particular, a report issued by 
Quebec Native Women Inc. NGO (Arsenault 2015, Dec 14, as in Reference 3) on 
violence against indigenous women found the existence of a code of silence among 
aboriginals with female victims often feeling fear and shame, which sparked intense 
debates and further effectively set the political agenda, as the federal government 
is now set to begin a national inquiry to analyze cases of murdered and missing 
indigenous female victims. In an earlier similar case, the Native Women’s 
Association of Canada developed data on the same issue, i.e. missing and murdered 
indigenous women, which amounted to 600 over the previous two decades (Woods 
2013, Sep 1, as in Reference 33). However, at that time around 2013 the issue 
remained largely ignored as Prime Minister Harper was busy trying to delay 
Parliament processes that would look into the causes of the issue, and also trying to 
stall calls into a national public inquiry (ibid). Next, the role of local communities 
                                               
23 Some references may point to more than a single category, e.g. Reference 3 emphasizing both 
the need to respond to the needs of aboriginal communities with regard to murdered and missing 
Native women and the role of an NGO (Quebec Native Women Inc.) that sparked debates by 
issuing a report on violence against women. 
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and neighborhoods is largely limited to being reactionary to certain events, e.g. 
references 29, 30, 49 where the Somali Canadian community urges police to react 
to an upsurge of violence against the Somali diaspora, while in references 39, 43, 
44 police comes into contact with local neighborhoods in attempts to moderate 
violent crime. Finally, with regard to public opinion, this manifests itself in a 
number of instances, e.g. Reference 5, where the public is outraged at the persistent 
prevalence of violence against women across the nation, with the public connecting 
this crime with larger social structures including within public institutions that the 
government continues to refuse. Put in other words, the Canadian government 
frequently demonstrates robust resilience against public pressure, although in some 
cases the public effectively sets the government agenda on violent crime, as 
described above (e.g. Arsenault 2015, Dec 14). The summary of mediatized 
agenda-setting interactions in the context of Canadian violent crime discourse is 
presented in Figure 48. To conclude this part, although the public initially appears 
to include four agenda-setting drivers – NGOs and activists, aboriginal 
communities, local communities and neighborhoods (other than aboriginal), and 
public opinion – local communities and neighborhoods generally remain rather 
passive as they mostly react to certain (often unfavorable) events or become 
somewhat active only in cooperation with police agencies. Compared with the 
government, the public in overall appears to set the policy agenda on violent crime 
in Canada as suggested by media discourse. 
Figure 48 Mediatized agenda-setting processes in Canadian violent crime context 
 NGOs 
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Note: Three elements - NGOs, aboriginal communities and public opinion - form 
the agenda-setting core of the public by sending messages to the government. The 
government, on the other hand, often (but not always) exhibits strong resilience 
against external pressure. 
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
 
The Public 
As noted earlier in the descriptive analysis (and also Appendix 3c), the two 
actors with the larger numbers of references in the context of violent crime in 
Canada as perceived by the public are the public itself (with 21 references) and the 
government (16 references). This section seeks to include a semantic content 
analysis of specific NVivo codes in order to identify which of these two actors is 
more plausible to drive the policy agenda on violent crime. 
First, with regard to references to the public, similar to the Australian case 
these are generally void of negative sentiments (with only 3 exceptions, i.e. 
Reference 7 pointing to social stigma by blaming women for being victims of male-
dominated violence; Reference 8 with the misogyny thesis and society remaining 
silent instead of taking action; and Reference 10 that suggests a lack of 
accountability among leaders of aboriginal communities when receiving support 
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from the federal government). Apart from these, the sentiments overall appear 
positive with regard to the Canadian public driving the agenda on violent crime. 
The major sub-issues of public interest include domestic (family) violence and 
against women (6 references #1, 6, 9, 13, 17, 19), gun violence (5 references, #4, 
11, 15, 16, 18), while the rest refers to the mega-issue of violent crime. Again, 
similar to the Australian case below, the public’s attention seems narrowly focused 
on two areas – domestic violence (and violence against women) and gun violence. 
Among the positive sentimental references to the public are Reference 2, where the 
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (an NGO) brings up the issue of police 
brutality and police-involved deaths of local residents by conducting its own 
research and attracting wide attention of netizens; Reference 3, where in response 
to a Statistics Canada report Toronto-based Professor Anthony Doob refers to the 
1960-70s period as an “unexplained upward blip” in violent crime, while the public 
appears to provide a plausible explanation for this being that the baby boom 
generation was born in 1952-1965, thus the peak ages of criminal activity happened 
around 14-25; Reference 13 where in the opinion of Canadian Women’s 
Foundation CEO, effectively addressing violence against women requires 
bolstering public education (thus empowering the public), boosting violence 
prevention programs (thus strengthening the capacity of NGOs), and sound 
criminal justice response (thus in cooperation with a government department); 
Reference 14 where an online commentator reminds the audience that to 
questionable government decision-making can be avoided by eliminating voter 
apathy, hence the driving role of the public; Reference 20 pointing to the 
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importance of public perceptions, especially when readers express disagreement 
with police data on violent crime; and Reference 21 relates to the role of an NGO 
driving the policy agenda on prison reform, etc. To summarize, the public well 
presents itself as a robust actor able and motivated to drive policy agendas. 
Next, with regard to the public’s references to government institutions (16 
in total), these can be broadly divided into the following three categories, as in 
Figure 49 below: negative sentiments (7 public references), positive (4 references) 
and neutral references (remaining 5 references, e.g. government statistical data as 
in references 1, 4, the need to strengthen immigration to control human inflows as 
in Reference 13, etc.). 
Figure 49 Public perceptions of government activities on violent crime in Canada 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on NVivo codes 
First of all, it is worth noting the public’s relatively strong (negative) 
perceptions toward government activities as compared to positive sentiments. Thus, 
the public in overall remains rather skeptical about the government capacity to 
effectively tackle violent crime evils, although not entirely through the prism of 
total government failure since the relative share of negative sentiments remains less 
than 50% of the total number of references, i.e. 43% (7 out of 16). Further, the 
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public’s perceived sentiments do not seem to correlate with specific types of violent 
crime, unlike the Australian case (see below in Section 4.2.2).  
Second, the Canadian public focuses on the following types of violent crime 
in their references to the government: gun violence and gun registry policy (4 
references, #2, 3, 7, 8), gang violence (4 references, #9, 10, 12, 14), violence against 
women (3 references, #1, 4, 5), ethnic violence (1 reference, #13), and assault (1 
reference, #16). The 7 negative sentiment references encompass violence against 
aboriginal women (Reference 5, where a special committee, which was established 
due to growing public pressure to tackle the issue of missing and murdered 
aboriginal women, now has uncertain future as Premier Harper intends to derail the 
parliament; similarly Reference 6, where the new committee is viewed as a channel 
for corrupting aboriginal community leaders; Reference 7 points to contradictions 
in statements by police chief and city mayor in response to a shooting crime that 
left two casualties, with neither statement found true; Reference 8 points to negative 
sentiments toward politicians attempting to re-introduce non-registered guns that 
would make it easier to own guns; Reference 11 points to corrupt pro-feminist bias 
in the political system; in Reference 14 academia raises doubts whether tough 
sentencing would produce any effect with regard to deterrence of crime, as 
politicians rush to support federal government’s proposed policy of toughened 
sentencing for drive-by shooters in response to increased gang activity in 
Vancouver; and Reference 16 points to a divergence between police data on lower 
violent crime and public perceptions that suggest violent crime increase over the 
period of 1998-2007). The positive sentiments include Prime Minister Harper’s 
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decision to dismantle gun registry (Reference 2) and his tough sentencing policy 
for gang violence cases (Reference 12), the decision of three provincial 
governments to collectively demand a package of amendments into existing laws 
on gang violence (references 9 and 10), and the need to strengthen immigration and 
border control services that should be able to more efficiently address illegal 
immigration (Reference 3). As a final note, these references are exposed to a small 
N issue, thus these observations should be viewed with caution. 
 
The Government 
As mentioned earlier in the descriptive analysis of nodes (and as in 
Appendix 4c), the total number of government references to the government (G-2-
G) in the context of Canada-based violent crime is 23. This content analysis, first 
of all, suggests that all G-2-G references point to the positive semantics attributed 
to Canadian government agencies. Second, with regard to specific contributions of 
the government to violent crime discourse, these can be divided into the following 
categories: government agencies as sources of valuable data and research (5 
references, # 11, 15, 17, 18, 23), refining definitions of concepts related to violent 
crime and its types (4 references, #1, 2, 7, 11), references related to guns and 
firearms control (4 references, #3, 9, 11, 21), references to domestic and family 
violence (3 references, #5, 16, 23), as in Table 12. 
Table 12 Canadian government (G-2-G) contributions to violent crime discourse 
Categories The number of references 
A source of valuable data and research 5 
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Definitions of violent crime concepts 4 
Guns and firearms control 4 
Domestic and family violence 3 
Source: The author’s own analysis 
Further content analysis of specific codes, however, points to a limited role 
of government units beyond what is suggested in Table 12. Specifically, with regard 
to agenda-setting interactions, it is primarily the public (with public opinion and 
perceptions being key elements) that seems to take a leading role in setting the 
policy agenda on violent crime (7 references, #4, 6, 8, 13, 14, 22 and 23). So, 
Reference 6 suggests that the government discourse considers public perceptions 
vital as related to perceived inefficiency of the law enforcement system, while 
references 4 and 8 relate to assessing the public perception of crime, specifically 
that crime rates either remain constant (perceived by 62% of surveyed Canadians) 
or increased (26%), as contrasted with police reported data trends that show steady 
decline of crime over the period from 2000 to 2012 (Government of Canada 2014, 
Sep 10 in Reference 8), as in Figure 50. 
Figure 50 Police-reported violent crime rates in Canada, 2000 to 2012 
 
Source: Government of Canada (2014, Sep 10) 
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The government commitment to addressing public needs is further 
emphasized in Reference 13, where the government expresses its intent to protect 
specifically the most vulnerable (elderly) strata of society by introducing tougher 
sentencing against abusers, while references 14 and 23 point to public opinion as 
collected through the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) survey 2010 to assess 
perceived severity of violent crime such as homicide and robbery (as in Reference 
14) and through the General Social Survey (GSS) collected by Statistics Canada on 
a regular basis on perceived intimate partner physical abuse. Finally, Reference 22 
relates to the tripartite unique relationship (of government agencies, guardians and 
child service centers) in protecting vulnerable children and youth based in B.C. 
Finally, Reference 4 (apart from what is mentioned above) also suggests that the 
tendency of public perception to ‘overestimate’ levels of violent crime is due to 
news media’s power to influence public minds by employing the fear factor. Thus, 
the summary of agenda-setting interactions can be presented in Figure 51. 
Figure 51 Key actors within government-to-government discourse on violent crime 
in Canada 
 
 
 
Note: As perceived by the government (G-2-G), the public both sets the policy 
agenda and acts as the partner with government agencies in driving the policy 
agenda on violent crime, while media may occasionally shape public perceptions 
by instilling fear among its readers. 
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Source: The author’s own analysis. 
The next key actor as perceived by government discourse on Canada-based 
diversification is the public. The G-2-P references (14 in total) point to the 
following agenda-setting interactions. First of all, the public largely perceives 
violent crime is increasing (Reference 14), although crime in general is not a top 
public agenda issue (Reference 4). Furthermore, in addition to what G-2-G 
discourse analysis above suggests, G-2-P discourse reinforces an observation that 
media does not seem to play a strong agenda-setting role, as Canadians largely 
reject the notion of influential media as an actor (Reference 5), so the public 
believes violent crime increase is real, not due to media effect (ibid). On the 
contrary, the public views specifically police chiefs and victim rights groups 
(NGOs) to be highly perceived, while (academic) researchers and (general) 
government statistics appear less credible, and media even less so (Reference 6). 
The public believes federal and provincial governments deserve the least ranking 
and the law enforcement is seen as not rigorous enough (ibid). Based on the above, 
the summary of agenda-setting interactions from the G-2-P viewpoint is presented 
in Figure 52. 
Figure 52 Government perceptions toward the public (G-2-P) on violent crime in 
Canada 
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Note: the public is presented as a robust independent actor that sets the 
(government) policy agenda on violent crime in Canadian context. The 
government’s capacity to set public agenda and shape perceptions is limited; 
however, police agencies are better equipped with interacting with the public as 
sources of valuable data and research. Media and academia remain weaker actors 
that may occasionally shape public perceptions. 
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
Academia 
The total number of A-2-A references is 55 (as in Appendix 5c). One way 
to classify these is by dividing into policy areas analyzed: the predominant share is 
given to sexual abuse and violence sub-issues (20 references), distantly followed 
by alcohol and drug-fueled violence (with 13 references), physical violence and 
robbery (10 references), murder and homicides (7), while youth violence (3), 
domestic violence and against women (2), and ethnic violence (1) sub-issues within 
the violent crime umbrella receive negligible research attention. 
Yet, another way to classify the references is with regards to the specific 
key actors emphasized in academic discourse on violent crime in Canadian context. 
These actors are profoundly academia (nearly all references point to academic 
research improving earlier research findings and suggesting policy 
recommendations), followed by the role of the public (19 references in total, which 
include local neighborhoods and communities – 8 references, #7, 9, 18, 25, 34, 35, 
45, 48; aboriginal communities – 2 references #38, 49; public opinion and 
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perceptions – 5 references, i.e. #11, 29, 40, 44, 52; society in general – 3 references, 
i.e. #8, 10, 46; and NGOs – 2 references #12, 4424), government agencies (14 
references in total, including government programs and legal acts – 8 references, 
#8, 19-21, 23, 31, 32, 54;police and Canada’s correctional system – 5 references, 
#2, 9, 18, 40, 44;and as a source of data – as in Reference 55). Furthermore, to a 
lesser degree, media features as an independent actor that often exploits the public’s 
fears (references 29, 46, and slightly different #53 where media is portrayed as one 
of important actors that influence policy discourse on organized crime along with 
government papers and academic research). 
Further, the role of the public deserves closer scrutiny. Indeed, it may first 
appear that it is viewed as a robust actor (with the total of 19 documented 
references), though still far behind academia (nearly all references). However, it 
should be noted that a number of academia references to the public suggest negative 
sentiments toward local neighborhoods and communities by pointing to a lack of 
robustness in driving policy agenda (references #8-10, where the society is 
portrayed as being vulnerable due to alcohol influence which causes criminal 
burden on Canadians; #29 and 46 where media exploits the public’s fears and moral 
panic with regard to violent crime). To summarize this part, academia appears to 
view other actors, e.g. the public (society, local communities, NGOs) and 
government agencies as rather moderate, as opposed to robust, players on the policy 
arena as related to violent crime discourse in Canadian context. The major agenda-
setting picture can be presented in Figure 53. 
                                               
24 Reference 44 overlaps across public opinion and NGO elements of the public, thus the total 
number is 19. 
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Figure 53 Key actors within academia (A-2-A) discourse on violent crime in 
Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Canada-based academia perceives itself as the robust actor that drives the 
policy discourse by improving its earlier findings and making policy 
recommendations to government agencies and the public on violent crime. The 
public (with communities and public opinion) and the government act as moderate 
actors that drive the agenda to a lesser degree, and furthermore, media may 
occasionally shape public perceptions by employing the fear factor among its 
readers. 
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
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Canadian think tank references relate to government agencies (43 in total) 
and to the public (24 in total), as in Appendix 6c. To begin with, think tank to 
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expressed toward government activity in the context of violent crime policy 
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toward government and public agencies (15 references, #6, 13-16, 19, 25, 27-30, 
36, 38, 39, 43) mostly directed towards Harper’s ‘tough on crime’ policy perceived 
Canadian 
Government 
agencies 
Media The Public  
Communities and 
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Public opinion 
Academia  
165 
 
inefficiency as violent crime rates do not seem to be on significant decline, 
generally positive sentiments (9 references, i.e. #1, 2, 5, 11, 17, 22, 23, 33, 37) 
mainly pointing to the government’s responsiveness to citizens’ security needs and 
police effectively apprehending perpetrators of violent crime, and neutral (e.g. as a 
source of statistical data) or mixed semantic references (19 references), as in Figure 
54. 
Figure 54 Think tank perceptions of government activities (TT-2-G) on violent 
crime in Canada 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on NVivo codes 
In terms of specific policy areas emphasized, TT-2-G references include the 
following: murder and homicide (8 references, #5, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 26, 32), gun 
and gang street violence (6 references, #1, 11, 19, 25, 26, 33), physical violence 
e.g. assaults and robbery (5 references, #4, 10, 20, 21, 26), violence against women 
and sexual abuse (4 references, #17, 24, 26, 29), alcohol and drug (substance) – 
fueled violence (3 references, #3, 22, 25), and youth violence (3 references, i.e. #31, 
37, 43). As compared with academia patterns, the think tank community’s attention 
appears more evenly distributed, unlike academia’s predominant focus on sexual 
abuse (20 references), and then distantly followed by alcohol- and drugs-fueled 
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violence (13), which further supports the earlier observation with regards to 
academia as the ‘Ivory tower’.  
Finally, with regard to specific actors emphasized in think tank discourse 
(as related to government activities, i.e. TT-2-G references), these include the 
following: the public (8 references, i.e. #4 that suggests the importance of 
community safety and social cohesion and thus measures to minimize violent 
crime, e.g. assaults, to retain trust within society, #5 where public perceptions 
toward safety clash with government statistics suggesting steady decline in 
homicide, #11 where the public has effectively set the government agenda on gun 
control policy for the last two decades and Harper, in light of 2015 elections, 
endorses the use of firearms for self-defense, #15 where the public continues 
pushing for changes in the correctional system due to overcapacity of prisons as a 
result of ‘Tough on crime’ policy, #23 where public opinion is employed to assess 
perceived effectiveness of police contributions to community safety in New 
Brunswick with 89% being satisfied and in #34 where public opinion shows support 
for physician-assisted suicide and then further endorsed by a parliament act on a 
way to government agenda [though the government resisted], #27 where the 
government breaches the long-standing social consensus [i.e. shows resilience to 
public pressure] by adopting the ‘Tough on crime’ strategy even though the public’s 
priority had been a focus on crime prevention and a think tank’s report stresses the 
importance of involving expert knowledge to a greater degree [i.e. think tanks and 
academia]; on the other hand the public can be occasionally manipulated by the 
government, as in Reference 25, where the government, using the fear factor and 
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media as a platform, pushes its own narrative of gang and gun crime epidemic with 
public being terrified and ready to support government measures); think tanks as 
an independent actor, with academia (#6, where reacting to a new think tank’s 
report a faculty from University of Victoria responded with a claim the report 
demonstrated political bias as it inaccurately supports Harper-led ‘Tough on crime’ 
policy that seems appealing to the wider public due to its perceived simplicity, #27, 
as mentioned above, with a think tank calling for expert knowledge, #31 where a 
think tank pushes government agenda on crime prevention, and #38 similarly a 
think tank criticizes the government for the inefficiency of ‘Tough on crime’); and 
finally, media, can occasionally act as an independent actor by stirring moral panic 
among the public, e.g. following a high-profile murder case, as in Reference 39, 
though this still appears relatively infrequent. The summary of key actors 
interacting in agenda-setting processes can be presented in Figure 55. 
Figure 55 Key actors within think tank-to-government discourse on violent crime 
in Canada 
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Note: As perceived by the think tank community, it is largely the public that drives 
policy agenda on violent crime in the Canadian case, despite occasional attempts 
to resist on the part of the government. Compared to economic diversification, the 
violent crime policy issue does not seem to emphasize the need for partnerships 
among key actors but instead exhibits intense one-way and two-way agenda-setting 
processes through two platforms - the parliament (by the public and government in 
their debates) and media (by government). Finally, the role of academia and think 
tanks (as independent actors) in driving the government agenda and the role of 
media in shaping public perceptions remain less strong as perceived by think tanks. 
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
Next, regarding think tank to the public references (TT-2-P, 24 in total), 
these, first of all, can be divided in terms of specific elements of the public. These 
include the public in general e.g. voters and citizens (9 references, i.e. #3, 4, 7, 15-
18, 21, 24), public opinion and public perceptions with regard to violent crime (6 
references, i.e. #1, 2, 13, 14, 19, 20), NGOs and activists (4 references, i.e. #5, 6, 
11, 23), aboriginal communities (Reference 10), and a councilor for youth equity 
appointed by the Toronto city government to serve as a liaison representing the 
public within the council and other government levels (as in #22). Last, a number 
of references (#6, 8, 9, and 23) relate to cases of murdered aboriginal women and 
references #12, 18 to aboriginal prisoners, however the aboriginal community itself 
generally does not appear to act in a way resembling an agenda-setting manner, in 
other words members of aboriginal communities do not actively push policy agenda 
(again except as in Reference 10). Thus it is largely active citizens and voters, 
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public opinion, and (to a lesser extent) NGOs that form the driving elements of the 
public as an agenda-setting actor in the context of violent crime in Canada, as 
opposed to other elements e.g. local and aboriginal communities, perceived by 
think tanks (Table 13). 
 
Table 13 The key elements of the public in TT-2-P discourse 
# Key elements of the public The number of references 
1 Society in general, i.e. voters and citizens 9 
2 Public opinion and perceptions 6 
3 NGOs and activists 4 
Source: The author’s own analysis 
TT-2-P references can be further classified in terms of policy areas (or sub-
issues) emphasized within violent crime discourse. These predominantly include 
murder and homicide (11 references, i.e. #5-10, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24), distantly 
followed by guns (and other weapons) and gang violence (4 references, i.e. #5, 7, 
15, 16), and violence against women and sexual assault (3 references, #9, 16, 23), 
while physical assault (#1), youth violence (#22) receive negligible public attention 
as perceived by the think tank community. As this analysis suggests, the public 
reacts predominantly to highly sensitive cases of murder and (to a less degree) to 
related cases of gun violence, as well as sexual abuse.  
Finally, these references can be classified in terms of key actors involved in 
agenda-setting interactions. The most frequently emphasized actor (apart from the 
public, as analyzed above) is government, which is referred to as a source of 
170 
 
statistical data and police research (2 references, i.e. #7, 9) and a single reference 
(#20) pointing to government robustness through resilience to public pressure for 
euthanasia with the government clearly articulating its position not to endorse 
assisted suicide in hospitals and further debating this issue in the Canadian 
parliament. The government, however is predominantly referred to with negative 
sentiments (5 references, i.e. #10 where Harper refuses a public inquiry into missing 
and murdered aboriginal women referring to the issue as crime, not a sociological 
phenomenon,and similarly #18 where Harper policies are viewed as an attempt to 
divide the society into naturally bad people versus law-abiding, good citizens, #15 
where Harper’s ‘Tough on crime’ policy is viewed as likely to pose risks to public 
safety, #17 with the government breaching the social consensus by introducing 
‘Tough on crime’ policy, highly unpopular with the public whose priority had been 
crime prevention, #21 where Harper decides to shut the secretariat on palliative 
care for the elderly. The other actors include to a much less extent, as mentioned in 
TT-2-G reference analysis, media, as well as think tanks (as an independent actor) 
and academia.  
To summarize, it is largely the public that is perceived to set the policy 
agenda on violent crime in Canadian context. As Table 13 suggests, the Canadian 
public predominantly pushes the government by voters and active citizens through 
political election campaigns and, to a less extent, by NGOs and activists. The 
government, on the other hand, often conducts opinion polls in order to assess 
public perceptions to certain policy areas of concern to government institutions and 
police agencies. It is worth noting that, as perceived by think tanks, the public 
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mainly views government activity with negative sentiments (62.5%, or 5 out of 8). 
Furthermore, as suggested by public-to-government discourse earlier (pp. 131-
133), the public itself perceives government activities relatively through negative 
sentiment terms (43% of all references, i.e. higher than positive sentiments but still 
less than half all references). This suggests (with a small N issue taken into account) 
that the think tank discourse, though not perfect, translates a relatively adequate 
representation of public sentiments toward government activities on violent crime. 
5.2 Violent crime in Australian context 
5.2.1 Quantitative analysis 
The Government 
The search for publications and bills of the Australian government related 
to violent crime policies over the span of 2008-2015 follows the same logic and 
procedure outlined earlier, e.g. section 4.2.2 (on economic diversification in 
Australia): 
- The Search Hansard Parliamentary document database produced the total 
of 93 bills introduced by all chambers and committees over the period of 2008-
2015, of which 29 were selected into the final sample. 
- Google search by using thewww.gov.au domain filtered for the time span 
from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2015, produced 102documents, of which 18 
files were finally selected for further analysis. 
Thus the total final sample size equals 47 documented files. These include 
16 files in 2015, 7 in 2014, 4 in 2013, 4 in 2012, 2 in 2011, 9 in 2010, 5 in 2009, 
and none recorded for 2008 (see Figure 56 below). 
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Figure 56 Trends in Australian government activity on violent crime 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
The data plotted above suggest the following. First, in overall the Australian 
government demonstrates increasing trends related to violent crime over the time 
span. This is different from the patterns shown by the Canadian government, which 
were rather monotonous without clear spikes (section 4.3.1).This may suggest that 
the Canadian government is more resilient against possible pressure from external 
actors and against critical events, e.g. mass shootings, vis-à-vis its Australian 
counterpart. This observation is supported by existing research. Pickup and Hobolt 
(2015) find that although minority governments tend to better respond to voters, 
they are less legislatively effective than majority governments. In other words, 
majority governments, including the Harper government (2006-2015) are therefore 
less responsive to the public. Dyussenov (2016) finds that when comparing 
attention trends of Canadian and Kazakhstan governments with regard to corruption 
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in 1997-2014, the Canadian government appeared less responsive to the growing 
(online) public debates on corruption than the Kazakh government, as measured by 
the number of bills introduced through their parliaments. Furthermore, the 
Canadian government appeared less responsive than Canadian courts (as measured 
by the number of laws and legal acts introduced over the period). 
Second, the government produces two spikes, first in 2010 due to a focus 
on gang and street violence (5 documents out of 9) thanks to assistance by the 
federal government through the COPS (Community Oriented Policing Services) 
program spurred by a violent incident at the Sydney airport in 2009 in which a man 
was beaten to death by violent gang members (Hayes 2010; Fielding 2010), and 
second around 2015. The 2015 spike is mainly characterized by the following three 
major issues: family violence (domestic violence, violence against women) - 6 
sources, followed by immigration policy – 3 sources, and gun violence – 3. 
Media 
The combined search (with both Google search and LexisNexis) for media 
articles on violent crime in Australian context led to the final selection of 281 
articles. In the process of selecting media articles 9Google-generated media articles 
and 272 pieces produced by LexisNexis were selected. The search command 
employed is the following: 
- ["violent crime" AND Australia] for Google search filtered for the span of 2008-
2015. The search brings 93 mentions including online documents uploaded by 
Australian governments of all levels, research depositories, lecture notes etc.  
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- ["violent crime" AND Australia and HEADLINE (Violent crime OR Violence), 
Geography – Australia] for LexisNexis, which then returned 569 news articles 
unfiltered for relevance and substance of content. 
 The final sample of 281 media articles includes 55 documents in 2015, 
followed by 46 in 2014, 28 in 2013, 23 in 2012, 23 in 2011, 32 in 2010, 33 in 2009 
and 41 in 2008 (see Figure 57).  
Figure 57 Trends in the Australian media activity on violent crime 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
Australian media attention trends first move gradually downward in 2008-
2012 followed by a spike around 2014-2015. It is interesting to note that while 
Canadian media trends demonstrate a short and sudden spike around 2012 with 
regard to violent crime (section 4.3.1 above), Australian media shows a more 
gradually increasing spike spreading from 2013 to 2015.  
Another observation is a plausible correlation between media and 
government attention trends and activities. As noted earlier, the most prominent 
theme within the 2015 attention spike of the government is family and domestic 
violence. A brief analysis of 2015 media articles shows that out the total 55 articles, 
the theme of domestic or family violence comes prominently in 46 media articles, 
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while the rest, e.g. alcohol-driven violent crime (2 articles), gang violence (2), and 
gun control (2), appears rather insignificant. Finally, Australian media pays 
significantly more attention to the topic of violent crime than economic 
diversification (281 versus 71 articles selected). Specific reasons explaining these 
phenomena, as well as identifying the key agenda-setting actor should be possible 
by conducting detailed content analysis. 
The Public 
The search for public sentiments involved the use of Google (to collect any 
relevant blog pieces), and LexisNexis(to select those media articles with public 
comments posted, letters to the editor, and opinion articles). The Google search 
returned 1 blog piece over the analyzed time span, while LexisNexis produced the 
following results: media articles with public comments posted (10),opinion articles 
(10) some of which also with public comments, and letters to the editor (8).Thus, 
over the time span of 2008-2015, the total of 29 media articles (with comments), 
letters to the editor and opinion articles have been selected for analysis. These 
include 6 pieces in 2015, followed by 7 in 2014, 5 in 2013, 5 in 2012, 2 in 2011, 2 
in 2010, 1 in 2009, and 1 in 2008 (Figure58). Public comments are spread over the 
time span in the following manner: 2015 – 26 selected comments, 2014 – 27, 2013 
–4, 2012 – 5, 2011 – 9, and none over the rest of the period, i.e. 2008-2010. 
Figure 58 Trends in Australian (online) public activity on violent crime 
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Note: Blue – media articles, letters, and opinion pieces; Red – readers’ comments. 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
The data suggest the following. First, as the number of media articles with 
public commentsposted only gradually increases over the time span (blue), the 
public comments themselves (red) demonstrate a sudden disproportionate spike 
around 2014-2015. This spike correlates with a spike in media attention (Figure 
57). Thus it would be interesting to see whether media sets the public agenda with 
regard to violent crime in Australian context or vice versa, which should be clarified 
with content analyses. In overall, the patterns shown by public trends resemble 
those of non-experts, i.e. demonstrating a spike only towards the end of the time 
span. 
Comparing with violent crime trends in the Canadian setting (Figure44), the 
Australian public demonstrates increased attention in 2014 and 2015, while the 
Canadian public only did so in 2015. Furthermore, the sample size in Australian 
context is 29 vs. 20 in Canada (i.e. 69% of the Australian sample size), despite the 
fact that the size of Australian population is about 68% the size of Canadian 
population, i.e. 24.4 million vs. 36.2 million (Countryeconomy.com 2018). This 
suggests the issue of violent crime appears more important and relevant in the 
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context of Australia than Canada. This is also reflected in the ratio of media sample 
sizes, i.e. 281 articles selected for analysis in the Australian case vs. 155 in 
Canadian context. 
Finally, vis-à-vis economic diversification trends in Australian context, the 
public’s attention across both issues remained largely dormant until 2014 in the 
case of violent crime and 2015 for diversification. Despite this seeming similarity 
in patterns, violent crime remains more intensely debated among Australian 
netizens than diversification (29 vs. 8 documents), although the difference in 
Canadian context is rather negligible (20 vs. 18). This also suggests greater 
importance of violent crime than diversification among the Australian public. 
Academia 
The search for violent crime publications in Australian context by using 
Web of Science and Scopus led to the total selection of 66 documents. This includes 
14 publications in 2015, 8 in 2014, 13 in 2013, 7 in 2012, 8 in 2011, 5 in 2010, 4 in 
2009 and 7 in 2008 (Figure 59 below). 
 The data suggest the following. First, Australian academia’s attention trends 
to violent crime policy remained rather moderate (but not dormant) over more than 
half of the time span to 2012, followed by two spikes – in 2013 and then 2015. 
Though year 2014 witnessed a downward trend, it still corresponds to 2011 (with 
8 publications), the highest year of the “moderate” period. 
Figure 59 Trends in Australian academic publications on violent crime 
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Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
 Compared to Canadian violent crime context with a sample size of 60, the 
Australian case presents a higher sample size selected for analysis, i.e. 66 
publications. This suggests prima facie that Australian scholars pay greater 
attention to the issue vis-à-vis their Canadian counterparts. It also reinforces the 
earlier observation that violent crime appears to be more relevant in Australian 
context more generally. Next, in terms of trends, both country cases show moderate 
trends through the majority of the time span followed by a spike (2 spikes in 
Australian context) toward the end of the period. 
 Finally, the analysis would be incomplete without comparing to Australian 
economic diversification trends. First, the sample size for violent crime is, again 
significantly larger than for diversification (66 vs. 40). This may suggest that 
violent crime appears to be of more importance to Australian academia than 
economic diversification. Second, academia attention trends show two spikes for 
each issue though for diversification the spikes (2011-2012 and 2015) are more 
spaced out than for violent crime (2013 and 2015). This may indicate the presence 
of a regular pattern, or a cycle, in the case of economic diversification.  
Think tanks 
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The search for relevant publications on violent crime from the websites of 
Australia-based think tanks results in the selection of 94 publications over the 2008-
2015 time span. These include 22 publications in 2015, 12 in 2014, 7 in 2013, 14 
in 2012, 8 in 2011, 15 in 2010, 7 in 2009, and 9 in 2008 (as in Figure 60 below. 
There are two observations worth noting. First, the data demonstrate that, similarly 
to the issue of economic diversification, violent crimetrends generally show an 
increase over the time span. However, while diversification trends do not show a 
clearly regular cycle but instead gradually increasing trends, violent crime trends 
demonstrate rather regular cycles, i.e. 2009-2011, 2011-2013, and from 2013 
onwards. Thus it is interesting to note that Australian think tank trends appear to 
resemble expert patterns with regard to the issue of violent crime with a plausibility 
to set its agenda on the issue, while for diversification it is academia that appears 
to set the ground, as mentioned earlier. 
Figure 60 Trends in Australian think tank publications on violent crime 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on collected data 
5.2.2 The descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes 
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Australia-based media appears to demonstrate more intense attention to the 
issue of violent crime vis-à-vis its Canadian counterpart, as measure by the number 
of references to key actors, types of violent crime and causes and effects (Appendix 
2d). First, media emphasizes the following key actors in its discourse: the 
government (119 references, 66 of which are assigned to police), closely followed 
by the public and NGOs (101, including 17 for aboriginal communities), media (57) 
and academia (54), while think tanks receive less attention (34, including 26 for 
government-affiliated think tanks). This is generally similar to the Canadian case 
with the government and the public being the key actors, followed by academia and 
media. Second, with regards to the types of violent crime, Australian media mainly 
focuses on domestic and family violence (109), followed by alcohol-fueled 
violence (76), violence against women (56), youth and child violence (50), and 
physical violence (50). This drastically differs from Canadian context, which 
demonstrates not only other priority types of violent crime (e.g. gun violence and 
murder) but also media’s interest spread across a range of types of violence without 
a clearly dominant type. This primarily suggests a more explicit quest for sensation 
news in Australian context (vis-à-vis the Canadian case) in efforts to please the 
mass audience, and furthermore, as mentioned below, media’s priority attention 
correlates with the public whose major sub-area of interest is also domestic 
violence. Last, media suggests the total of 114 causes and 18 effects of violent 
crime in its discourse, which is significantly higher compared to Canadian context 
(67 and 7, accordingly). In other words, violent crime appears to be higher on 
Australian media agenda than in Canadian context. 
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The (online) public apparently demonstrates a higher degree of interest, or 
concern, regarding violent crime issues in the Australian case than in Canada 
(Appendix 3d). First, the following key actors are emphasized: the public and 
NGOs (27 references), closely followed by the government (25), media (19), while 
academia (5) and think tanks (1) received negligible public attention. While 
generally similar to Canadian context in the sense of including both the public and 
government as the top key actors, the Australian case also suggests a strong role 
attributed to media. Interestingly, Australian media also refers to its (media) 
institutions as the third key actor, following the government and the public (as in 
Appendix 2d). Second, the public highlights the following two major types of 
violent crime: domestic and family violence (30), followed by physical violence 
(20), while other types receive moderate attention, i.e. murder and homicide (9), 
alcohol-fueled violence (9), guns and firearms (8), violence against women (8), 
ethnic violence (7) etc. It is worth noting that not only does Canadian public appear 
to pay less attention to violent crime than in Australian context, but the priority 
types are different, i.e. guns and firearms (11) and violence against women (9) 
being the top two items on Canadian public agenda list as related to violent crime 
discourse. Furthermore, the public’s attention trends correlate with media that, 
similarly to the public, points to domestic and family violence as the top item under 
the violent crime umbrella (109). Lastly, the public suggests the total of 41 causes 
and 5 effects of violent crime, while media, as an institutionalized non-expert actor, 
develops a significantly higher number of both causes and effects, as mentioned 
earlier, i.e. 114 and 18 accordingly (as in Appendix 2d). It is also worth noting that 
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the Australian public’s attention seems more attracted to violent crime than 
economic diversification, with 0 cause and 3 effects (Appendix 3b), and shows 
higher attention to violent crime vis-à-vis the Canadian public as measured by the 
number of causes (20 causes and 0 effect in Canadian context, as in Appendix 3c), 
possibly due to a higher perceived degree of severity of violent crime. 
With regard to the experts, academia first of all, points to the following key 
actors in its violent crime discourse: academia (35) closely followed by the public 
(33), the government (27), and media (19), while the private sector receives less 
attention (7), as in Appendix 5d. While generally similar to the Canadian case with 
the top three actors being the same, the Australian case also attributes a role to 
media. Second, academic attention is focused on the following types of violent 
crime: alcohol-fueled violence (24), drug-fueled violence (19), physical violence 
(15), violence against women (15), and murders and homicide (14), while the rest 
receives less attention. This is somewhat different from the Canadian case, where 
academic focus on youth and child violence (18) is heavier than other items, yet 
violence against women (15), murder and homicide (15) and drug-fueled violence 
(14) also receive significant attention, which is similar to Australian context. Lastly, 
academia suggests the total of 69 causes and 7 effects, being quite similar to the 
Canadian case (63 causes and 7 effects, Appendix 5c). 
The other expert actor, the think tank community first of all, tends to points 
to the following key actors in its discourse on violent crime in Australian context: 
their fellow think tanks (63 references) including 40 government-affiliated think 
tanks, followed by the public (52) including aboriginal communities (21); and the 
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government (50) including police agencies (17); while other actors receive 
moderate (media – 22 and academia – 18) or negligible attention (the private sector 
– 2) over the time span (as in Appendix 6d). This is generally similar to attention 
trends suggested by academia (Appendix 5d) which emphasize their academic 
fellows (35), closely followed by the public (33), then the government (27). 
However, in contrast to Australian counterparts, Canada-based think tanks refer to 
the government (43), distantly followed by the public (24), as in Appendix 6c. 
Again, the semantic (content) analysis of codes related to the ‘key actors’ node 
should clarify plausible reasons why Australia-based think tanks mainly refer to 
their fellow think tanks and whether Canadian think tanks’ more frequent 
references to government agencies translate to the government’s robust role in 
driving violent crime agenda or whether some references to government 
inefficiencies. Second, the following types of violent crime are generally given 
higher priority by think tanks: physical violence (49 references), followed by 
domestic and family violence (35), and murder and homicide cases (33), while the 
remainder receives less attention. Canada-based think tanks generally exhibit 
divergent attention trends, i.e. murders and homicide (17) followed by physical 
violence (8), then gun (6) and youth violence (6). The only plausible explanation 
for this is a substantial involvement of government-affiliated institutions in violent 
crime discourse led by Australian think tanks, i.e. 40 out of 63 references to think 
tanks, as mentioned above. Indeed, as described below, the top two sub-issues 
emphasized by the Australian government are domestic violence (14) and physical 
violence (13). Furthermore, this correlates with the public’s attention trends, i.e. 
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domestic violence (30 references) and physical violence (20). Australia-based 
academia, on the contrary, emphasizes rather different types of violent crime: 
alcohol-fueled violence (24), followed by drug-fueled violence (19), then physical 
violence and violence against women (15 each), and murder and homicide (14), as 
in Appendix 5d. Third and finally, the think tank community produces the total of 
64 causes and 11 effects of violent crime. This is largely typical of experts, e.g. 
compared with Australian academia (69 and 7, accordingly, as in Appendix 5d). 
 Lastly, Australian government agencies, first of all, mainly refer to the 
following two actors in their discourse on violent crime: the public and NGOs (33 
references) including aboriginal communities (10), and government agencies (26) 
including police (8), while other actors receive less attention, as in Appendix 4d. 
This is starkly different from Canadian context, where the government remains the 
most emphasized actor (23 government references), followed by the public (14), 
with the remaining actors receiving insignificant attention (Appendix 4c). While 
the Australian case suggests the public possibly setting its agenda on the 
government (or at least exerting certain influence), the Canadian case clearly shows 
the government’s resilience against external pressure, e.g. coming from the public. 
Second, the following types of violent crime are emphasized: domestic and family 
violence (14 references), physical violence (13), and drug-fueled violence (12). 
This is somewhat different from Canadian context, in which the government mostly 
refers to physical violence (18 references), followed by youth violence (13), and 
murders and homicides (12). Finally, the Australian government produces the total 
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of 46 causes and 8 effects of violent crime, which largely resemble trends exhibited 
by non-experts, e.g. the public (41 and 5 accordingly, as in Appendix 3d). 
5.2.3 The content analysis of the ‘key actors’ node 
Media 
            Based on descriptive analyses, Australia-based media mainly refers to the 
government (119 media references) and the public (101 references) as key actors. 
These are further analyzed in terms of media (semantic) perceptions based on 
NVivo codes regarding violent crime. 
            Regarding media references to Australian government agencies, these can 
be divided into the following categories: positive assessment (55 references), 
negative assessment (47 references), then followed by neutral assessments (17 
media references), as in Figure 61 below. The positive sentiments mainly refer to 
government agencies as sources of valuable data that spur further media and public 
debates (references 2, 3, 7, 17, 22, 37, 48, 57, 77) and as providers of valuable 
services, e.g. to help domestic violence victims (references 19, 31), new bylaws 
positively perceived by media (references 8, 14, 26, 56, 58, 106, 115), stricter 
measures adopted by police and government agencies with regard to street violence 
(references 21, 64, 107, 117), alcohol violence (references 27, 35, 44, 52, 57, 59, 
68, 72, 76, 79, 80, 90, 96, 100) and domestic violence (references 4, 6, 9-14, 16, 
25, 28, 30, 32, 50, 66, 70, 99, 105, 114), though a number of negative accounts 
serve as a vivid reminder that the domestic and family violence issue persistently 
remains debated (i.e. Reference 4 points to the public’s limited understanding on 
the complexity of the issue; Reference 17 points to media frustration about 
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increased domestic violence in Victoria as “the state’s most shameful social 
problem” and Reference 37 on increased domestic violence in rural New South 
Wales; Reference 18 points to continuing debates among opposition and NGOs, 
with a commonly agreed factor being alcohol as a driver of domestic violence; 
Reference 20 calls for the need of better security for domestic violence victims as 
they often face re-victimization back home; Reference 40 points to NSW 
government measures to impose GPS tracking bracelets on perpetrators of violence 
but the parliament then rejects this idea due to unreliability and violation of personal 
freedom; it is thus unsurprising that increased domestic violence sparks calls for 
stricter sentencing, as in references 42 and 54; furthermore, Reference 69 points to 
widespread underreporting of domestic violence due to fear of retribution across 
Western Australia in 2010, and Reference 74 where Victoria police describes the 
domestic violence situation in 2011 as a “frightening” problem, although later in 
2014 Victoria police saw “positive signs” since police had started to actively 
intervene with domestic violence orders that consequently led to increased 
reporting on the crime, as in Reference 24).  
Figure 61 Media semantic assessment of government activities on violent crime in 
Australia 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on NVivo codes 
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Next, apart from domestic violence, the other negative sentiment references 
embrace the following issues: gun violence (i.e. Reference 1, where the 1996 gun 
ban25 is viewed through negative terms as a number of violent crime types peaked 
in the post-ban period; Reference 55 where NSW Police Minister views gun 
violence as organized crime with perpetrators often immune from prosecution, 
hence the need to strengthen laws); mandatory sentencing (Reference 39, where 
NSW Labor opposition expresses negative views on mandatory sentencing 
referring to research by academia and NGOs on the issue, which is an interesting 
observation, as the below media references to the public should indicate the public 
frequently pushing the government agenda on stricter policy measures including 
tougher mandatory minimum sentencing; Reference 43 is closely related as the 
legal professionals also criticize mandatory sentencing policy proposed in NSW as 
it may not have an effect on lowering alcohol-fueled assaults; Reference 49 with 
the public urging the government to introduce stricter mandatory sentencing; 
Reference 54 where in 2013 the government responds to public pressure and 
introduces tougher sentencing measures to address the issue of domestic violence 
as weak sentences discouraged victims to report crime ; street violence (Reference 
47 where the online public criticizes Sydney city government for ignoring the issue 
of violent assaults in the streets; Reference 65 where street violence is viewed to be 
                                               
25 The 1996 Port Arthur massacre with 35 people dead and 23 injured led to a series of 
government measures, primarily the National Firearms Agreement, aimed at banning the use of 
semi-automatic and fully automatic weapons across Australia (Wikipedia, 2018. Gun laws in 
Australia. Retrieved from: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gun_laws_in_Australia#Port_Arthur_massacre) 
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caused by extended drinking hours; Reference 81 where Melbourne is depicted as 
a place of fear due to high levels of street and alcohol violence, while politicians 
often use the fear factor in attempts to manipulate the public perceptions). Finally, 
another important issue debated within media discourse is alcohol-fueled violence 
(e.g. in Reference 33 experts doubt the effectiveness of controversial forced alcohol 
rehab policy and on-the-spot alcohol ban policy, etc.), which primarily includes 
references to the suggested 3 a.m. lock-out policy targeted toward nightclubs, bars 
and hotels across some Australian states. Initially, it was the state of Queensland to 
witness a proposed policy to move operating hours of local nightclubs and hotels 
backwards from 5 a.m. to 3 a.m. under a parliamentary inquiry (Sandy 2010, Mar 
17 as in Reference 87), while it is worth noting that the Australian parliament is 
largely driven by the public interest, as among its key functions are to provide an 
arena for popular representation and control the actions of the Australian 
government (Parliament of Australia 2018). Thus it is the public that appears to 
effectively set the government agenda via the Parliament in Queensland. Then, in 
2014 New South Wales witnesses a distressed father, whose son had been 
physically assaulted, who pushes the NSW and federal government agenda on a 6-
item plan to address alcohol-fueled violence, which includes the proposed measure 
of 1 a.m. lock-out and 3 a.m. closing time for licensed premises (Nicholls 2014, Jan 
17, as in Reference 46). In response to the public call, NSW Premier O’Farrell 
expressed a commitment to developing a response to alcohol-fueled violence but 
excluded the possibility of considering the proposed closure of bars and nightclubs 
at 3 a.m. (ibid). Yet, a few days later  the public agenda was effectively set on the 
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Sydney city government as local pubs and nightclubs would be affected with a new 
3 a.m. closure policy, as well as strict mandatory sentencing against perpetrators of 
alcohol-fueled violence (Nicholls and Whitbourn 2014, Jan 22). The agenda-setting 
interactions are summarized in Figure 62 below.  
Figure 62 Mediatized agenda-setting processes in Australian context on violent 
crime 
 
 
 
 
Note: The public employs media (to a greater degree) and the parliament (to a 
lesser degree)as policy arenas to exert its agenda-setting influence on the 
government. The government, on the other hand, occasionally attempts to 
manipulate public perceptions by using the fear factor. 
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
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violence policies. Furthermore, while quantitative analysis earlier suggests that the 
general public exhibits rather sporadic, unsystematic attention patterns to both 
diversification and violent crime issues, key observations from this section along 
with earlier descriptive analyses of NVivo nodes clearly demonstrate that a) it is 
specific subgroups that most actively push government agenda, i.e. distressed 
family members of victims of violent crime and NGOs, which possess 
institutionalized capacity to drive policy agendas; and b) the public appears to 
strongly prefer the media platform rather than (online) Google and the parliament 
platforms for effectively transmitting their agenda-setting signals to other key 
actors, mainly the government. 
Secondly, due to a significant share of negative sentiments (47 out of 119 
media references, or 39.5%, strikingly similar to Canadian context with 30 out of 
74 media references, or 40.5%), the government is rather limited in its ability to 
effectively set the policy agenda, though it remains a key actor as a source of 
valuable data that often spark intense media and public debates and as an engine 
for relevant laws and legal amendments. Further similarly to the Canadian case, it 
is the public that appears to set the government agenda (at all levels – city, state and 
federal). However, while the Canadian case points to the presence of three drivers 
of the public, namely NGOs and activists, aboriginal communities, and public 
opinion, this analysis of media references to Australian government agencies falls 
short of pointing to specific elements of the public that drive agenda-setting 
processes. Thus, the next sub-section on media references to the public might reveal 
further details. 
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 Regarding media references to the public as related to violent crime 
discourse in Australian context, similarly to the Canadian case, the public enjoys 
negligible negative semantic references (2 references out of 101 in total). The 
remainder of references can be divided into the following broad categories: NGOs 
and activists – 32 media references, public opinion (and perceptions) – 25, 
communities (other than aboriginals) – 18, aboriginal communities – 14, distantly 
followed by a role model – 4, and the Ombudsman – 126. NGOs and (human rights) 
activists are mainly featured with regards to leading new projects and research 
related to protecting the rights of domestic violence victims (references 10, 11, 13, 
14, 15, 17, 18, 25, 26, 29, 53, 55, 59, 60), violence against women (references 19, 
27, 28, 55, 72, 73, 100), alcohol abuses and street violence (references 4, 80, 95), a 
critique of mandatory sentencing (references 37, 87), ethnic violence (Reference 
51), and workplace violence (Reference 56). Particularly, NGOs contribute to 
violent crime discourse in the following ways. First, it is a special type of NGOs, 
i.e. women’s rights groups, that pioneered in setting the public agenda on family 
violence issues decades ago (Salter 2015, Aug 20, as in Reference 10); in a related 
case it is women’s group Destroy the Joint that developed an alternative narrative 
with regard to domestic violence by referring to it as being a result of societal 
misogyny, while political opposition initially developed a more simplistic narrative 
as being a result of entrenched disadvantage and poverty (Alcorn 2015, Jun 8, as 
in Reference 17). It should be noted here that even earlier as of 2013, a media article 
                                               
26 Due to negligible numbers of references, the role model and ombudsman will not be included 
into detailed analysis. The role model is Rosie Batty, the 2015 Australian of the Year and 
campaigner on domestic violence issues (which have been extensively analyzed above). 
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(Meltzer 2013, Nov 24, as in Reference 49) developed the misogyny-based narrative 
with regard to pervasive violence against women. This is a vital observation: given 
the modern web-based interconnected world, it is a fair assumption that key actors 
learn from each other as relates to the same context, i.e. violent crime discourse in 
Australia. If so, it appears that media may act not only as a platform for the public 
to transmit its agenda-setting messages to other actors but occasionally acts as an 
independent actor that may shape agendas for other key actors, e.g. the public. This 
is further supported with other references, i.e. #22 where media ignores the child 
abuse ‘epidemic’, since NSW law bans publication of children’s pictures and media 
tends to pick those issues  that have ‘a name and a face’ to tell the story to the wider 
public; references 70 and 83 where increased violence among young girls is 
attributed to long exposure to violent TV content, while Reference 90 (referring to 
the Australian Medical Association Western Australia’s council of general 
practice) attributes this to both the influence of TV and newspapers, and finally 
Reference 101 points to tabloid media that employs emotions and sensation to 
simplify its narrative into “tough on crime” and “soft on crime” categories. 
Second, in response to the government’s proposed introduction of a register 
of domestic violence offenders, it was first civil rights groups that disproved the 
validity of this policy by noting its deficiencies such as being rife for abuse due to 
its public availability and lack of reliable safety for the victims of crime, the idea 
which was picked up by Victoria police (whose major agenda is safety of victims) 
and further elaborated in a submission to the Royal Commission into Family 
Violence (Hall 2015, Jul 1, as in Reference 14). In a similar case, again Destroy the 
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Joint NGO (mentioned above) effectively disproves the government narrative with 
regard to violence against women: while the government attempted to promote 
“Going Home, Staying Home” policy to the masses, it only intensified the 
‘epidemic of women’s violent deaths’, while Destroy the Joint feminist group noted 
that increasingly women had been “stabbed, beaten, strangled or shot, at or near 
home, by closely related men and often after prolonged control by fear”, thus 
effectively refuting the reasonability behind the government’s proposed policy 
(Farrelly 2015, Apr 23, as in Reference 19). Furthermore, this misogyny narrative 
further translates into an NGO-driven organizational policy aimed at improving the 
awareness of male-dominated violence against women in the workplace, with 24 
organizations already in the program by the end of 2014 (as in Reference 28). 
The third manifestation of NGO-driven agenda-setting is observed with 
regard to disproving the soundness of government-promoted mandatory sentencing 
and tough(-er) penalty policy toward perpetrators of violent crimes. Reference 37 
describes the NSW opposition (Labor and Greens) derail the state government’s 
narrative of pushing anti-violence law based on mandatory sentencing as this policy 
does not seem effective, at least as suggested by criminology research and civil 
freedom NGOs. It is worth noting that the role of academia and research is also 
emphasized in references #76, where crime research shows overall declined rates 
of gun violence over the past 20 years despite growing public perceptions, #80 
where researchers, doctors and counsellors point to alcohol as the primary drug-
abuse problem in Australia, #82 where academia (Professor J. Toumbourou, chair 
in health psychology from Deakin University) emphasizes the importance of early 
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intervention to avoid widespread use of knives and other weapons by young people, 
and #93 similarly points to preventive programs and early-age intervention as 
means to change community culture. Thus, having disproved the effectiveness of 
mandatory sentencing policies, NGO-driven discourse develops an alternative 
approach based on early intervention and preventive programs focused on 
educating the youth as opposed to the forced incarceration mentality attributed to 
state governments (as in Reference 87). Furthermore, when comparing contexts of 
West Australia and Victoria, the latter’s successful policy is driven by the greater 
involvement of NGOs in monitoring the rehab programs for young offenders (ibid). 
Last, since the paid domestic violence leave provision was introduced in 
2010 by Victoria’s Surf Coast Shire, there had been around 700,000 Australia-
based workers entitled to it by the end of 2012, with unions and NGOs further 
pushing the agenda on expanding the coverage under the new provision which 
increasingly attracts the interest from European and North American policymakers 
(Schneiders 2012, Oct 27, as in Reference 59). This is a revealing case: indeed, it 
is a provincial government (Surf Coast Shire) that pioneers the paid domestic 
violence leave initiative which is then further driven by labor unions and NGOs not 
only across the nation but the globe. 
The next most important category of media references to the public is public 
opinion and perceptions. This category of the public discourse encompasses the 
following two key areas and policy sub-issues: alcohol and street violence (10 
media references #33, 40, 43, 44, 46, 48, 89, 91, 92, 97), domestic, family violence 
and violence against women (8 references #24, 30, 35, 36, 38, 39, 49, 86). 
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Furthermore, two references point to the fear factor inherent in perceptions of 
violent crime, i.e. Reference 2 where recent criminalization surveys show around 
25% adults feel unsafe to walk in the street at night (thus public perception) which 
is supported by actual data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics with violent 
crime growing at recreational facilities, shops and around business locations 
following a period stability since 2005; and Reference 63where, according to 
Family First MLC27 Hood, the public does not feel safe despite official government 
stats data that suggest otherwise. The presence of the fear factor is important: as the 
earlier analysis suggests, politicians can potentially exploit the fear factor to their 
benefit in attempts to shape the public agenda and perceptions (see also Figure 63 
below). Furthermore, another three references point to the role of media and its 
interactions with public opinion: Reference 3, where the murder of a French student 
in Brisbane, referred to as ‘stranger’ murder (the victim and the killer did not know 
each other) is found to be more ‘attractive’ to media driven by sensationalism than 
a domestic murder case (with victim and perpetrator familiar with one another); 
Reference 24 suggests that when discussion turns toward women’s views, then 
media and the general public are quick to frame it as a “women’s issue” implicitly 
related to a narrow niche. Reference 40 suggests an almost (or somewhat) equal 
agenda-setting role of both the public and media in setting NSW government 
agenda on the introduction of 3 a.m. closure policy with regard to pubs and 
nightclubs in an ongoing fight against alcohol-fueled violence. All these three 
media-related references point to the following. First, media occasionally acts as an 
                                               
27 Member of the Legislative Council 
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independent actor, though certainly less robust than the general public (see Figure 
63 below for a comprehensive layout of key actors in the mediatized agenda-setting 
context on violent crime discourse). Secondly, media attention tends to focus 
mainly on highly sensational issues while leaving a bulk of less exciting issues aside 
(or paying less attention). Third, it is worth noting a correlation of attention both 
among public opinion (i.e. the general public) and media and among NGOs and 
media, while academia in some instances correlates with NGOs but not 
significantly with the general public. This can be explained by the institutionalized 
status of NGOs (that conduct their own research and regularly publish reports, thus 
referring to relevant academic sources when necessary) as opposed to the general 
public often with sporadic and unsystematic attention patterns.  
Figure 63 Mediatized agenda-setting processes in Australia on violent crime: The 
comprehensive marketplace of narrative ideas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Four major elements – NGOs, public opinion, local communities, and to a 
less extent aboriginal communities – form the agenda-setting core of the public by 
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sending messages to, and setting the agenda of, mainly the government but also the 
Parliament (on tough sentencing) and organizations (violence against women in 
the workplace). Key politicians may occasionally attempt to shape the public 
perceptions playing on the fear factor (as shown in the lower diagram pasted from 
Figure 62). 
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
Third, local communities (apart from aboriginal communities) tend to focus 
mainly on the following key sub-issues within violent crime discourse: street and 
alcohol-fueled violence (also included into this bandwagon are use of guns outdoors 
and a single case of forced abduction) – 8 references, #41, 42, 61, 65, 68, 76, 88, 
94; and domestic violence and violence against women (7 references, #6, 12, 20, 
23, 69, 75, 99), while Reference 1 analyzes the community-driven agenda-setting 
on the parliament with regard to tough sentence policy for perpetrators of violent 
crime sparked by an earlier series of violent deaths across NSW. Two other (closely 
interrelated) references that show an agenda-setting example are 41 and 42, where 
in response to intensified community pressure, the NSW government (under Brian 
O’Farrell premiership) introduces mandatory sentencing policy for alcohol and 
drug-fueled violent crimes with a range of 8-25 years in prison. Lastly, references 
68, 69 and 99 point to the presence of two key actors in the violent crime discourse 
– the public (as local communities) and police. While references 68 and 99 
emphasize the need to develop closer cooperation between police and the local 
communities (as two key actors) to more efficiently tackle violent crimes and anti-
social behavior, Reference 69 points to a clash of narratives among police and a 
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Victoria-based Sudanese ethnic community: first, police claims this community 
features high in police crime statistics (with around 330 Sudanese immigrants 
accused of assault in 2009-2010), then the leader of the community responds the 
data came as a shock, since earlier police assured the community their youth had 
been less involved in committing assaults than other ethnic groups. 
Finally, the major sub-issues of aboriginal community discourse include 
domestic violence and violence against women (and children) – 9 references, #8, 
12, 31, 34, 52, 58, 78, 79, 98, and alcohol-fueled violence – 3 references, #32, 81, 
91. In contrast to the local communities, the aboriginal community generally does 
not exhibit intense agenda-setting patterns. The only notable exception is Reference 
67 where protests unfolded after two aboriginal youngsters were shot by police, and 
attempted to push the parliament to introduce tougher gun laws for law enforcement 
bodies. Other references suggest the passive stance of aboriginal communities in 
the context of violent crime discourse in Australia (e.g. Reference 12 where the 
spread of domestic and family violence in the Canberra area is believed to impact 
especially Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women, as acknowledged by the 
ACT government; Reference 32 describes a new policy of Temporary Beat 
Locations (TBLs), i.e. stationing police near liquor stores to contain alcohol-fueled 
violence but this turns out to cause severe restriction of local aboriginal 
communities with police being accused of unfair treatment, while Reference 78 
refers to “the chronic violence in north Australian Aboriginal communities” with 
no sign of improvement anywhere in the next 25 years or so (Hall and Karvelas 
2010, May 28). Thus, the aboriginal community appears to be the least (pro-)active 
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element in the public actor paradigm as related to the context of Australia-based 
violent crime discourse. The summary of relevant agenda-setting interactions is 
presented in Figure 63 above. 
The Public 
As the descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes suggests, the two key actors 
with the larger numbers of public references as applied to violent crime discourse 
in the Australian case are the public itself (with 27 references) and the government 
(25 references)28. Since the difference between the two in terms of numbers of 
references is negligible, further detailed content analysis of specific codes should 
be conducted to identify a degree of plausibility to set the policy agenda on violent 
crime in Australian context. 
First, with regard to the public, the overall sentiment analysis suggests 
rather a positive and (potentially) strong role attributed to the public. To begin with, 
out of the total 27 references only two explicitly suggest a weaker role of the public, 
i.e. Reference 1 where the public is viewed as being preoccupied with lust for 
‘money and title’, much less for benign abstract ideas such as democracy thus there 
is no use teaching good concepts at school when a young student’s home 
environment appears to be so ‘erratic’ and violent; and in Reference 15 the public 
often exhibits almost a total lack of compassion for others even refusing to contact 
police for help. Apart from these two negative sentiment references, the overall 
tone appears quite positive with regard to the public driving (and setting) the policy 
                                               
28 Full transcripts are available by following this link: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327551915_NVivo_transcripts_Key_Actors_-
_the_Public 
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agenda on violent crime in Australian context. Among the remaining 25 references 
the following sub-issues are mainly analyzed: domestic violence and violence 
against women (though rather distinct, these two types of violence still often 
overlap) – references, #3-8, 10-14, 17, 18, 23-26; alcohol-fueled and street violence 
(again, these two types of violence often overlap in discourse) – references, #2, 9, 
20-22, 27; and Reference 19 relates to a single murder case. As this brief overview 
suggests, the public’s attention (as expressed via the public’s lens) appears quite 
focused on a narrow set of sub-issues within violent crime discourse, i.e. domestic 
violence (and against women) and alcohol-fueled violence, as opposed to, for 
instance, gang and/or workplace violence, or drug-fueled violence that are also 
analyzed by media etc. 
The positive role attributed to the public is evident through some of the 
following references. Reference 5 raises a critical question as to why the Australian 
federal government does not take heed of policy advice from Rosie Batty, 
Australian of the Year 2015 and a campaigner for domestic and family violence 
issues, and instead reduces the funding to fight domestic violence. This reference 
is important in two regards: first, the public pushes the policy agenda on domestic 
violence reminding all of the importance to maintain funds at an adequate level; 
and secondly, the (online) public shows support for the human rights campaigner, 
a role model that is (somewhat a less pronounced) part of the general public as the 
actor (that mainly consists of NGOs, public opinion, local communities, aboriginal 
communities, and to a less extent, the role model Rosie Batty and the ombudsman), 
as in the media section above. Reference 7 points to the importance of the public-
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driven ‘national forum’ to develop new ideas and issues related to domestic 
violence, as opposed to media and political figures’ preoccupation with terrorism 
– the latter may have caused 100 Australian casualties over the last 50 years while 
domestic violence kills thousands lives every decade or so. Next, Reference 9 
presents a clash of narratives offered by media versus the public over domestic 
violence, namely the public points to the media’s narrow focus on blaming men 
(via the misogyny thesis, also emphasized in references 23 as men brutalizing 
women with ‘overwhelming frequency’ and 18 as ‘male privilege’ and distorted 
masculinity) for causing trouble to ‘helpless women’, but instead the problem 
should be that both genders employ the abuse as a means to resolve their own issues. 
Furthermore, Reference 11 explicitly calls for men to initiate awareness campaigns 
via media sources as related to domestic violence. Another example of the public’s 
robust role in setting the policy agenda is in Reference 16, where it is actually 
suggested that while charity NGOs traditionally assist people in need, the 
government should do ‘some in depth work’ as it cannot simply ‘keep leaving it up 
to the charities’. Another important area where the public is seen to set its agenda 
is street violence. To this regard, Reference 20 suggests that while the NSW 
government has ignored the escalation of violence in Sydney streets and the follow-
up (public) intense debate, its official (government) statistics suggest a third of 
reduction in the number of assaults lately in the Kings Cross area of Sydney, 
whereas the public points to police recorded data with only 4.25 per cent reduction 
in 12 months. This case suggests that while the public’s attention to violent crime 
broadly can be inconsistent and sporadic (as suggested earlier in Quantitative and 
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NVivo Descriptive analyses), nevertheless in specific circumstances of high local 
significance i.e. at the community level, the public can effectively mobilize to push 
their agenda on certain sensitive (sub-)issues, e.g. street violence in Sydney. 
References 24 and 26 further support this observation by pointing to the need for 
local communities to get involved and form a policy response to a recent escalation 
of street violence in Sydney, which attests to police being unable to prevent 
violence. Finally, Reference 25 is less critical of police, instead pointing to the need 
of strengthening cooperation among the public, police and other key government 
agencies (customs and border control) to prevent the spread of gun violence. 
Second, with regard to the public’s references to the government (25 
references), these are divided into negative sentiment (15 public perception 
references), positive sentiments (9 references), and a single neutral reference, i.e. 
with mixed assessments (Figure 64). 
Figure 64 Public perceptions of government activities related to violent crime 
discourse in Australian context 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on NVivo codes 
In terms of specific sub-issues analyzed in the public discourse, these 
include domestic violence and against women (10 public perception references), 
street and alcohol-fueled violence (8 references), gun violence (4), and ethnic 
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violence (3). It is interesting to note that not only negative sentiments prevail over 
the positive references as perceived by the public but specifically with regard to 
domestic violence and violence against women the references are predominantly 
negatively sentimental (9 out of 10 references). This suggests that the public largely 
perceives government policy measures aimed at reducing the spread of domestic, 
family violence and violence against women largely as failure. Another 
manifestation of perceived failure is with regard to ethnic violence, though it is vital 
to note a small N of references (3 references #19-21) thus caution should be taken 
in overgeneralizing this observation and drawing specific conclusions. Regarding 
street and alcohol-fueled violence, the public perceptions are mixed, with positive 
assessments prevailing overall. Reference 11 points to NSW government 
downplaying the significance of street violence in Sydney while the public pushes 
this issue on government agenda through ‘urgent debate’; Reference 12 points to 
the government, along with political opposition and the hotel industry refer to the 
need to toughen laws on alcohol by ‘talking in hypotheticals’, while the public 
specifically pushes the need to restrict alcohol sales after 10 p.m. and access to 
liquor stores after 1 a.m. (the Newcastle model) and thus attempts to minimize 
violence described as unacceptable. On the other hand, the public appreciates the 
contribution of police forces to containing street violence with calls for further 
police involvement (references 13, 22-25). This particular sub-issue clearly 
demonstrates the public’s overall positive sentiments toward Australian police 
agencies while exhibiting negative sentiments toward other government institutions 
in dealing with policy measures. Next, gun violence (both in the street and inside 
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premises) is generally perceived with positive sentiments (though the issue of small 
N remains as with regard to ethnic violence), with a single reference (#14) 
producing mixed assessments: following the gun buyback campaign in 1996-97 
that lowered gun ownership from 3.2 to 2.2 million, this trend was reversed to its 
previous level and the nationwide homicide level was reduced only 8 years after 
the policy was introduced, thus it appears this reduction is not directly due to 
government policy (somewhat negative sentiment) but increased police forces 
(positive) that correlate over the period. In another account (#15) it is argued that 
gun buyback is generally successful, especially in preventing reoccurrence of 
events such as the 1996 Port Arthur massacre and tougher laws on automatic and 
military firearm ownership. Further, Reference 16 calls for cooperation among the 
community, police and customs and border control agencies to reduce gun violence, 
while Reference 17 presents an anecdotal account of the effective mobilization of 
security staff at the moment of a break-in at a Sydney-based self-storage facility 
and its cooperation with police that arrived at the scene minutes later to arrest the 
perpetrators and avoid casualties. 
To summarize this part, the public largely perceives itself as largely a robust 
actor that can and should drive the policy agenda and discourse on violent crime in 
Australian context. With regard to the government, the public perception, though 
generally negative, appears to be highly sub-issue specific (see Table 14 below), 
and further exhibiting somewhat positive sentiments with regard to the role of 
police forces in containing the spread of violence. 
Table 14 Public perception sentiments in Australian context by violent crime type 
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Types of 
violent crime 
Domestic violence 
and violence 
against women 
Ethnic 
violence 
Street and 
alcohol 
violence 
Gun 
violence 
 
Public 
perception 
sentiments 
 
(Predominantly) 
negative 
 
Negative 
(with a 
small N) 
 
Mixed 
(somewhat 
positive) 
 
Positive 
(small N) 
Source: The author’s own analysis based on NVivo codes 
The Government 
The government discourse on Australian-based violent crime policy 
emphasizes two key actors, i.e. the public (33 references) and government 
institutions (26 references), as suggested by the descriptive analysis of NVivo 
nodes earlier, and as in Appendix 4d. 
First, with regard to government references to the public (G-2-P), one way 
to classify these is with regard to the sub-issues analyzed within the umbrella of 
violent crime discourse. These include the following: violence against women and 
domestic violence (9 references, #4, 5, 7, 13, 19, 20, 24, 25, 29), drug-fueled 
violence (2 references, #1, 11), gang (street) violence (3 references, #15-17), 
alcohol-fueled violence (2 references, #18, 32), physical violence (2 references, 
#21, 23), while gun violence, child abuse and kidnapping receive negligible 
attention, i.e. with a single reference each). The second way of classification is 
through the elements that constitute the concept of the public. Here, the references 
are divided into the following types: aboriginal communities (10 references, #5, 10, 
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12, 14, 20-22, 24, 27, 33), local communities (apart from aboriginals) – 9 
references, #2, 4, 7-9, 11, 13, 17, 23; the public in general (7 references, #6, 15, 18, 
28, 29, 32 including empowerment of women, i.e. #3), public opinion (4 references, 
#21, 24-26), NGOs (3 references, #16, 19, 30), and the ombudsman (a single 
reference, #31). As this analysis suggests, three primary elements of the public – 
local and aboriginal communities, and the public in general – tend to drive the 
policy agenda on violent crime in Australian context. This is in sharp contrast with 
the Canadian case, where (at least from the G-2-G reference viewpoint) it is largely 
public opinion and perceptions that form the core of the public’s engine to set the 
policy agenda on violent crime.  
Next, in terms of agenda-setting interactions, first Reference 4 points to an 
interesting case. Here the community sends strong agenda-setting signals (i.e. calls 
to take policy measures) to the government with regard to violence against women 
and family violence issues, however the government then approves a budget 
without an increase in funds for the services required to address these issues. 
Though this is rather an idiosyncratic case, it demonstrates the Australian 
government occasionally resorts to exercising resilience, if not refusal, to accept 
policy propositions from the public at times of budget constraint. Closely related is 
Reference 7 where the community presses the government to take action with 
regard to family violence as it regards this of primary importance. Next, the public 
effectively sets the government policy agenda on kidnapping and abduction, where 
initially high public awareness of the sub-issue led to media and police forming a 
partnership aimed at intensifying reporting on related offences, which then led to 
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an increase in recorded statistics, i.e. intensified policy action. In another case (as 
in # 30), an initial push for a government response by a youth NGO with regard to 
assaults was then effectively reflected in higher police recorded statistics on public 
assaults, i.e. by 27% from 2004/2005 to 2008/2009. Finally, Reference 29 points to 
another public campaign in early 2009 with regard to mandatory minimum 
sentencing for family violence, which was introduced later the same year with an 
accompanying increase in recorded statistics. 
As the above analysis suggests, the public largely drives policy agendas on 
a range of sub-issues under the violent crime umbrella in Australian context, as 
perceived by the government with regard to the public (G-2-P references). The 
summary of agenda-setting interactions can be presented in Figure 65 below. 
Figure 65 Government perceptions toward the public (G-2-P) on violent crime 
discourse in the Australian context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: As perceived by the government with regard to the public (G-2-P), the public 
(especially with two key elements – local and aboriginal communities) acts as a 
robust actor that sets the policy agenda on violent crime. The public furthermore 
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employs media and police as platforms through which it also sends messages to the 
government (though to a lesser degree). 
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
Second, regarding government references to itself, i.e. government 
institutions (26), related to violent crime context in Australia, theses should be 
classified in order to analyze relevant observations. One way to categorize the 
references is a range of specific sub-issues related to violent crime. These include 
the following: domestic and family violence (5 references, #17, 19, 22, 24, 25), 
physical and other gross violence (5 references, #15, 20, 21, 23, 26), gun and/or 
gang violence (4 references, #5, 7, 9, 16), and substance abuse e.g. alcohol and 
drugs (3 references, #6, 13, 18). It is worth noting certain commonality with the 
attention pattern of G-2-P references that predominantly focus on domestic 
violence, however treating physical violence as insignificant. One possible reason 
for this could be related to operationalization, i.e. it is easier to quantify and assess 
change in domestic and family violence incidents than an amorphous concept of 
physical abuse, including a range of crimes e.g. serious injury, kidnapping, torture 
etc. The other reason is the public’s fear factor being driven by physical abuse 
incidents such as highly visible tortures and kidnappings rather than often behind-
the-door and underreported domestic violence. The second way of categorizing the 
references is identifying the key elements of the public as a robust actor. These 
include the (local) community – 5 references, #2-4, 7, 16, then aboriginal 
communities (2 references, #12, 19), and to a lesser degree public perceptions and 
fears (Reference 22). It is worth noting that similarly to G-2-P, these G-2-G 
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references emphasize the local community as a key element of the public, however 
paying less attention to aboriginal communities. One possible explanation is that 
aboriginal communities tend to reside in remote areas often away large cities which 
make it more challenging to properly record the related crime and thus quantify 
change processes related to this crime. 
Thus, in terms of agenda-setting interactions, it is largely the public (and 
especially local communities) that drive the policy agenda from the G-2-G 
viewpoint in Australian violent crime context. Furthermore, references 2-4, 7 
specifically emphasize the need for government agencies to address the needs of 
local communities. Finally, the government responds to public agenda calls with 
regard to introducing mandatory minimum sentencing for various types of violent 
crime, as in references 5, 7, 9 (for gun violence), 18 (for drug and alcohol-fueled 
violence), 20 (gross violence, e.g. serious injuries), and 25 (domestic and family 
violence). Yet another key actor also referred to in this discourse is police 
(Reference 8 that points to police carrying out “an exceptional job”; Reference 10 
where federal police is praised for the ability to conduct technical analysis and 
collect information; and in Reference 16 in response to gun violence epidemics, 
local police, with the assistance by the federal government, developed a safe streets 
program in partnership with the local community). The summary of agenda-setting 
interactions can be outlined in Figure 66 as presented below. 
 
Figure 66 Government perceptions toward itself (G-2-G) on violent crime in 
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Note: The public (driven by local communities) sets the government agenda on 
violent crime and acts as a partner with local police departments, which are funded 
by the federal government. 
Source: The author’s own analysis 
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Canadian context of academia discourse mainly points to sexual abuse, the 
Australian case emphasizes the severity of alcohol and drug abuse sub-issues as 
part of violent crime policy. 
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violence and against women as crime against humanity and state crime thus should 
be put into international law in the context of public and institutional policy, #2 
with a reference to a corrections policy document, #9 analyzing the government’s 
gun buyback policy, #10 on military conscription lottery policy, #26 on the positive 
effect of restorative justice on lowering youth violence, #27 with government-led 
diversionary conferences lowering youth violence, and #8, 19 pointing to statistics 
agencies as sources of data and classification of types of violent crimes; 
furthermore negative sentiments include #12 with the government systemically 
trivializing and ignoring intimate partner violence and against women sub-issues, 
#15 where Western Australia correction system releases prisoners with a higher 
mortality rate due to drug use, #17 where despite stringent restrictions, the number 
of legal firearms have grown); and the public (4 references, i.e. #6 with compulsory 
community treatment reducing violent victimization, #16 where specific locations 
of communities correlate with prevalence of violent crime and negative sentiments 
– 2 references, i.e. #5 where community-driven collective efficacy and social ties 
fail to materialize in reducing violent victimization in Brisbane, and #33 where 
public perception, or self-reported counts of aggression can be inaccurate in 
measuring an extent of video gaming effects on physical aggression). To 
summarize, academia views itself as the most predominant actor that drives the 
policy agenda on violent crime in Australian context, while government agencies 
act as a moderate actor (11 references including 3 with negative sentiments), and 
the public is viewed to be rather passive and under-emphasized (4 references, 
212 
 
including 2 with negative sentiments). Schematically, agenda-setting links can be 
presented in Figure 67. 
Figure 67 Key actors within academia (A-2-A) discourse on violent crime in 
Australian context 
 
 
 
 
Note: Australian academia perceives itself as the robust actor that drives the policy 
discourse for government agencies and the public on violent crime. Government 
agencies act as a moderate actor that drives the discourse to a lesser degree, and 
furthermore, the public appears to act as an under-emphasized player on the violent 
crime policy arena. 
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
Next, the 33 academia references to the public (A-2-P), first, can be 
similarly classified in terms of policy areas analyzed. These predominantly include 
domestic violence and violence against women (5 references, #2, 17, 18, 23, 29), 
alcohol and drugs-fueled violence (4 references, #4, 10, 11, 15), and youth violence 
(4 references, i.e. #1, 6, 7, 25), while other sub-issues such as sexual abuse (2 
references, #22, 30), physical violence (#13), gun violence (#14), and murder and 
homicide (#20) receive negligible public attention as perceived by academia in A-
2-P discourse. This is an interesting observation: while academic discourse (A-2-
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substance abuse (alcohol and drugs), the public’s attention span covers a broader 
range, as analyzed above. This further supports a tentative observation with regard 
to Canadian-based academia as the Ivory Tower. 
Another way to group the references is with regard to the key actors 
emphasized in A-2-P discourse on violent crime policy in Australian context. Apart 
from academia that predominantly drives the policy agenda, another key actor 
appears to be the public (15 references with positive sentiments, i.e. #4 where 
NGOs are praised for their proactive involvement in tackling alcohol abuse, #5 
where NGOs partner with a local government in lowering violent crime around a 
Sydney neighborhood, #8 and 9 where social control based on collective efficacy 
is viewed as a strong factor in reducing violence, #10-12 where the local 
community and government partnership is viewed as a strong factor in effectively 
reducing alcohol-fueled violence, #14 with community-based interventions being 
most effective in addressing gun violence as opposed to government policies, #16 
where the public partnering with government promotes the notion of restorative 
justice that eventually is found to be an effective approach in addition to procedural 
justice practices, #17 with the public pushing the government agenda on 
introducing aggravated sentencing for high-profile violence against women cases, 
#25 with a local community pushing the public agenda on framing Sudanese ethnic 
violence as an issue not only of concern to refugees but also to wider society, #26 
and 27 where the public moral outrage is viewed as a strong independent factor that 
explains the severity of punishments in the context of retributive justice, and 
including the public and media as partner actors, i.e. #1, 3), while the role of 
214 
 
aboriginal communities seems rather passive (e.g. references 13, 15, 22 etc. that 
only raise the overall importance of addressing violence within aboriginal 
communities without any specific initiative on their part, and Reference 32 points 
to the possibility of inaccurate public perception as in the case of NSW courts 
whose sentencing verdicts have actually become tougher over time as opposed to 
public opinion.  
On the other hand, government agencies in overall act as a moderate actor 
(6 references with positive sentiments versus 3 containing negative sentiments). 
The positive sentiment references include #7 with sound government programs to 
address gun violence, #19 with police refining their efforts to contain violent crime 
by using TASER, #24 with the Australian government being commended for its 
better social wellbeing policy vis-à-vis the US that reduces outright deprivation and 
poverty as major preconditions for violent crime, and #1, 6, 28 as sources of data, 
while negative sentiments are reflected in #2 where government bodies are 
criticized for creating and maintaining institutional conditions that disempower 
women and thus ignoring the issue of intimate partner violence in their discourse, 
#14 where government policies are found ineffective in addressing gun violence, 
and #23 where the government criminal justice system is criticized for taking 
lenient measures in cases of indigenous domestic violence). Finally, a somewhat 
moderate role is attributed to media: apart from above-mentioned references 1 and 
3 where media is viewed as a partner with the public in addressing violence, media 
is found to drive moral panic in its portrayal of high-profile rape (i.e. violence 
against women) scandals as gender issues as in references 29, 30. 
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To summarize this part, academia predominantly drives the policy agenda 
on violent crime, while the public acts as the second key actor often pushing its 
own agendas whether in partnership with other actors (government and media) or 
on its own. The summary of agenda-setting interactions in the context of violent 
crime discourse in Australia as reflected in academia-to-public (A-2-P) references 
is presented in Figure 68 below. 
Figure 68 Key actors within academia-to-public (A-2-P) discourse on violent crime 
in Australia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Academia-to-public references suggest the presence of two key actors – 
predominantly academia and then the public (to a lesser degree, with NGOs and 
local communities and neighborhoods being its key elements) that set the 
government policy agenda on violent crime. Academia also partners with 
government and the public. Furthermore, government agencies not only act as a 
moderate actor but also partners with the public (along with media) as perceived 
by academic research.  
Source: The author’s own analysis. 
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As in Appendix 6d, the two actors to which the Australia-based think tank 
community most frequently refers to in their violent crime discourse are their local 
counterparts (TT-2-TT references, 63 in total), followed by the public (TT-2P 
references, 52 in total). First, the semantic content analysis of TT-2-TT references 
is conducted. To begin with, it is important to classify these references in terms of 
the following think tank categories: 
- think tanks setting or shaping the government agenda on violent crime (7 
references, i.e. #6 where the government-affiliated Australian Institute of 
Criminology [AIC] is presented as a vital think tank institution that conducts 
relevant research to inform policy debates mainly related to substance abuse, child 
sexual abuse, and family violence and similarly #52 with AIC setting government 
agenda on substance abuse, domestic violence in vulnerable communities with a 
focus on youth and aboriginal communities, #33 where a new AIC report in human 
trafficking with the aim to improve the existing knowledge on help-seeking 
strategies for victims is viewed as a vital source to assist both government and 
communities in responding to this crime, #46 where a Labor party-affiliated Evatt 
Foundation critically reassesses government prison policy with regard to 
psychological intervention and cognitive therapy of prisoners, #48 and 55 where 
AIC pushes government agenda on aboriginal overrepresentation in Australian 
prisons, #58 where AIC effectively sets the government agenda on physical assault 
that has been debated for long time); on the other hand, think tanks are also engaged 
in partnerships with other actors though to a lesser degree, i.e. government (as in 
references 7, 53) and academia (as in #7, 30, 53); finally, think tanks’ discourse is 
217 
 
often somewhat shaped by data provided mainly by police, as in references 11, 12, 
31, 44, 60);  
- think tanks as strong actors that shape public perceptions on violent crime 
(9 references, i.e. #1, 3, 28, 29, 33, 34, 36, 50, and 59 where think tanks seek to 
clear the public misperceptions on violent crime, thus in a way setting the public 
agenda in a manner perceived to be right by think tanks, including the intermediary 
use of media as in #50); and  
- think tanks as sources of valuable data and research (nearly all references 
include relevant statistics employed to establish links between violent crime and 
other phenomena, such as mental health issues, alcohol consumption etc.).  
It is vital to note the following key distinction vis-à-vis the think tank 
discourse in the Canadian setting, i.e. that the Australian case exhibits greater 
robustness of think tanks that act not only as a platform through which other key 
actors send their agenda-setting messages to government agencies (detailed 
analysis below) but themselves appear as independent actors motivated and 
empowered to drive the policy agenda as related to violent crime. As described 
above, it is predominantly the (government-affiliated) AIC that often sets the policy 
agenda on government agencies and the public. Given its somewhat higher 
premium institutionalized status, that is affiliated with the Australian Ministry of 
Home Affairs (AIC 2018), it is empowered to demonstrate robustness in policy 
agenda-setting through its established status as the nation’s major research center 
focusing on criminal justice policy, “compiling trend data and disseminating 
research and policy advice” (ibid). Together with the other three related institutions 
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(BOCSAR – the NSW government-affiliated Bureau of Crime Statistics and 
Research, 8 references, the Labor Party-based Evatt Foundation with a single 
reference, and the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, one reference), the 
Australia-based government-affiliated think tanks and research centers feature 
prominently in 50 references (including 40 related to AIC), while the remaining 
references include academia-affiliated university-based research centers (11 
references) and other, uncategorized think tanks (2 references), as in Figure 69 
below.  
Figure 69 Australia-based think tanks and research units, by institutionalized status 
(affiliation) 
 
Source: The author’s own analysis 
Another useful way to classify the references is by policy areas analyzed. 
These include physical violence (e.g. burglary, assaults, robbery) – 20 references, 
i.e. #2, 3, 5, 10-12, 15, 20, 36, 44, 48, 49, 51, 52, 56-59, 62, 63; family, domestic 
violence and sexual abuse (both against women and children) – 17 references, i.e. 
#6, 8, 10, 12-14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 27, 45, 47, 52, 54, 55, 57; substance abuse (i.e. 
alcohol- and drugs-fueled violence) – 16 references, i.e. #3-6, 9, 11, 15, 18, 24, 28, 
35-37, 49, 51, 52; murder and homicide (10 references, i.e. #10, 12-14, 34, 49, 51-
53, 59); weapons (guns, knives) – 5 references, i.e. #5, 31, 38, 39, 44; while the 
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remainder receives negligible attention, i.e. prison violence (2 references, i.e. #23, 
46), and human trafficking (#33). Similarly to the Canadian case, the Australian 
context suggests the think tank community focuses on a wider range of policy areas 
as analyzed above, as compared to academia which predominantly looks into 
substance abuse, i.e. alcohol- and drugs-fueled violence research. 
Last, apart from the think tank community, the other key actors involved 
include the public – 8 references in total, including 3 references that point to 
robustness of the public in setting government agenda on violent crime (i.e. #1 and 
59, where it is suggested that public perceptions toward crime victimization and 
violent crime generally remain high on government agenda, and #54 where it 
suggests that the society-driven notion of restorative justice is increasingly applied 
to crime cases of gendered violence, e.g. sexual assault and rape etc.), and 5 
references on driving think tank agenda through public opinion and perception 
surveys i.e. #3, 20, 24, 52, 57; and 3 references that emphasize public 
misperceptions toward violent crime to which think tanks contribute by providing 
evidence-based policy recommendations, i.e. # 1, 15, 34); and the industry – 
Reference 37, where the digital technology industry, via media, effectively pushed 
a policy at the local state government level to introduce the use of ID scanners in 
Geelong (Victoria) as a measure to contain alcohol violence near liquor stores and 
nightclubs. The summary of key actors interacting in agenda-setting processes can 
be presented in Figure 70. 
Figure 70 Key actors within TT-2-TT discourse related to violent crime in 
Australian context 
The industry 
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Note: As perceived by think tanks, this actor itself appears to drive the violent crime 
policy both onto the government and the public (i.e. by shaping and/or correcting 
its perceptions), occasionally via media. Furthermore, think tanks can also engage 
in partnership relations with academia and government. Yet, another key actor that 
also sets government agenda is the public. 
Source: The author’s own analysis 
Next, with regards to think tank references to the public (TT-2-P, 52 in 
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the other hand, however, the public remains to be a robust actor that drives the 
government policy agenda on violent crime (9 references, i.e. #1 where the public’s 
concern with regard to crime victimization is a significant factor that government 
decision makers take into account when forming their agenda, #8 where aboriginal 
communities express their willingness to develop initiatives aimed atsafety 
improvement in their locales, #12 which suggests that feminist NGOs historically 
have set the government agenda on family violence, #20 where public awareness 
campaigns led to increased rates of violent crime reported to police, #25 where 
public opinion informs government official statistics, while victimization surveys 
inform police reported crime, #35 where alcohol-fueled violence among the youth 
translates from a community concern to all-level government agenda, #38 where 
community corrections appears to be a more efficient approach to dealing with 
violent recidivism than prison rehab, #49 where public perception toward violent 
crime is viewed to be an important factor that needs to be considered along with 
police statistics, and #50 where [NGO-led] public awareness campaigns lead to 
higher reporting to police on physical violence and sexual assaults; yet occasionally 
government policy has an effect on local citizens, i.e. #27 where Western Australia 
Government’s proposed ‘stop and search’ legislation is viewed with negative terms 
with likely repercussions on citizens’ interactions with local police).  
Second, apart from the government, the public also shapes the policy and 
research agenda for think tanks (9 references, i.e. #2, 7, 21 where public opinion 
and local community perceptions inform think tank research findings and similarly 
#14 where youth’s perceptions on youth violence have an impact on a think tank’s 
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discourse, #3 where vulnerable communities are the focus of AIC research which 
in turn shapes government policy, specifically for the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Drugs, #9 where aboriginal initiatives related to alcohol-fueled 
violence inform think tank discourse, #28 where it is local communities, families 
and NGOs that effectively help victims of human trafficking break this exploitation 
and similarly #47 where community, family, individual characteristics, along with 
historical events, are viewed as determinants of violence in aboriginal communities, 
and #48 where individual, community and family functionality are presented as 
predictors of physical violence in aboriginal communities). Finally, the public is 
engaged in partnership with police and government agencies (as in references 16, 
23), and so is the think tank community, to a lesser extent (i.e. Reference 12, where 
a think tank develops a collaborative project with Victoria police on youth 
violence). 
In essence, the analysis of think tank references to the public (TT-2-P) 
suggests that apart from the think tank community, the public appears as another 
key actor that often drives the policy agenda on violent crime in Australian context, 
both in relation to government agencies and to the think tank community. 
Furthermore, it is the public that appears to set the government agenda to a greater 
extent than think tanks, as related to TT-2-P references, while think tanks serve as 
a platform through which the public transmits its messages. With regard to shaping 
public perceptions, it is media (to a greater degree, 5 references as mentioned 
above) and think tanks (to less extent, 3 references) that are found to have impact 
(Figure 71). 
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Figure 71 Key actors within TT-2-P violent crime discourse in Australian context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: With regard to TT-2-P reference discourse, the public is largely shaped by 
media through the fear factor and moral panic and, to a lesser extent, by think 
tanks. The public (to a greater extent) and think tanks (to a lesser extent) set the 
government policy agenda on violent crime. Furthermore, think tanks occasionally 
engage in partnership with police, while the public does so with police and 
government. 
Source: The author’s own analysis 
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crime issues as applied to two country cases. The analysis leads to a number of 
observations. First, regarding violent crime in Canadian context, the actors 
demonstrate less coherence in terms of trends vis-à-vis economic diversification. 
The government (Fig. 42) exhibits steady, recurring cycles which may suggest 
government’s resilience against external pressure both to events and other actors 
thus able to pursue its own agenda but unlikely to drive the policy agenda on other 
key actors, while the public does not appear to show clear patterns (Fig. 44), though 
exhibiting somewhat increased attention toward the end of the period, i.e. 2015 both 
in terms of the number of articles and reader comments. The other non-expert, 
media (as in Fig. 43), following a steady downward trend shows a distinct peak 
around 2012, possibly sensation-driven due to 2 mass shooting events, then 
returning to the pre-shock state by 2013 followed by steadily growing trends to 
2015. It is worth noting here that the public does not appear to react to media’s 
heightened attention immediately but only toward 2015, thus not likely due to 
media effect since media actually exhibits lower attention trends since 2012. 
Finally, among the experts, academia only shows a somewhat increased trend by 
2014 thus resembling non-experts, while the think tank community exhibits two 
distinct recurring attention cycles, first in 2010 and then 2014-2015, thus more 
likely to drive the policy agenda on violent crime discourse. The Australian case 
shows different, more coherent, patterns. To begin with, the three non-experts, i.e. 
government agencies, media and the public, as well as one of the experts, academia, 
largely exhibit increased attention trends towards the end of the period, i.e. 2014 
(media, the public), 2015 (government), and 2013 (academia), though government 
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trends show a slight uptick in the earlier period, around 2010 (Fig. 56-59). Finally, 
think tanks exhibit two distinct spikes in 2010 and 2012, thus pointing to a 
correlation with government trends over the year 2010. This is one interesting 
observation that should be further investigated at the content analysis stage. 
Another observation is a possible correlation between think tanks, media and the 
Australian government in 2014-2015 (as in Figures 56, 57, 60).The most prominent 
theme within the 2015 attention spike of the government is family and domestic 
violence. Similarly, out the total 55 media articles that came out in 2015, domestic 
or family violence is a major theme in 46 articles, while think tanks relate to 
domestic violence in 8 out of 22 publications in 2015.The third observation is that 
although economy generally is the most important issue according to public opinion 
polls in 2015 in Canada (CBC News 2015) and Australia (Roy Morgan Research, 
2015), Australian context shows that violent crime as a sub-issue of general crime 
is of greater concern to all actors vis-à-vis economic diversification, as a sub-issue 
within the economy umbrella. Thus, quantitative analysis tentatively points to the 
prevalence of think tanks in driving violent crime agenda across both countries, less 
plausibly in Australian context. This may seem counterintuitive given the issue’s 
high position in opinion polls and as in the above analysis. Two possible factors 
can explain this. First, there might be an omitted variable issue, i.e. an unobserved 
key actor that may manifest more prominently, as perceived by other actors at the 
stage of more detailed content analysis. Second, the public might play a more robust 
role than what is suggested by this ‘litmus test’ quantitative analysis, as the public 
may not necessarily express its sentiments and policy stances through the online 
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platform but via public polls conducted by government institutions and think tanks, 
via public perceptions assessed by academia, via NGOs etc. 
Next, the analysis of NVivo nodes related to violent crime leads to certain 
observations. First, regarding causes and effects of violent crime (see Table 15 
below), similarly to the issue of economic diversification, both countries 
demonstrate an overall division among actors as related to attention intensity. Of 
particular relevance is an interesting similarity (in terms of lower attention trends) 
among the public and government institutions across both countries. A striking 
exception to the division of attention intensity among key actors is the think tank 
community: while exhibiting somewhat higher attention intensity (64, 11) in the 
Australian case, which is typical of experts, it demonstrates rather lower intensity 
in the Canadian example (16 and 2, accordingly). This actor, therefore, does not 
appear to set its agenda on violent crime, at least with regard to the cause and effect 
node in Canadian context. On the contrary, it is largely media and academia that 
can effectively compete for setting the agenda as related to the cause and effect 
node in the Canadian case, as well as possibly another hidden actor that might be 
identified in the process of content analysis. The Australian case presents a different 
picture: here it is media that seems to exhibit strongest interest in the issue, while 
academia and think tanks remain other key actors. Thus these actors should be 
further analyzed and contrasted in detail. 
Table 15 Causes and effects on violent crime across Canada and Australia 
Canada Australia 
 Causes Effects  Causes Effects 
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Media 67 7 Media 114 8 
The Public 20 0 The Public 41 5 
The 
Government 
10 4 The 
Government 
46 8 
Academia 63 7 Academia 69 7 
Think tanks 16 2 Think tanks 64 11 
Source: The author’s own analytics based on NVivo-generated nodes 
The second node employed is related to key actors. As Table 16 below 
suggests, Canadian and Australian cases present a number of interesting 
observations. Unlike the analysis of economic diversification, in which almost all 
actors refer to the government across both nations, violent crime points to the 
prominence of the public and government agencies. Media (both in Canadian and 
Australian examples) refers mostly to the government, followed by the public. 
Furthermore, the government is emphasized by Canadian government agencies and 
Canadian think tanks. The Australian case presents different key actors: while 
media refers to government institutions more than to other actors, it also emphasizes 
the public as the next key actor. Furthermore, the public is mostly referred to by the 
(online) public, and the government, while think tanks and academia refer to the 
public as the second key actor. Lastly, another interesting divergence between the 
two country cases is a stronger role of media in Australian context vis-à-vis the 
Canadian case, emphasized by media institutions and academia. It is worth noting 
that media’s presence as an actor in Australian context is also observed for 
economic diversification. In other words, the nature of policy issues does not seem 
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to cause substantial variation in media’s presence, as emphasized by other actors, 
in the context of agenda-setting interactions in the Australian case, even despite 
media’s increased interest to violent crime vis-à-vis diversification, as measured by 
the number of developed causes and effects. However, the nature of policy issues 
appears to influence the agenda-setting interactions among the public and 
government: indeed, while the government is much emphasized in relation to 
economic diversification policy across both nations, violent crime analysis suggests 
an increased emphasis of the public. This tentative observation should be further 
confirmed or disproved by the content analysis of the ‘key actors’ node below. 
Finally, similarly to the diversification case, violent crime discourse points to a 
greater degree of resilience attributed to Canadian government agencies vis-à-vis 
the Australian government (with Canadian government making 23 references to its 
own agencies versus 7 to the public, while the Australian counterpart makes 33 
references to the public and 26 to itself). This may indicate Australian government’s 
greater receptiveness to public messages as compared with the Canadian case. The 
content analysis of specific codes related to the ‘key actors’ node should test this 
proposition. 
Table 16 Key actors on violent crime across Canada and Australia 
Canada Australia 
 Key actors  Key actors 
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Media  Government (74),  
the public (69),  
academia (29) 
Media  Government (119), 
the public (101), 
media (57), 
academia (54) 
The Public The public (21), 
government (16) 
The Public The pubic (27), 
government (25), 
media (19) 
The 
Government 
Government (23), 
the public (7) 
The 
Government 
The public (33), 
government (26) 
Academia Academia (55),  
the public (25), 
government (23) 
Academia Academia (35),  
the public (33), 
government (27), 
media (19) 
Think tanks Government (43),  
the public (24) 
Think tanks Think tanks (63), incl. 
government-affiliated (40); 
the public (52); 
the government (50) 
Source: The author’s own analytics based on NVivo-generated nodes 
Lastly, the actors mainly focus on the following types of violent crime in 
their discourse (as in Table 17 below): in the Canadian case, media and the public’s 
attention seems to correlate by mainly focusing on gun violence, while academia 
and think tanks’ attention patterns correlate by focusing on murder and homicide, 
while government’s attention is uncorrelated by focusing more on physical 
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violence; in Australian context, media, the public and government mainly focus on 
domestic violence, though physical violence also remains an important area, while 
think tanks mainly address physical violence (which is also high on government 
agenda), while academia seems rather alone focusing on alcohol violence cases. 
The Canadian case appears to support the notion of government resilience by 
pursuing its own agenda related to physical violence, while the Australian example 
supports the notion of academia as the ‘Ivory tower’. Finally the Australian case 
points to a certain degree of correlation between government and think tank 
agendas with both domestic and physical violence being the focus of their attention. 
This is understandable – as the detailed content analysis of the ‘Key actor’ node 
shows, a significant part of Australian-based think tanks are government-affiliated. 
Table 17 Types of violent crime across Canada and Australia 
Canada Australia 
 Types of violent crime  Types of violent crime 
Media  Gun violence (60),  
murder and homicide (58),  
gang violence (34), 
youth violence (33) 
Media  Domestic violence (109),  
alcohol-fueled violence (76), 
violence against women (56), youth 
(50) and physical violence (50) 
The Public Guns and firearms (11),  
violence against women (9), 
and murder and homicide (6) 
The Public Domestic violence (30), 
physical violence (20) 
The 
Government 
Physical violence (18), youth 
(13), murder and homicide 
The 
Government 
Domestic violence (14), 
physical violence (13), and 
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(12), gun violence (9), and 
violence against women (9) 
drug-fueled violence (12) 
 
Academia Youth violence (18), murder 
and homicide (15), violence 
against women (15), drug 
violence (14) 
Academia Alcohol violence (24), drug-fueled 
violence (19), physical violence 
(15), violence against women (15), 
and murder and homicide (14) 
Think tanks Murder and homicide (17),  
physical violence (8), youth 
(6) and gun violence (6) 
Think tanks Physical violence (49), 
domestic violence (35), and 
murder and homicide (33) 
Source: The author’s own analytics based on NVivo-generated nodes 
Last comes the content analysis of codes related to the ‘key actors’ node on 
violent crime discourse. First, regarding the Canadian case, media largely perceives 
the public to drive the policy agenda (both for media-to-government and media-to-
public references) though the government exhibits greater resilience against public 
pressure as compared to the case of economic diversification. Interestingly, in 
media references to the government, police is relatively referred to with positive 
sentiments, i.e. 20 out of 36 positive sentiments attributed to (public) government 
agencies. This entails an important policy implication, i.e. despite the government’s 
use of resilience against public pressure it can effectively employ police as an 
agency to communicate with the public with regard to relevant data and research 
on violent crime. Next, the public also views itself as the leading actor in setting 
the agenda (with overall positive sentiments toward itself, i.e. public-to-public, 
including only 3 negative out of 21 references in total), while the public regards the 
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government with negative sentiments in 7 out of 16 references or 43%, though with 
a small N to be kept in consideration. One of the negative references points to 
government resilience against public pressure in the case of Harper government 
attempts to derail the parliament with regard to investigations into missed and 
murdered aboriginal women (p. 137). Compared to economic diversification 
policy, the public’s negative sentiments toward the government appear to be less 
intense (70.1% for diversification). This suggests the Canadian government is 
motivated to keep the public generally satisfied with its violent crime policy as this 
issue appears socially sensitive, according to recent polls (as in CBC News 2015, 
Sep 10). Third, the government perceives the public to drive violent crime policy 
agenda while also cooperating with police as a source of recent data on crime (both 
in government-to-government and government-to-public references). Then 
academia (A-2-A) largely perceives itself to drive the agenda, followed by a 
moderate role attributed to the public (Fig. 53). Finally, the think tank community 
(with perceptions toward the government, TT-2-G) largely views the public to be a 
key driver of policy agenda though the government may occasionally resist public 
pressure (see Fig. 55), followed by think tanks (as an independent actor) and, to a 
less extent, academia that often disprove the inaccuracies in government statements 
and thus contribute to better understanding of policy processes by the public, e.g. 
with regard to Harper-led ‘tough on crime’ policy. Furthermore, think tank 
references to the public (TT-2-P) specifically point to the following driving 
elements of the public: active voters and citizens (9 references), public opinion (6), 
followed by NGOs (4), as in Table 11. The government, on the other hand, often 
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organizes public polls in attempts to measure perceptions to certain policy areas. 
The above analyses can be summarized in Table 18 below. 
Table 18 The summary table of key actors for Canada-based violent crime 
 Media The public The government Academia Think tanks 
Key 
actors 
M-2-G and  
M-2-P: the 
public sets 
the agenda 
(NGOs, 
aboriginal 
communities 
and public 
opinion) 
P-2-P: the 
public; 
P-2-G: 
negative 
sentiments to 
the 
government 
relatively 
prevail* 
G-2-G and G-2-
P: the public 
drives policy 
agenda, while 
partnering with 
police 
A-2-A: 
academia, 
followed 
by the 
public 
TT-2-G: the public, 
then think tanks;  
TT-2-P: the public 
(active voters, 
opinion polls, 
NGOs) 
Note: *denotes a small N issue, i.e. fewer than 10 references 
Source: The author’s own analysis 
It is interesting to note that as compared to the case of economic 
diversification, the violent crime discourse emphasizes the government’s use of 
resilience against external pressure to a greater degree: indeed, while it is only the 
public that perceives certain resilience on the part of government in the case of 
economic diversification (Fig. 17), the violent crime case points to a wider range 
of actors, i.e. media (Fig. 48), the public (p. 137), and think tanks (as in Fig. 55) 
that perceive government resilience against public pressure as clearly manifested. 
Canadian government’s resort to resilience against external actor pressure appears 
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to correlate with a degree of social sensitivity of policy issues (as comparison of 
diversification and violent crime suggests). Thus further research might look into 
these phenomena in detail. 
Second, the Australian context suggests that media, in reference to the 
government (i.e. M-2-G references), points to the public that largely drives the 
policy agenda, with the specific elements including distressed family members and 
NGOs, by employing media (to a greater degree) and the parliament (to a lesser 
degree) to effectively set the government agenda on sub-issues related to violent 
crime, e.g. alcohol violence and tougher sentencing. The government still remains 
a key actor, as a source of valuable data for public discourse and as engine for 
producing relevant laws and legal amendments as related to violent crime. 
Furthermore, M-2-P references emphasize the following key driving elements of 
the public: NGOs, followed by public opinion, and local communities (as in Table 
19). 
 
Table 19 The summary table of key actors for Australia-based violent crime 
 Media The public The government Academia Think tanks 
Key 
actors 
M-2-G: the 
public; 
M-2-P: the 
public sets the 
agenda (NGOs, 
public opinion, 
P-2-P: the 
public; 
P-2-G: 
negative 
sentiments 
to the 
G-2-P and G-2-
G: the public 
drives policy 
agenda (local, 
aboriginal 
communities and 
A-2-A: 
academia;  
A-2-P: 
academia 
and the 
TT-2-TT: think 
tanks set 
government and 
public agendas. 
It is then 
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and 
communities) 
government 
prevail 
the public in 
general) 
public as 
key actors. 
followed by the 
public*;  
TT-2-P: the 
public, and 
media*. 
Note: *denotes a small N issue, i.e. fewer than 10 references 
Source: The author’s own analysis 
The public likewise largely views itself (in public-to-public references, i.e. 
P-2-P) as the key actor that drives the Australian government agenda on violent 
crime, while exhibiting largely negative sentiments toward government policy 
measures, though according to Table 14, their sentiments vary depending on a 
specific sub-area. The government (both G-2-P and G-2-G) largely views the public 
to be a key actor setting the policy agenda, with local, aboriginal communities, and 
the general public being the leading elements (Table 19). The public specifically 
sets the policy agenda on family violence and physical violence (assaults, 
kidnapping and abduction) from the viewpoint of G-2-P references and on 
introducing mandatory minimum sentencing for various types of violent crime from 
the viewpoint of G-2-G references. Next, academia views itself (A-2-A) as the most 
robust actor driving government policy agenda (Figure 67). Unlike the other key 
actors, academia appears focused on a narrow range of sub-issues within violent 
crime discourse, i.e. mainly on substance abuse (alcohol and drugs), similarly to 
Canadian context where academia is found to mainly focus on sexual abuse. This 
reinforces the thesis regarding academia as the ‘Ivory tower’. The analysis of 
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academia references to the public (A-2-P) suggests that in addition to academia, 
another key actor appears to be the public. Furthermore, academia, the public and 
government agencies often engage in partnership relations to collectively address 
the evils of violent crime. Finally, think tanks largely perceive their local 
counterparts, mostly government-affiliated think tanks (in TT-2-TT references), to 
set the government agenda on violent crime and to shape public perceptions, 
followed by the public as the second key actor (Figure 70). It is worth noting that 
compared to the Canadian case Australian context demonstrates a greater role 
attributed to think tanks as an independent actor, not just a platform through which 
other actors send their agenda-setting messages to the government or the public. 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the Australian government endeavors to adopt 
the partnership approach to more efficiently accommodating the agenda-setting 
playing field, in this case establishing links with the local think tank community 
mainly government-affiliated think tanks and research institutions such as the AIC, 
BOCSAR etc. (pp. 190, 191). Regarding think tank references to the public (i.e. 
TT-2-P), though the public remains to be perceived as the key actor that sets the 
government agenda on violent crime, certain criticism is raised regarding the 
public’s vulnerability to misperception of violent crime levels and trends, as well 
as media manipulation (yet with a small N in consideration). Still, the public is 
perceived to set the policy agenda on governments and think tanks (as reflected in 
think tank references to the public, TT-2-P). Thus, by setting the policy agenda on 
think tanks and using the think tank community as a platform through which it 
transmits messages to the government, the public remains the most vital actor. 
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 Chapter 6.Key Findings and Discussion 
The thesis largely seeks to answer the following research questions as raised 
in Chapter 3 (section 3.2):  
RQ 1: Who sets the agenda? It is largely the public that is found to set the 
policy agenda on violent crime both in Canadian and Australian cases. Regarding 
economic diversification, it is academia that appears to set the policy agenda in 
Canadian context, followed by the private sector, while the Australian case largely 
attributes the leading agenda-setting role to the private sector and industry. Thus 
Hypothesis 2 is found to be confirmed: indeed, the public unambiguously appears 
to set the policy agenda on violent crime in both Canadian and Australian settings. 
Hypothesis 1, on the other hand, is only partially supported: while Canadian context 
suggests the agenda-setting power of academia in the economic diversification 
case, the Australian country context points to an omitted variable issue, i.e. the role 
of the private sector. 
RQ 2: Is the agenda-setting influence uni-, bi-, or multi-directional for each 
of the two issues over the period from 2008 to 2015? Generally agenda-setting 
influence is the mixture of all three types of relationships. First, regarding economic 
diversification, the Canadian case suggests that media and the public perceive 
agenda-setting interactions to be one-way, i.e. messages being transmitted by 
academia (to greater extent) and the private sector (lesser extent) onto the 
government agenda without any explicit feedback from the government. However, 
the remaining three actors – government, academia and think tanks – largely point 
to bi-directional agenda-setting interactions, i.e. Figure 18 where partnership links 
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are observed among the government on the one hand, and the private sector and the 
public, on the other hand, Figure 20 that points to a mixture of one-way and two-
way links as perceived by academia, and Figure 23 with partnerships between the 
private sector and government, as perceived by think tanks. In Australian context, 
the reverse is found to be confirmed, i.e. two actors (media and government) point 
to bi-directional partnership links between the private sector and government, while 
three actors (the public, academia and think tanks) largely suggest one-way agenda-
setting links from the private sector and government (all three) and between both 
academia and government, and the private sector and government one-way links 
(one actor, i.e. the government). Thus, regarding economic diversification, it is 
largely uni-directional (AUS) and bi-directional (CAN) agenda-setting links that 
appear more prominent.  
Next, regarding violent crime, the Canadian case suggests the applicability 
of multi-directional agenda-setting links (perceived by government, academia and 
think tanks) versus uni-directional relationships driven by the public (as perceived 
by media and the public). Likewise, Australian context largely points to multi-
directional links, i.e. as perceived by the government (Fig. 65), academia (fig. 67, 
68), and think tanks (fig. 70, 71), while media and the public suggest the presence 
of one-way agenda-setting processes driven by the public. Thus, the violent crime 
case (in both countries) points to the prevalence of multi-directional links. 
The findings of this thesis should be contrasted with findings of some of the 
existing research as described in the literature review of Ch. 2 (section 2.1). To 
begin with, this thesis supports observations of Neuman et al. (2014) and Copeland, 
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Hasell and Bimber (2016) that refer to agenda-setting processes as two-way and 
multi-directional links. Second, these findings not only generally support the 
importance of the public and academia as robust actors capable of setting (context-
specific) policy agenda, but further specify the role of the public in driving the 
policy agenda on violent crime. Namely, the following major elements of the public 
have been found to be key drivers: public opinion (e.g. as also found by Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen 2013); local communities (e.g. as in Duan-Barnett et al. 
2012,Dearingand Rogers 1996); NGOs (e.g. as in Murphy 2010); and to a lesser 
extent, active citizens and voters (e.g. Margetts et al. 2016, Wlezien and Soroka 
2016, Bonafont and Palau 2011), as described in Canadian context on violent crime 
through think tanks perceptions toward the public (see Table 13). Yet, this thesis 
fails to support the robustness of netizens (e.g. Coopers 2006 as in Denham 2010), 
indeed the public does not appear to express strong preference for using Google 
search as an online platform for sending its messages and the numbers of reader 
comments collected for analysis suggest rather unsystematic and inactive attention 
to both issues. This might be due to netizens’ tendency to react to and engage in 
specific events and stories (as Coopers 2006 finds) rather than giving attention to 
broader issues such as violent crime, though this thesis finds that the public’s 
overall attention to violent crime remains greater than to economic diversification 
as this correlates with a degree of perceived social sensitivity. 
Furthermore, this thesis seeks to refine some of agenda-setting theories. 
First, as the thesis finds, media’s role generally appears to be rather inactive, i.e. 
largely serving as an intermediary platform for other key actors, e.g. the public in 
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the violent crime case and the private sector as related to economic diversification, 
to transmit their agenda-setting messages to other players, primarily government 
agencies. Interestingly, this validates some of the recent theories of agenda-
building, where media is viewed as a passive actor whose agenda is shaped, or built, 
in the process of an “ongoing negotiation between media personnel and their 
sources of information” (as in Denham 2010, p. 311)29 ; similarly, Wanta and 
Kalyango 2007 find US media coverage being influenced by presidential emphasis 
of terrorism issues across African nations. This thesis finds that with regard to 
economic diversification the key source of information, as perceived by media, is 
academia in the Canadian case (see media perception in Table 10) and the private 
sector and industry (often in partnership with government) in Australian context 
(Table 11), while regarding violent crime it is the public in both country cases, 
including NGOs, communities and public opinion (tables 18, 19). Furthermore, it 
is vital to clearly differentiate between agenda co-building, i.e. as what appears to 
be the case in Denham 2010 and what this thesis finds with regard to the case of 
economic diversification policy where media jointly constructs stories with major 
sources from the private sector and government agencies (this is a plausible claim 
given the technical nature of the policy issue), and pre-built, or pre-fabricated 
agenda-setting, where there is little time for media to build the agenda for itself but 
whose agenda is rather set (or pre-built) often driven by a combination of a high-
profile event (mass murder, gun shooting, rapid spread of disease etc.) and public 
                                               
29 Not to be confused with the notion of intermedia agenda building that Denham 2010 refers to as 
phenomena where media builds agenda for themselves (which might be valid but remains outside 
the scope of the thesis). 
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opinion and perceptions when press staff would only have a few hours to grasp the 
sentiments of reader comments to related events before writing their own story. 
Again, this thesis endorses support to the latter as related to violent crime discourse. 
The second theory that requires re-assessment in light of thesis findings is 
the classical notion of political contestation based on the need to define the scope 
of conflict among key actors (Schattschneider 1960). Specifically, this thesis finds 
that while the notion of conflict-driven contestation among actors generally remains 
valid, the notion of partnership is increasingly emphasized across Canadian and 
Australian cases as applied to both violent crime and diversification policy 
discourse, more so in the Australian setting where it appears to have been adopted 
to a greater extent than in Canadian context. Thus, the emerging notion of a 
partnership-driven agenda setting process, whereby a key actor (the government in 
the case of this research) strategically attempts to set mutually reinforcing and 
dependent ties with another powerful actor, e.g. the private sector in the case of 
economic diversification policy in Australian context, is context specific and 
should become a fruitful area for further scholarly attention. 
As a final note, the above described notion of partnership agenda-setting 
appears somewhat similar to the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) as developed 
by Sabatier (1988). Both rely on extended periods of analysis, i.e. Sabatier 1988 
calls for the need to embrace a decade or more to fully observe a cycle in policy 
change, and the new notion of partnership agenda-setting is similarly based on 8-
year time frame. Furthermore, both theoretical notions analyze a set of actors and 
their interactions in setting policy agendas with an explicit need to cooperate in 
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order to effectively achieve policy goals and to withstand the pressure from other 
actors or coalitions. Yet, there are key differences. First and foremost, Sabatier’s 
(1988) ACF is not specifically grounded in agenda-setting but apart from its initial 
focus on problem perception and changes in elite and public opinion (elements 
attributable to agenda-setting), it then continues to emphasize the stages that follow 
in “…an iterative process of policy formulation, problematic implementation, and 
struggles over reformulation” (p. 130). The partnership-driven notion is specifically 
grounded in the agenda-setting stage, or agenda-building (Denham 2010) as 
contrasted to Schattschneider’s notion of conflict-driven contestation in an actor-
centric context. Second, Sabatier’s framework is still based on the assumption of 
“intense conflict” (p. 133) that ‘policy brokers’ attempt to minimize in the context 
of conflicting tactics and strategies “from various coalitions” (idid). On the other 
hand, the notion of partnership agenda-setting assumes the near-monopoly position 
the ‘partners’ (or a single coalition) enjoy, e.g. attributed to the partner cooperation 
between Australia-based private sector and government agencies as applied to 
economic diversification policy (see Table 11 for a summary). This is in stark 
contrast to government resilience (observed more in Canada-based violent crime 
context than related to economic diversification and the Australian case), which is 
largely embedded both in Sabatier’s (1988) ACF and more narrowly in Heclo’s 
(1974) notion of ‘iron triangles’ (as in Sabatier 1988). 
 
Chapter 7. Conclusion 
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The thesis, hopefully, leads to a number of relevant findings. First, it 
contributes to ongoing academic debates around the key question of who sets the 
agenda for various policy issues. Specifically, it generally supports the existing 
agenda-setting literature that the public remains an important actor, in this case 
related to violent crime policy, while academia is found to play a key role in 
Canadian economic diversification policy context and the private sector in the 
Australian case. However, contrary to much of traditional media agenda-setting 
research (e.g. McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar and Simon 1993; Wood and 
Peake 1998) that emphasize media as a key actor to set public agendas, this thesis 
reinforces the notion of agenda-building theory (originally Cobb and Elder 1972, 
1983; and Denham 2010), specifically as applied to diversification policy in 
Canadian context whereby media is involved in an ongoing process along with 
other more powerful sources to jointly build the agenda for other media outlets. 
Furthermore, media is found to be rather inactive with regard to pushing the policy 
agenda on violent crime discourse, instead serving as an intermediary platform for 
other key actors to transmit their messages to the government. Second, the thesis 
attempts to refine some of the existing agenda-setting theories, i.e. 
Schattschneider’s (1960) notion of contestation, and Denham 2010 agenda-
building framework, while also contrasting against Sabatier’s (1988) ACF. 
Next, it is important to point to certain limitations of the thesis. First, both 
Canada and Australia are energy-rich Anglo-Saxon democracies. Thus the findings 
from this research may not be immediately generalizable to the broader context that 
includes other Anglo-Saxon nations such as the US, UK and New Zealand, let alone 
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other western democracies, e.g. Continental Europe. Further studies should take a 
step further to test whether the key findings and observations of this research remain 
valid in the broader context of Anglo-Saxon democracies, specifically related to 
violent crime policy, or in the context of comparative analysis of other energy-rich 
nations, e.g. Norway, Brazil specifically with regard to economic diversification. 
Further yet, the energy-rich nations could be divided into developed democracies 
(e.g. Canada, Australia, Norway) and emerging economies (e.g. Brazil, Russia). 
Second, the thesis is limited to analyzing two issues, thus further scholarly attention 
may encompass a wider range of issues. 
Certain limitations notwithstanding, the thesis suggests the tentative 
applicability of an emerging partnership-driven agenda-setting framework in 
Australian context. Since the thesis only focuses on two issues, further research 
should try to test the validity of the partnership framework in the context of actor-
centric agenda-setting as applied to other issues across jurisdictions. Thus, while 
seeking to refine some of the actor-centric agenda-setting theories as analyzed 
above (Schattschneider 1960; Sabatier 1988; Denham 2010), the thesis further 
supports the validity of uni-, bi- and multi-directional links observed in agenda-
setting interactions among various players, as increasingly employed in academic 
research (e.g. Neuman 2014). 
All the above mentioned analysis points to a number of policy implications. 
First, knowing what actor actually sets the agenda for a specific policy issue allows 
government decision makers and the society to arrange a more efficient policy 
design. If academia plays a vital role in setting the agenda on diversification policy 
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in Canadian context, then the federal government should direct its budget, human 
and organizational resources to facilitate academia’s interests through research 
grants and joint programs, as opposed to organizing additional media campaigns or 
public hearings (with NGOs involved). Since the public is found to drive policy 
agenda on violent crime across both nations, the government is better accommodate 
public interest by organizing various hearings, (mediatized) seminars and round 
tables with NGOs and active citizens, fund NGO-led projects aimed at providing 
shelters to victims of abuse etc. The second policy implication stems from the two 
opposing notions of partnership-driven agenda-setting (in the Australian case) and 
government resilience (in a Canadian setting). While the notion of ‘who sets the 
agenda’ suggests what an ideal policy design should be in terms of accommodating 
the most vital actor’s interest, the notions of partnership agenda and government 
resilience are important as these help identify the likelihood that this ideal policy 
design is indeed adopted. If a government demonstrates a pro-partnership stance 
(as is the case in Australian context), then this environment is more favorable to 
adopting this policy design whereby the government is likely to be interested in 
building strategic partnership with another powerful agenda setter. If, on the other 
hand, the government demonstrates resilience toward external pressure (the case of 
the Harper cabinet in Canada), then it becomes less plausible for this government 
to adopt the ideal design and instead continue to play the policy game in isolation. 
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